Environmental justice and public participation :a case study of nuclear waste managment and policy in Taiwan by Huang, Gillan Chi-Lun
 i 
UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE  
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
SCHOOL OF GEOGRAPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION:  
A CASE STUDY OF NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT AND POLICY IN 
TAIWAN  
 
 
 
GILLAN CHI-LUN HUANG 
 
 
 
 
THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE 
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHLOSOPHY IN THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES 
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES SCHOOL OF GEOGRAPHY, POLITICS AND 
SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE 
 
9  OCTOBER 2012 
 
 
 
 ii 
Abstract 
 
The politics and management of nuclear waste has always been a controversial issue. 
This research critically assesses the management and politics of nuclear waste in Taiwan 
using an environmental justice approach.  
 
This research comprises three parts: first, the nature of radioactive waste; second, the 
theory of environmental justice; and third, the case study of nuclear waste siting policy 
in Taiwan. In the first part, background information is provided to understand what 
nuclear waste is; how it has been managed in different countries; and the difficulties and 
uncertainties of nuclear waste management.  
 
In the second part of this research, the idea of environmental justice is employed as a 
theoretical framework to interpret nuclear waste policy and the policy process in Taiwan. 
Environmental justice is derived from the environmental justice movement in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Environmental justice issues are two-fold: distributive justice 
refers to the distribution of environmental risks among different communities, and 
procedural justice refers to the access of citizens to decision-making processes that 
affect their environment. 
 
Finally, the case study of nuclear waste management and politics in Taiwan serves as the 
third part of this project. Through the lens of principles of environmental justice, the 
historical development of nuclear waste in Taiwan is examined. The process and 
progress of protracted attempts to site a new nuclear waste repository in Taiwan is 
investigated in considerable detail by conducting interviews with government officials, 
NGOs, and members of local communities. Particular attention was paid to the 
decision-making process and to the involvement of minority and low income 
 iii 
communities in that process.  
  
The overall purpose of this project is to determine how far the ideas and principles of 
environmental justice have informed the nuclear waste management policies of Taiwan. 
By examining how consistent nuclear waste management in Taiwan complies with the 
idea of environmental justice, this project contributes to the growing literature on an 
urgent policy issue, and helps members of local communities, government officials and 
politicians to develop a greater awareness of the problems and issues of nuclear waste. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The politics and management of nuclear waste has always been a controversial issue 
because nuclear waste is an on-going problem. Up to 2008, there were 440 reactors in 
47 countries which made the total amount of nuclear waste accumulated since nuclear 
power generation started 30,260,371 square metres.  Currently, there are about 200,000 
square metres of low and intermediate level radioactive waste, and about 10,000 square 
metres of high level waste being produced worldwide by nuclear power generation 
facilities each year (IAEA. Managing Radioactive Waste Fact Sheet). Managing nuclear 
waste is a controversial issue. Many countries in the world have not yet found a 
permanent repository for their nuclear waste because of strong opposition from local 
communities. This thesis focuses on the opposition from several local communities in 
Taiwan to proposals from the government to site a permanent repository in one of them. 
It found that the opposition was not based on nimbyism (‘not in my backyard’ism) but 
on principle, and it makes use of the theory of environmental justice to analyse the 
nature of that principle. 
 
This introductory chapter discusses why the nuclear waste issue is so controversial; how 
it is traditionally managed; the case study of Taiwan; the methodology employed in the 
research; and the content of the remaining seven chapters of the thesis.     
 
1.2 Why is nuclear waste such a controversial issue?   
 
Nuclear waste is controversial partly because of public anxiety. The general public’s 
fear about nuclear waste is about radiation, which can cause serious health problems to 
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human beings. The short-term effect of an acute dose of radiation is radiation sickness, 
causing nausea, vomiting, dizziness, and intense headache. Long-term effects of chronic 
exposure can cause cancer, reproductive failure, birth defect, genetic defect, and death 
(Openshaw et al. 1989: 8). Public anxiety is well-founded in the sense that the half-life 
of some radioactive substances could extend over thousands of years. Moreover, it is 
compounded by the myriad of arguments made by researchers, media, nuclear industries, 
government spokespersons and environmental groups about the safety of radioactive 
waste, which are often contradictory. It seems there is no accurate information that the 
general public can believe. Moreover,  when nuclear accidents such as Three Mile 
Island in the US, Chernobyl in the former USSR, and Fukushima in Japan occur, though 
they were not directly related to nuclear waste, these incidents have a have significant 
impact on public concern about the risk of nuclear energy and its consequent problems. 
Indeed, people are becoming aware that no absolute level of safety and security can be 
guaranteed by the management of nuclear waste and nuclear energy, despite the 
increasingly strict safety measures enforced both inside and outside radioactive waste 
repositories and nuclear facilities.   
 
1.3 Management of nuclear waste 
 
Since nuclear waste is a controversial issue, the management of nuclear waste has 
become a very important problem for countries which use nuclear energy. The most 
common method employed for the long-term management of nuclear waste is 
geological disposal. But because of the fear of nuclear waste, siting a nuclear waste 
repository is not an easy task for a country. Disposal of radioactive waste typically 
involves placing it in a repository to insulate it from any disturbance and prevent the 
escape of any waste material for hundreds, thousands or millions years. Safety of the 
disposal facilities can be achieved by placing conditioned radioactive waste in a suitable 
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natural environmental with disposal facilities. The facilities comprise the natural 
geological barrier provided by the host rock of the site together with an engineered 
barrier system such as a  waste matrix, a container, the over-pack, buffer or backfill to 
a repository wall, and wall linings (Ojovan and Lee 2005: 130, 270, and 271). 
 
The normal practice is that short-lived low level waste (LLW) and short-lived 
intermediate level waste (ILW) are given shallow disposal (near-surface disposal), while 
high level waste (HLW), long-lived LLW and long-lived ILW, are given deep disposal. 
Near-surface disposal in shallow trenches or engineered structures is for waste that will 
decay to harmless levels over a period of 200-300 years (Bayliss and Langley 2003: 8). 
The design of these facilities provides a multiple barrier system to prevent the waste 
returning to its radioactivity and to allow the monitoring of any activity over the time 
frame (Bayliss and Langley 2003: 8). Examples of shallow disposal of short-lived LLW 
and ILW can be found at Drigg (West Cumbria) in the UK, Centre de’Aube and Centre 
de la Manche in France, Rokkasho-Mura in Japan, and El Cabril in Spain (Bayliss and 
Langley 2003: 8). Some countries have not adopted the shallow disposal idea, but stored 
nuclear waste in somewhat deeper underground facilities. For example, facilities which 
to a depth of 100-500 metres in hard rock or underground salt domes host LLW and 
short-lived ILW are found in Olliluoto and Loiviisa in Finland, Forsmark in Sweden, 
Morseleben in Germany, Himdalen in Norway, and Wellenburg in Switzerland (Bayliss 
and Langley 2003: 8). Even deeper disposal of long-lived waste (i.e., depths of >500 
metres) is intended to reduce the risk of any return of radioniclides to the environment. 
In such sites, natural and engineered barriers also help to prevent radioactive discharge. 
Examples of very deep waste disposal sites are Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in 
New Mexico, Yucca Mountain in Nevada in USA, and Gorleben in Germany (Bayliss 
and Langley 2003: 8). Siting a repository for nuclear waste is, however, not easy for 
many countries, as we see in chapter 2, where the experiences from four countries will 
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be discussed. 
 
1.4. Case study of Taiwan 
 
The case study of the present thesis is the politics of nuclear waste in Taiwan, which is 
pervaded by the idea of the environmental justice. The time frame of this research 
started in the 1980s when environmental groups discovered that Taipower had dumped 
nuclear waste in Lan Yu. As the study of the politics of nuclear waste in Taiwan has 
been relatively rare, especially in the English language, this research helps to fill a 
general gap. It also provides an insight into how local opponents of nuclear waste 
constructed their opposition and the experiences they encountered in the 
decision-making process. In particular, the research is designed to improve our 
understanding of the values, beliefs, motives and discourses of opponents of nuclear 
waste storage sites in Da-Ren(達仁鄉), Taitung(台東縣) and Wang-An(望安鄉) in 
Penghu (澎湖縣)in Taiwan. Finally, this study will help to examine the usefulness of 
ideas of environmental justice as a way of interpreting oppositional perspectives. 
 
Three features of this case study indicate its originality. First, it provides a picture of the 
development of nuclear waste policy in Taiwan during the last 30 years – a picture that 
has not been provided before. Second, it studies the issue of nuclear waste storage sites 
at a particularly propitious time. In March 2009, the government announced two 
potential sites for hosting nuclear waste in Taiwan - Taitung and Penghu. This 
announcement provided a unique opportunity to undertake qualitative interviews with 
local people in these two candidate sites to understand local opposition to nuclear waste 
in Taiwan and, in particular, to explore how local opponents conceptualized and 
constructed their opposition. The data gathered from interviews will be analysed in the 
context of environmental justice in order to examine the usefulness of ideas of 
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environmental justice as a way of interpreting the oppositional perspective. Third, 
because over 90% of the population of one of the case study communities is made up of 
an indigenous people, , this research can connect with indigenous Indian communities 
in Native America as well as other indigenous people elsewhere in the world on the 
issue of siting nuclear waste repository.  
 
1.5. Research Questions 
  
The aim of this research is to critically assess the management and politics of nuclear 
waste in Taiwan using an environmental justice approach. Firstly, this research looks 
into the history of nuclear waste management to see if the past politics of nuclear waste 
policy in Taiwan reflected an idea of environmental justice. Secondly, by looking into 
the current siting process of a nuclear waste repository in Taiwan, this research explores 
how the latest controversy over siting reflects the ideas and principles of environmental 
justice. Thirdly, this research hopes to provide suggestions about what could be done to 
improve the extent of environmental justice in the siting of the nuclear waste repository 
in Taiwan.   
 
1.6. Methodology 
 
To understand the nuclear waste situation in Taiwan, this research conducted two sets of 
qualitative interviews. The first set of interviews was carried out in December 2003 and 
January 2004, with government officials, anti-nuclear campaigners from Lan Yu (Orchid 
Island) (蘭嶼鄉) and Da-Wu (大武鄉), and members of environmental NGO such as 
Taiwan Environmental Protection Union. The second set of interviews was carried out 
in September and October 2009 in order to understand the opposition to nuclear waste 
in Da-Ren and Wang-An, focusing on local people’s experiences of the siting process. 
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The long gap between these two sets of interviews was because of the protracted nature 
of the policy development in Taiwan for siting nuclear waste repository.  Before 2006, 
there was no legal basis for siting a new nuclear waste repository in Taiwan. Since 2002, 
government and legislators started to discuss and drafted the ‘Act on Sites for the 
Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Facility’. This Act was 
not enacted until April 2006. The details of the policy process will be discussed in 
chapter five. . 
 
 For the 12 interviews carried out in 2003 and 2004, interviewees were identified from 
newspapers, magazines, and websites, and contacted by emails and telephone to confirm 
the date and time for the interview. The interviewees included 2 government officials (at 
the same time) from the Fuel  Circle and Material Administration, 7 anti-nuclear waste 
campaigners from Lan Yu(蘭嶼), 1 anti-nuclear waste campaigner from Da-Wu (大武), 
and 3  members of Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU). Government 
officials were asked to view the interview questions before the interviews, because I 
suspected that otherwise they might not want to provide any information which would 
not be in the government’s favour. 4 interviews were conducted face to face in Taipei 
(台北), 6 in Lan Yu (蘭嶼), and 2 in Taitung (台東). Most interviewees agreed to allow 
their affiliations and  names to be revealed, but two interviewees from Lan Yu asked to 
keep their details anonymous. Interviews lasted between one and two hours and the 
language used in the interviews was mandarin. Government officials were contacted 
after the interviews as they requested to see the transcription.  
 
For the interviews conducted in 2009, news about nuclear waste siting published in 
newspapers and websites was searched for in order to identify potential interviewees 
who were the key players in the campaign against nuclear waste storage in the two areas 
before the interviews. Those key players in Da-Ren and Wang-An were contacted by 
 7 
telephone or email to explain to them the purpose of the research and to request 
interviews from them. Several interviewees asked to see the interview questions before 
the interviews. I also used interviews as a snowballing method to get more opponents of 
nuclear waste to talk about their feelings and experiences about the siting process, 
asking interviewees to recommend people they knew were keen to talk about the issue 
of nuclear waste. This method was very helpful in increasing the interview numbers as 
well as locating some key players who had not been identified by the media. Two 
interviewees who did not live in Taitung and Penghu were also interviewed, because 
they were longstanding environmental campaigners against nuclear waste, and could 
offer a different perspective from the local campaigners. During September and October 
2009, a total of 32 interviews were carried out by telephone. Because Wang-An and 
Da-Ren are in relatively remote areas in Taiwan, face-to-face interviews would have 
been very costly in terms of money and travelling time. The interviewees included 
members of local communities, members of local environmental groups, local village 
leaders, local county councillors, environmental lawyers, and a local geologist.  
 
In Wang-An, the opposition to nuclear waste were led by local villagers, and these 
leaders were interviewed. In Da-Ren, where Christianity was the main religion in the 
local communities, local campaigns were led by the Paiwan (排灣) Anti-Nuclear Waste 
Union which was established by priests from Paiwai Presby of the Presbyterian Church 
in Taiwan. Also, the Taitung Branch of Taiwan Environmental Protection Union played 
a very important role in Taitung areas. Members of both of these groups were 
interviewed during September and October 2009. The number of interviewees from the 
Taitung area was 25, of whom 11 belonged to the aboriginal Paiwan tribe, while in 
Penghu, the number of interviewees was 7, all of whom were either local residents or 
people from the Wang-An area (see Appendix for the list of interviewees). The reason 
that Da-Ren has more inteviewees than Wang-An was because the population who live 
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in Wang- An are less than in Da-Ren. Most locals in Wang-An moved out in search for 
work. 
 
All interviewees were kept anonymous on the list in the appendix (See Appendix I) in 
order to protect their identities. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and one hour, and 
were semi-structured in form. The main objective of the interviews was to explore how 
respondents perceived the prospect of hosting nuclear waste, and what their perceptions 
were of the decision-making procedures, including the holding of referendums. 
Moreover, the interview questions were designed to look at themes of environmental 
justice, both distributive and procedural, including the issue of compensation. All the 
interviews were conducted and recorded in Taiwanese or mandarin Chinese; transcribed 
in full in mandarin Chinese; then translated into English in order to provide quotations 
for the thesis. 
 
Generally, the interviewees could comprehend the interview questions during the 
telephone dialogue, but without face-to-face contact, it was not easy for me to 
understand the emotions of the interviewees. The degree of willingness and openness of 
interviewees varied: some interviewees from local indigenous communities in Da-Ren 
questioned the purpose of the interviews, making it clear that they did not want to be 
interviewed by anyone who represented Taipower or the government. After I explained 
the purpose of the research to them, and assured them that their identities would always 
be anonymous, they were willing to be interviewed. Indeed, interviewees were generally 
eager to talk about their experience, which might be because they felt that their voices 
had been neglected by the authorities in the siting process and they would like other 
people to listen to them.  
 
However, neither set of the interviewees included officials from Taiwan Power 
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Company Co. Ltd1. (Taipower). This is because of lack of access. Officials from 
Taipower were contacted, but no one was willing to be interviewed. This suggested a 
closed attitude on the part of Taipower. Evidence has shown that Taipower see nuclear 
waste as a matter to be kept secret because nuclear waste is a very controversial and 
sensitive issue. Another characteristic of Taipower was lack of information, both about 
nuclear waste and the policy process of nuclear waste management. Members of local 
communities often claimed that Taipower did not provide them with accurate 
information about nuclear waste and they had no access to Taipower about the policy 
process of nuclear waste management. In addition, Taipower has been accused of often 
bribing local political elites in exchange for their support for accepting nuclear waste. 
Details of Taipower’s behaviour can be found in Chapter 5 on the previous siting for a 
nuclear waste repository in the 1980s, and in Chapter 7 for the later siting for a nuclear 
waste repository in Taiwan in 2009. 
 
1.6.1. Data Analysis 
 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed in full. The transcripts were read carefully 
several times, because transcribing interviews and translating the results into different 
languages is not easy. In order to identify the main themes in the context of 
environmental justice, words and phrases were directly translated. For example, 
interviewees rarely mentioned the words justice and injustice (正義 Zeng-Yi; 不正義
Bu Zeng Yi). Instead, many interviewees mentioned the words fairness and unfairness 
(公平 Gong-Ping; 不公平 Bu Gong-Ping). In the transcripts, the latter terms were 
faithfully reproduced. 
                                                 
1
 Taiwan Power Co. Ltd (Taipower) is a state-owned company which is under the management of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. All nuclear power stations in Taiwan are administrated by Taipower. Hence, 
Taipower is the biggest producer of nuclear waste in Taiwan. 
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In the data analysis, the main themes of environmental justice were searched for and 
divided into distributive and procedural perspectives. Interviewees’ feelings implicit in 
expressions such as ‘why choose us as a candidate site?’ were analysed as part of the 
distributive environmental justice discourse, in which the feeling of unfairness about 
carrying a disproportionate health risk by hosting nuclear waste while other parts of the 
country benefitted disproportionately from electricity which nuclear power generated, 
was explored. Issues of compensation and generational justice were also analysed using 
the distributive environmental justice framework 
 
The procedural environmental justice framework was also a core element in the data 
analysis process of themes raised in the interviews - such themes as the transparency of 
the government and Taipower; Taipower’s attitudes and strategies to engage local 
communities; the form of public consultation; and issues about the scale of referendums. 
Also, the interview data was used to test whether behind these perceptions of 
distributive and procedural injustices in the nuclear waste decision making process lay 
more general senses of injustice such as economic injustice, political injustice, and 
cultural injustice. For example, economic injustice was identified by interviewees in the 
way that Taipower and government officials exploited local poverty by offering 
compensation; political injustice was identified in the interviewee’s criticism of the 
absence of proper public consultation; and cultural injustice was identified in the 
experiences of most aboriginal interviewees encountered in Da-Ren, who complained 
that government officials did not respect their culture in the siting process.  
 
1.7. Chapter outline 
 
Chapter two is about the politics of nuclear waste management. The aim of this chapter 
is to offer background ideas about the politics of nuclear waste management from 
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experiences in several different countries. The chapter starts from the different 
management options of nuclear waste management which have been implemented in 
different countries. The experience of how these countries developed their strategies on 
nuclear waste siting will also be discussed in this chapter. Next, this chapter will discuss 
different aspects of uncertainty in the politics of nuclear waste management which make 
the issue of nuclear waste very difficult to find a solution to deal with. The chapter also 
includes a literature review of the issue of nuclear waste management and 
environmental justice from previous researches. The final part of this chapter will 
discuss the published literature on the politics of nuclear waste, including studies of 
opposition groups and analyses of environmental justice 
 
Chapter three will look at environmental justice and issues of nuclear waste in the 
context of environmental justice. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part 
covers notions of environmental justice, looking at social justice theories and theories of 
environmental justice that are racial, procedural, and distributive, to establish a 
framework of environmental justice. In the second part of the chapter, the 
environmental justice framework will be discussed in relation to nuclear waste.  The 
environmental justice of nuclear waste management also includes more general justice 
issues, and economic, political, and cultural justice will therefore be discussed in this 
part of the chapter.  The last part of the chapter is about the environmental justice 
implications of the opposition to nuclear waste.  
 
In Chapter four, the thesis begins to examine the case study in Taiwan. However, we 
cannot discuss the politics of nuclear waste in Taiwan without understanding the politics 
of Taiwan. The overall political, social and economic situation in Taiwan will be 
discussed from 1624 to the present. The general political situation in Taiwan, political 
economy, foreign relations, and democratization will be discussed in order to give a 
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picture about politics and society in Taiwan.   
 
Chapter five is about the political history of nuclear waste policy development in 
Taiwan, focusing on the dumping of nuclear waste by the Taiwanese government on an 
indigenous people’s island during 1982-1996. Chapter five will also examine the 
decision-making process and the response from the local communities, how the local 
communities were affected by dumping nuclear waste in their homeland, and how these 
communities negotiated with government.  
 
Chapter six is about understanding current opposition in the case study communities 
which have been most recently affected by the siting process. This chapter is based on 
the second set of interviews which I conducted in September and October 2009. Taiwan. 
In April 2009, the development of nuclear waste policy in Taiwan reached a new stage, 
when two new potential sites were nominated by the government of Taiwan. This 
chapter provides background information about the siting criteria and siting process in 
Taiwan which led to the decision of these two potential sites being made in April 2009. 
It also provided information about the geological, demographic, and socio-economic 
situation of these two communities in order to analyse the siting process in the context 
of environmental justice. 
 
Chapter seven discusses the results of the case study, using qualitative data gathered 
from interviews to examine the decision-making process of siting new nuclear waste 
repositories in Taiwan. The whole siting process is analysed to see how well the policy 
and management of nuclear waste in Taiwan complies with the idea of environmental 
justice as well as economic, political, and cultural justice. The main concern of this 
chapter is how local communities feel about the environmental justice in the siting of 
new repositories of nuclear waste in Taiwan. 
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Chapter eight, the final chapter of this thesis, has three objectives.  Firstly, it discusses 
the importance of this research based on the evidence provided in the previous chapters. 
Secondly, the chapter will endorse the value of using environmental justice as a 
framework in the analysis of nuclear waste management policy. Finally, this chapter will 
show how lessons on the environmental justice of nuclear waste management and 
policy can be learnt from the experience of policy makers in Taiwan and other countries  
 
1.8.Conclusion 
 
This thesis is an investigation into the environmental justice of nuclear waste policy in 
Taiwan. It focuses on two cases – Taitung and Penghu – to tease out the environmental 
justice perspectives of the oppositional groups in these two communities. In doing so, 
the thesis not only contributes to our understanding of the politics of nuclear waste 
management in Taiwan, but also offers an insight into the way in which the concept of 
environmental justice can articulate the reasons for local opposition to nuclear waste site 
proposals. One such insight is that behind the interviewees’ perceptions of 
environmental injustices (both distributive and procedural) lay wider perceptions of 
economic, political, and cultural injustice. 
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Chapter 2. Nuclear Waste Disposal  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The disposal of nuclear waste during the last 65 years has presented the world’s nuclear 
powers with a growing problem. Its development in power generation, arms, medical 
and industrial applications have all led to an increasing concern over how to dispose of 
the radioactive waste produced. The National Safety Council of the USA has identified 
different kinds of nuclear waste in the form of gases, liquids and solids, all with their 
own specific disposal problems; different sources of nuclear waste from isotopes to 
equipment contaminated as a secondary result of manufacture or use during processes 
utilising radioactivity; and different levels of radioactivity - very low (VLLW), low 
(LLW), intermediate (ILW), and high (HLW).  
 
By far the biggest nuclear waste disposal problem is that posed by the nuclear power 
generation industry. The International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed that 
30,260,371 square metres of nuclear waste have been generated since nuclear power 
generation started and there are now 200,000 square metres of low and intermediate 
level radioactive waste, and about 10,000 square metres of high level waste being 
produced worldwide each year (IAEA. Managing Radioactive Waste Fact Sheet). In 
Taiwan, huge amounts of waste have accumulated: 232,460 barrels (26,681 are HLW 
and ILW, 205,779 are LLW) of nuclear waste since the first nuclear power station began 
to operate in 1978. This chapter defines radioactive waste; discusses the different types 
of radiation and how dangerous they are to human beings; explains the specific health 
risks of radioactive waste and the management of those risks; rehearses the experiences 
of some countries in dealing with this controversial issue; discusses the published 
literature on the politics of nuclear waste, including studies of opposition groups and 
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analyses of environmental justice; and investigates the particular characteristics of 
radioactive waste that make dealing with it so problematic. 
 
Table 2.1. Total amount of nuclear waste in Taiwan until 2008 
Type of Waste LLW HLW and ILW Total 
Amount (barrels) 205779 26.681 232,460 
Sources: Republic of China (Taiwan). Fuel Circle and Material Administration, FAMA.  
 
2.2 Nuclear waste 
 
2.2.1 Nuclear fuel cycle 
 
Radioactive waste is the main source of radioactivity, and it is produced in three ways: 
from mining, enriching, and reprocessing. There are five main stages in the civil nuclear 
fuel circle, as shown in Table 2.2. In the first stage, uranium mining, uranium is 
extracted from sandstone, shale and rocks. Experts calculate that only five pounds of 
uranium can be extracted from each ton, and so the mining of uranium creates a huge 
amount of liquid and solid waste such as radium and thorium which contain long-lived 
radionuclides (Blowers et al 1991:8). Furthermore, mill tailings in the mining site may 
be dispersed off-site by wind and rain and cause additional hazards to the environment 
and people. The second and third stages - fuel enrichment and fuel manufacture - create 
minor quantities of waste. The fourth stage, electricity production by the nuclear reactor, 
is the major source of radioactive waste in the nuclear fuel circle. This stage creates 
large volumes of waste which are highly radioactive including spent fuel, intermediate 
level solid wastes and low level liquid and solid waste. In the fifth stage, reprocessing of 
the spent fuel generates large amounts of hot liquid radioactive waste and large volumes 
of solid waste. Moreover, after the nuclear fuel circle is finished, the level of 
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radioactivity has not stopped increasing, because after nuclear power plants are closed, a 
large amount of nuclear waste will be caused by the process of decommissioning 
(Blowers and Elliot 2003: 106). 
 
Reprocessing is a form of chemical processing or recycling of spent fuel. Originally, 
reprocessing developed to recover uranium and plutonium for nuclear fuel (Blowers and 
Elliot 2003: 1076). Russia, USA, Pakistan, the UK, and France are the countries in the 
world which reprocess spent fuel for commercial use of nuclear substance. The clients 
of UK and French reprocessing plants include Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and 
Japan. As the last section has mentioned, spent fuel has been categorised as HLW, and 
reprocessing releases large volumes of nuclear waste in solid, liquid and gaseous forms. 
According to a European Parliament report, 80 per cent of nuclear waste in France 
results from reprocessing and 90 per cent of nuclide emissions and discharges in the UK 
result from reprocessing activities (European Parliament 2001: 34 and 59). 
 
Reprocessing has become a highly controversial issue. It began during the 1950s 
because raw materials for nuclear power were not as easily available as now, and 
reprocessing was an option to supply raw material for both nuclear weapon and nuclear 
power generation. But now, commercially, the cost of new uranium ore is cheaper than 
reprocessing and the previous reprocessing and decommission of nuclear weapons had 
accumulated enough plutonium for civic nuclear power. Worries about environmental 
risks from the large volume of nuclear waste generated by reprocessing led many 
environmental NGOs and local communities to request the shutting down of 
reprocessing plants. However, both UK and France are tied into many international 
commercial contracts to reprocess spent fuel, and it is not easy for them to withdraw 
from these contracts quickly.  
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Table 2.2. Nuclear Fuel Circle 
  
 
Source: Blowers and Elliot 2003: 112 
 
2.2.2 Classification of radioactive waste 
 
Nuclear waste can be broken down into four accepted categories as follows: 
 
2.2.2.1 Very Low Level Waste (VLLW) 
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This is waste with an extremely low level of radiation, arising from a variety of sources 
including medical and industrial processes. The UK Department of Trade and Industry 
has stated that VLLW can be disposed safely directly at landfill site or indirectly after 
incineration (Great Britain. DTI).  
 
2.2.2.2. Low Level Waste (LLW) 
 
This can be identified as lightly contaminated materials, which includes metals, soils, 
building rubble, clothes, paper towels, and laboratory equipment. Decommissioning of 
nuclear power plants will produce large volumes of LLW in the forms of building 
materials and redundant plan (Blowers et al 1991:8). Virtually everything that is used or 
is in contact with radioactive substances eventually ends up as LLW. Though very little 
LLW is considered threatening, some of it will remain radioactive for very long periods 
of time (Openshaw et al 1989: 22). 
 
2.2.2.3. Intermediate Level Waste (ILW)  
 
This is the waste originating from processes which closely relate to energy production 
and reprocessing. It includes fuel cladding, control rods, filters, slugs and resins from 
cooling system (Blowers et al 1991: 10). The major component of ILW is metals and 
organic materials with small quantities of cement, graphite, glass and ceramics (Great 
Britain. DTI). ILW is subdivided into long-lived and short-lived with the division base 
on the half-lives more or less than 30 years. ILW can be extremely radioactive but it is 
more stable than HLW. 
 
2.2.2.4. High Level Waste (HLW)  
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HLW has the greatest concentration of radioactive materials and produces substantial 
quantities of heat. HLW is generated when the uranium and plutonium have been 
removed from spent nuclear rods through the reprocessing process (Blowers and Elliot 
2003: 109). In some countries where spent fuel is not reprocessed, it is classified as 
HLW. The temperature of HLW may rise significantly so it needs to be cooled before 
being stored. HLW is highly dangerous, containing the most radioactivity: 0.1 cubic 
meters of HLW contains 99% radioactivity, by contrast to one cubic meter of ILW 
which contains only 1% of radioactivity, and four cubic meters of LLW which contain 
0.001% of radioactivity (Blowers and Elliot 2003: 109). 
 
2.3 Radiation 
 
Radioactive waste contains radioactivity which is dangerous to health and the key 
problem of management. Radiation is the main concern which brings fear to the public. 
As Lash (1979) stated, ‘Unlike the disposal of any other type of waste, the hazard 
related to radioactive waste is so great that no element of doubt should be allowed to 
exist regarding safety’ (Blowers et al 1991: 8 and Lash 1979)2 In this section, types of 
radiation are discussed; how radiation works is outlined; and what health risks it brings 
are considered. Radiation is the energy transferred by nuclear fission or a similar 
process as particles or waves through space or from one body to another (Blowers et al. 
1991: 2). The reaction inside a nuclear reactor will irradiate non-radioactive materials, 
yielding an ‘activation product’ in the surrounding air, water, pipes and containment 
building, and thereby making them all radioactive. This ‘activation product’ returns 
these media or objects to their normal stable state over time when they release their own 
                                                 
2
 Quote from Blowers, A., Lowry, D., and Solomon, B (1991) International Politics of Nuclear Waste, 
London: Macmillan. originally from Lash, T. (1979) “Radioactive Waste: Nuclear Energy’s Dilemma”, 
Amicus, Vol.1, No.2, Fall 1979, pp 24-34. 
 
 20
radiation. 
 
The rate of radioactive decay of unstable atomic nucleus is measured by ‘half-life’. 
Half–life is the time which an unstable atomic nucleus takes to decay to half its original 
mass. The half-life of plutonium is 24,000 years and that of uranium is billons of years. 
But one half-life does not mean that the radioactive materials are no longer hazardous - 
atoms remain radioactive after one half-life, so it may take several times of a 
substance’s half -life before it becomes not hazardous (USA. National Safety Council 
2002: 3). 
 
We can only prevent radiation from nuclear waste by burying or disposing of 
radioactive substances or by minimising its production in the first place. It is very 
difficult for scientists to conduct empirical experiments to test different types of 
procedures for treating nuclear waste because safety can only be proven after 
repositories for nuclear waste disposal have been constructed and begun to operate, and 
have been monitored over several generations of time.  
 
2.3.1 Measurement of radiation  
 
Generally, a Sievert (Sv) is the unit to measure the effective dose of radiation, normally 
expressed in millisiverts (mSv). 1 mSv=0.001 Sv. In the UK, the average exposure from 
background sources of radiation is around 2.6m Sv per year. Over 1,000m Sv per year 
could cause serious illness such as genetic disorder, increasing the probability of early 
death (Hinchliffe and Blowers 2003: 13).  
 
2.3.2. Types of radiation: 
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Some radioactive substances can be more damaging to living cells than others, and to 
reflect this, radiations are scientifically divided into three types:  
 
2.3.2.1 Alpha  
 
Alpha radiation is the least penetrating but most dangerous form of radiation. It is 
unable to penetrate skin but severe cell damage can occur if an alpha emitter such as 
plutonium enters the human body (Blowers et al. 1991: 2). Alpha radiation must be in 
touch with living tissue to cause harm, and it slows down rapidly when it enters living 
tissue, but it leaves a much larger of quantity of energy than any other type of radiation. 
Alpha radiation is roughly 20 times more effective at causing cell damage than beta or 
gamma radiations. However, Alpha radiation is easier to prevent than the other forms of 
radiation – indeed, it can be stopped by a piece of paper (Blowers et al. 1991: 3).  
 
2.3.2.2 Beta  
 
Beta radiation can cause skin burns (Blowers et al 1991: 3). It is less effective than 
Alpha but it can travel meters in the air and can moderately easily penetrate human skin 
to the "germinal layer," where new skin cells are produced (USA. DOE). If 
beta-emitting contaminants are allowed to remain on the skin for a prolonged period of 
time, they may cause skin injury. Clothing gear provides some protection against most 
beta radiation, while a sheet of aluminium foil can also block it (Radioactive Waste 
Management http:// www.uic.com.au/waste/ht). Turning gear and dry clothing can keep 
beta emitters off of the skin. 
 
2.3.2.3 Gamma  
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Gamma rays usually accompany alpha and beta radiations. Gamma rays are highly 
penetrating - they can travel through several feet of concrete in the walls of a 
containment building. Gamma rays can cause damage to living tissue at several feet of 
distance or more, depending on the intensity of the source. Pocket chamber (pencil) 
dosimeters, film badges, thermo luminescent, and other types of dosimeters can be used 
to measure accumulated exposure to gamma radiation (USA. DOE).   
 
Table 2.3. Radiations 
Source: Blowers et al. 1991: 3  
 
    
2.4 Health risks of nuclear waste  
 
Radiation can cause serious health problem to human beings. The short–term effect of 
an acute dose of radiation is radiation sickness, which causes nausea, vomiting, 
dizziness, and intense headache. The long-term effect of chronic exposure can cause 
cancer, reproductive failure, birth defect, genetic defect, and death (Openshaw et al. 
1989: 14). According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), we are 
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exposed to ionizing radiation from natural sources in two ways: (1) we are surrounded 
by naturally-occurring radioactive elements in the soil and stones, and we are bathed in 
the cosmic rays entering the earth's atmosphere from outer space; and (2) we receive 
internal exposure from radioactive elements which we take into our bodies through food 
and water, and through the air we breathe. In addition, we have radioactive elements 
(Potassium 40, Carbon 14, Radium 226) in our blood or bones. On average, our 
radiation exposure from all natural sources amounts to about 2.4 mSv a year - though 
this figure can vary, depending on the geographical location by several hundred percent. 
In homes and buildings, there are radioactive elements in the air (IAEA. Factsheets & 
FAQs). So we live surrounded by natural radioactive sources, in that there are 
radioactive isotopes in our bodies, houses, air, water, and in the ground. Since radiation 
and radioactive substance are natural and permanently exist in the environment, the risk 
associated with radiation can only be limited, not eliminated entirely. 
 
2.4.1 ‘Deterministic’ and ‘stochastic’ effects 
 
Radiation causes two basic types of harmful effect - ‘deterministic’ effect and 
‘stochastic’ effect. The deterministic effect has a threshold dose, above which the 
frequency and severity of the effect increase with increasing doses (Bayliss and Langley 
2003: 8). The most common examples of deterministic effects are erythematic and hair 
loss. Stochastic effects have a proportional relation to the radiation dose: higher doses 
increase the probability of diseases such as fatal cancers and severe hereditary 
abnormality in offspring. The International Commission on Radiological Protection 
(ICRP) produced quantitative data on such harmful effects, which it calibrated as 
‘health detriment’. In summary, ICRP risk factors show that overall health detriment 
following exposure to low doses of radiation amount to ~7.3×10-2 Sv-1. The risk factor 
for an exposed working population, aged 18-64 years, is slightly less at 5.6×10-2 Sv-1 
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(Bayliss and Langley 2003: 8). 
 
Table 2.4.  ICRP Risk Factor for Stochastic Effects 
Detriment Adult workers Whole Population 
Fatal Cancer  4.0 × 10-2   5.0 × 10-2 
Non fatal Cancer  0.8 × 10-2   1.0 × 10-2 
Severe Hereditary effects   0.8 × 10-2   1.3 × 10-2 
Total  5.6 × 10-2     7.4 × 10-2 
Sources: Bayliss and Langley 2003: 8 
 
Research by ICRP on the acute effects of radiation on humans for a single whole body 
dose is as following: 
At ~ 1 Gy, symptoms of radiation sickness will be apparent, but the patient will almost 
certainly recover (but with an enhanced risk of later stochastic effect); 
at 4Gy, there is a 50 % chance of death; 
at ~8Gy, death will occur within 2 months, due to bone marrow failure; 
at ~ 15Gy, death will occur within 2 weeks, due to gastrointestinal tract failure; and  
at ~40 Gy death will occur within 2 days, due to central nervous system failure (Bayliss 
and Langley 2003: 8). 
 
2.4.2 Safe limits of radiation 
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has set a standard of dose limit to 
protect the human body. For the members of general public this should not exceed 
1mSv in a year - equivalent to a dose to the lens of the eye of 15mSv in a year, and a 
dose to the skin of 50 mSv in a year (IAEA 1996: 91) For workers, occupational 
exposure should not exceed a dose of 20 mSv averaged over five consecutive years or a 
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dose of 50 mSv in any single year - an equivalent dose to the lens of the eye of 150 mSv 
in a year, and to the extremities (hands and feet) or skin of 500 mSv in a year (IAEA 
1996: 92). For apprentices of 16-18years of age who are training for employment 
involving exposure to radiation, and for students of age 16 to 18 who are required to use 
radiation sources in the course of their studies, the occupational exposure should not 
exceed to a dose of 6 mSv in a year, an equivalent dose to the lens of the eye of 50 mSv 
in a year, and to the skin of 150 mSv in a year (IAEA 1996: 92).  
 
2.4.3 Epidemiological evidence 
 
Research has shown a link between doses of radiation received and certain types of 
disease such as cancer and leukaemia. In the UK, Craft et al. (1993) examined the 
incidence of cancer in young people under 25 years of age, and found that the incidence 
of leukaemia near Sellafield nuclear installation was higher than normal. The study 
showed that in Seascale which is 3km south to Sellafield, there were four cases of 
leukaemias while only 0.4 were statistically to be expected .In another village, North 
Egremont, which is 7km north of Sellafield, four cases of leukaemia were discovered 
while only 0.4 case were expected (Craft et al.). Also, a team led by an epidemiologist, 
Martin Gardner, from the University of Southampton, estimated that a dose of 100mSv 
or more received by a father could lead to a six-fold increase of leukaemia in children 
born subsequently (Gardner et al.). Similarly, a research study conducted in 1999 by the 
University of Newcastle found that the exposure of radiation is associated with a greater 
risk of fathering stillborn children (BBC News 1999). In France, the same results were 
obtained in a study of an area of about 10 km around the La Hague nuclear installation 
where there were 3 cases of leukaemia observed while only 0.46 were expected 
(European Parliament 2001: 63). In 2008, a study in Germany funded by German 
Federal Office for Radiation Protection suggested that children under 5 years of age 
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who lived within 5 kilometres of a nuclear power station were 2.19 times as likely to be 
diagnosed with leukaemia as those living outside (Petel et al. c.f. Fleming 2008). In the 
meantime, children under 5 years of age living within 10 kilometres were 33 percent 
more likely to have disease than those living  further away (Petel et al. c.f. Fleming 
2008). 
 
2.4.4. Fear  
 
In addition to the effect of radioactive waste on physical health there is also an effect on 
human emotional or even mental health arising out of the fear which the threat of 
radioactive waste causes to people in certain areas. People’s anxiety about nuclear waste 
is partly because of the health risk that it poses, and partly because of the uncertainty 
generated in their minds by the confusing picture of scaremongering by the media and 
reassurance by the nuclear industry and government. Popular anxiety is compounded by 
the fact that symptoms of illnesses generated by exposure to radiation may not manifest 
themselves for many years after the exposure, and indeed genetic effects may not reveal 
themselves until subsequent generations of children mature.     
 
2.5 Management of nuclear waste 
 
How are these risks to be managed? The key issue in the management of radioactive 
waste is safety, and this is not only about how to achieve safety, but also how to make 
people believe that safety is being achieved.  
 
2.5.1 Principles of nuclear waste management 
 
The objective of radioactive waste management is to deal with radioactive waste in a 
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safe way to protect human health and the environment now and in the future without 
imposing an undue burden on future generations (Ojovan and Lee 2005: 73). In 1995, 
IAEA published a document entitled ‘The Principles of Radioactive Waste 
Management’ as a guide to help countries develop a national regulatory programme on 
radioactive waste. This document stated nine principles as follows:  
Principle 1 Protection of human health 
Radioactive waste shall be managed in such a way as to secure an acceptable 
level of protection for human health. 
Principle 2 Protection of the environment 
Radioactive waste shall be managed in such a way as to provide an acceptable 
level of protection of the environment. 
Principle 3 Protection beyond national borders 
Radioactive waste shall be managed in such a way as to assure that possible 
effects on human health and the environment beyond national borders will be 
taken into account. 
Principle 4 Protection of future generations 
Radioactive waste shall be managed in such a way that predicted impacts on the 
health of future generations will not be greater than relevant levels of impact that 
are acceptable today. 
Principle 5 Burden on future generations 
Radioactive waste shall be managed in such a way that will not impose undue 
burdens on future generations. 
Principle 6 National legal framework 
Radioactive waste shall be managed within an appropriate national legal 
framework including clear allocation of responsibilities and provision for 
independent regulatory functions. 
Principle 7 Control of radioactive waste generation 
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Generation of radioactive waste shall be kept to the minimum practicable. 
Principle 8 Radioactive waste generation and management interdependencies 
Interdependencies among all steps in radioactive waste generation and 
management shall be appropriately taken into account. 
Principle 9 Safety facilities 
The safety of facilities for radioactive waste management shall be appropriately 
assured during their lifetime (IAEA 1995). 
 
The document urged each country where radioactive materials are handled to establish a 
national waste management programme and to ensure continuing communication 
between the regulatory authorities, the operators, and the public, in order to implement 
these nine principles. It is worth noting that Principles 4 and 5 affirm a concept of 
generational justice.  
 
2.5.2 Technical aspects of nuclear waste management  
 
Since nuclear power plants generate nuclear waste at every stage of the nuclear fuel 
circle, waste management must map on to each stage. In 2001, a consultation paper 
published by the UK government stated fourteen ways of managing nuclear waste, 
including above-ground storage, underground disposal, underground storage, 
partitioning and transmutation, disposal at sea, sub-seabed disposal, outer space, 
subduction zones, and ice sheets (Great Britain. DEFRA 2001: 17). Although there is no 
certain way of determining which is the best method to choose for the management of 
nuclear waste, some methods have been forbidden. For example, since 1983, the 
dumping of radioactive waste at sea has been banned by the London Dumping 
Convention. The remaining methods are discussed below. 
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2.5.2.1 Pre-disposal 
    
Predisposal comprises all activities prior to waste disposal. There are six steps or stages 
of predisposal: pre-treatment, treatment, conditioning, immobilisation, transportation, 
and storage (Ojovan and Lee 2005: 126). During the pre-treatment stage, there are four 
activities: collection, segregation, chemical adjustment, and decontamination (Ojovan 
and Lee 2005: 130). First, wastes are collected and are stored for an interim period of 
time. Second, this interim period provides an opportunity to segregate radioactive waste 
according to radiological, chemical and physical properties. Third, chemical adjustment 
facilitates interim storage, transportation and treatment. Fourth, decontamination 
reduces a significant volume of the waste that requires further treatment. At the 
treatment stage, the objectives are to reduce the volume of waste, remove radionuclides 
from the waste, and change the waste’s physical and chemical composition. At the 
conditioning stage, the aim is to transform radioactive waste into a form which is 
suitable for handling, transportation, storage, and disposal. The aim of immobilisation is 
to convert waste into a waste form by solidification, embedding, or encapsulation. A 
common immobilisation method is to solidify low and intermediate level of liquid 
radioactive waste in cement, bitumen, or glass, and to vitrify high level liquid waste in a 
glass matrix or embed it into a metal matrix (Ojovan and Lee 2005: 130). These 
methods include packaging the solidified radioactive waste into steel drums or into 
highly engineered thick-walled containers. Over-packing is also necessary for secondary 
or outer containers for subsequent handling, transportation, storage, or disposal of the 
waste. Transportation of conditioned radioactive waste would additionally use special 
containers or vehicles to journey to the final disposal repositories. Finally, at the storage 
stage, radioactive waste would be maintained in a condition suitable for isolation, 
environmental protection and monitoring. Storage of HLW requires a cooling period to 
alleviate some of the radiogenic heating before geological disposal (Ojovan and Lee 
 30
2005: 130, 270, and 271)3.  
 
2.5.2.2. Disposal   
 
Disposal is the final step in the management of radioactive waste. Disposal of 
radioactive waste means placing radioactive waste in a repository to prevent the escape 
of any waste material for hundreds, thousands or millions of years. This requires a 
system of multiple barriers comprising the natural geological barrier provided by the 
host rock of the site; an engineer barrier system such as the waste matrix; a container; an 
over-pack; a buffer or backfill; and a repository wall and wall linings. These various 
barriers act together to limit the radionuclide release into the environment (Ojovan and 
Lee 2005). The usual practice is that the short-lived LLW and ILW receive shallow 
disposal (near- surface disposal), while HLW, long- lived LLW and, ILW, receive deep 
disposal. Near-surface disposal in shallow trenches or engineered structures is for waste 
which will decay to a harmless level over a period of 200- 300 years (Bayliss and 
Langley 2003: 8). The design of these facilities should provide an adequate multiple 
barrier system to prevent the waste returning to its radioactivity over the timeframe 
(Bayliss and Langley 2003: 8). The design would also allow the monitoring of any 
activity in the local area to give advance warning of any action that needed to be taken. 
The near- surface disposal might be located on the surface or from a few metres to tens 
of metres depth in rocks and boreholes (Ojovan and Lee 2005: 273). Examples of these 
shallow disposal sites for short-lived LLW and ILW can be found in Drigg (West 
Cumbria) in the UK, Centre de’Aube and Centre de la Manche in France, 
                                                 
3
 There is often confusion between ‘storage’ and ‘disposal ’. The distinction between them is that storage means that 
the waste must be retrievable, whereas disposal is intended to be a permanent measure. However, the term 
‘repository’ is often used loosely to imply a place of temporary storage but one that might become permanent because 
the government and the public have not yet reached agreement on the final disposal site of radioactive waste.  
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Rokkasho-Mura in Japan, and El Cabril in Spain (Bayliss and Langley 2003: 8). 
Facilities to a depth of 100- 500 metres in hard rock or underground salt domes to host 
LLW and short-lived ILW can be found in Olliluoto and Loiviisa in Finland, Forsmark 
in Sweden, Morseleben in Germany, Himdalen in Norway, and Wellenburg in 
Switzerland (Bayliss and Langley 2003: 8). 
 
Deeper disposal of long-lived waste is intended to reduce the risk of any return of 
radionuclides to the environment. It is possible for the radioactive material to be 
discharged via groundwater pathways, so it is essential to choose the site in a place 
where the water movement is very low and where natural and engineered barriers can 
help to prevent the discharge. Examples of very deep waste disposal sites (i.e., below 
500 metres) include the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico, Yucca 
Mountain in Nevada in USA, and Gorleben in Germany (Bayliss and Langley 2003: 8). 
However, as the decay of some of the radioactive material could continue for hundreds 
or thousands of years or even longer, containment is difficult, nor is it easy to gain 
public confidence in containment policy. In some countries, underground research 
laboratories have been constructed to test the robustness of containment policies, and 
such facilities are found in Bure in France, Onkalo in Finland, Gorleben in Germany, 
Grimsel, Mont Terri, and Wellenburg in Switzerland, Mol in Belgium, Aspo in Sweden, 
Sellafield in the UK (though these facilities were abandoned after the public enquiry in 
1986), and Tono and Honorobe in Japan (Bayliss and Langley 2003: 8). 
 
The most obvious danger lies in the leaking of nuclear waste drums. Most countries 
using nuclear energy infuse nuclear waste in steel barrels. But after several decades, 
these drums became rusty and some of them leak radioactive substance into the 
surrounding environment, making repair work urgent. However, no scientist can 
guarantee that such repair work would prevent leaking forever: all that scientists can do 
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is to keep monitoring and repairing facilities for generation after generation until a 
solution is found. 
 
2.5.3 Ethical aspects of nuclear waste management  
 
The disposal of radioactive waste often imposes the cost on local communities while 
other part of the country benefit from the clean electricity production without bearing 
any cost. This unequal distribution of radioactive waste raises three ethical issues: 
interregional equity; intergenerational equity; and equitable compensation.  
 
2.5.3.1 Interregional equity   
 
Interregional equity is about local communities near nuclear waste repositories for 
nuclear waste facilities suffering from long-term exposure of radiation and health risks 
while other communities – indeed,  the rest of the  nation - benefit from the electricity 
produced by nuclear power without being exposed to these risks. This is an unfair 
concentration of health risks in local communities which host nuclear waste. For 
example, as we shall see in later chapters, the Taiwan government has since 1982 
disposed of its nuclear waste in an indigenous people’s island 65 kilometres from 
Taiwan Main Island. These indigenous people suffer from inequality of treatment 
because they are exposed to much more radiation than other people in Taiwan. However, 
inter-regional equality is not only within a country but also between countries. Some 
international agreements have allowed countries to dump nuclear waste in other 
countries. Invariably, the host countries are economically poorer than the producer 
countries, and they obtain money to fund their poverty-reduction programs by providing 
facilities for producer countries to dump their nuclear waste. Producer countries gain 
from such deals because they lack their own repositories for nuclear waste due to strong 
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opposition within their countries. But the result is an unequal distribution of hazards: 
the host countries carry the burden of health risk and environmental risks while the 
producer countries benefit from dumping their nuclear waste outside their borders. Also, 
within the host countries, the outcome is an unequal imposition of risks on the local 
communities which are located near the dump sites, because they suffer from exposure 
to radiation while other communities in the host countries benefit from the financial aid 
which flows from the producer countries without being exposed to the radiation. 
 
2.5.3.2. Intergenerational inequality 
  
Another ethical dimension of nuclear waste management is intergenerational inequality. 
Nuclear waste is a long-term problem: nuclear energy provides power supplies not only 
for the present generation but also for future generations, and in so doing, it generates 
large volumes of nuclear waste. This nuclear waste will not vanish until its radioactivity 
decays to a safe level, which may take thousands of years, during which time the costs 
of managing nuclear waste, which includes monitoring, repairing, and carrying out 
detailed safety measures, falls not only on the present generation but also on future 
generations. Similarly, radiation from nuclear waste causes health risks not only to the 
present generation but also to future generations. These two considerations – cost and 
health risk - raise the difficult ethical issue of how to ensure their fair distribution over 
time. It seems almost impossible for politicians to redress intergenerational inequality 
hundreds of years into the future.  
 
2.5.3.3. Compensation  
 
One way of redressing an inequitable concentration of radioactive waste in some local 
communities is by compensation. At any rate compensation could be the answer to 
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tackle interregional inequality, taking the form of investments by governments or the 
nuclear industries to provide public infrastructure for local communities, employment of 
local citizens, grants, or tax rebates (Openshaw et al. 1989: 9). Such compensation 
would also serve as an incentive for local communities to accept the proposal of 
dumping nuclear waste in their area. Of course, compensation would not reduce any 
risks caused by dumping nuclear waste – negative health effects on local communities 
would not vanish because of any compensation. Moreover, some people regard 
compensation as merely a way to bribe or buy off opposition to nuclear waste dumpling 
in local communities.   
 
As for compensation for intergenerational inequality, although this would be very 
difficult far into the future, many countries have established funds to benefit at least the 
next two or three generations. For example, the government-owned nuclear industry, 
Taiwan Power Company, contributes NT$ 0.17 (approximately £0.34 pence) per unit of 
electricity to such a fund, which since 1986 has topped NT$ 9.97 billions 
(approximately £199.4 billion) (Taipower 2009). This fund is exclusively earmarked for 
the final disposal of nuclear waste and the decommissioning of nuclear power plants, 
and its large size has attracted several local communities and foreign countries to 
compete for contracts for nuclear waste dumpsites. 
 
2.5.4. Political aspects of radioactive waste 
 
There is a lot of politics surrounding the nuclear waste disposal issue. This is mainly 
because the issue is highly controversial, causing considerable conflict between 
different groups of people, especially government, officials, nuclear industries, NGOs, 
and local communities. One means of resolving such conflicts is often held to be public 
participation – i.e. for those who are directly concerned to have a formal opportunity to 
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express their opinion. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of 
the Conferences on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Global Nature Charter 
of the United Nations General Assembly of 1982, all state an obligation on governments 
to inform the public, and to make it possible for every person to have the opportunity to 
participate, individually or with others, in decisions concerning their environment 
(IAEA 1998: 48). In France and Hungary, the authorities have established local 
information or safety committees to directly monitor the safety, operation and 
emergency planning at nuclear facilities (IAEA 1998: 48). In Sweden, municipal 
councils, which have power to veto industries they do not want, have established local 
nuclear safety committees composed of municipal politicians to review nuclear 
emergency plans and keep the public directly informed of all safety related matters 
(IAEA 1998: 48). 
 
To achieve public participation on the issue of radioactive waste, first, the type of 
information provided to the general public is very important: it needs to be accessible 
and easy to understand. Second, an independent expert s group or local liaison 
committees should be established to provide this information to people. Third, there 
should be a mechanism to allow members of local communities to express their 
opinions about nuclear waste. Fourth, there must be a mechanism to enable local people 
to have to right to veto the decision by central government. Fifth and most importantly, 
decision makers must recognise local economic, political, and cultural considerations, in 
order to avoid making prejudiced decisions.   
 
2.6 International comparisons of nuclear waste management practice  
 
Different nuclear energy-producing countries have adopted different waste disposal 
policies. We can gain a deeper understanding of Taiwan’s policy by studying the three 
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phases that six of the world’s most important nuclear energy-producing countries have 
all undergone during the last 50 years: (1) little public awareness of the problem 
(1960-1980); (2) growing public anxiety (1980-2000); and (3) public involvement in 
decision-making. In all the cases, governments had to deal with major opposition to 
proposed sites for nuclear waste disposal. The six countries are USA, Canada, UK, 
Germany, France, and Sweden.  
 
2.6.1. USA 
 
In the USA before the 1980s, issues about nuclear waste did not attract much public 
attention. In 1962, civil nuclear waste began to be disposed of in commercial 
shallow-land facilities in 1962. By 1980, the accumulation of waste from nuclear power 
stations stirred up growing environmental and safety concern, and state governors began 
to use their political power to influence the decision-making for siting the repositories 
for LLW and HLW. Then Congress stepped in and produced two laws that were 
intended to provide the basis for a national policy for radioactive waste management. 
These two acts were the ‘Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy of 1980’, which 
stipulated that state governments had responsibility for ensuring the safety of LLW 
disposal, and the ‘Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982’, which stipulated that the 
federal government had responsibility for ensuring the safety of ILW and HLW 
disposal.  
 
With regard to LLW, many states in the USA entered into negotiations to form regional 
compacts to share facilities for LLW disposal. For example, the three states with their 
own LLW disposal facilities - Nevada, South Carolina, and Washington - were quickly 
joined by nearby states to form the Rocky Mountains Low-Level Waste Management 
Compact, the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Waste Management Compact, and the 
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Northwest Interstates Low-Level Waste Management Compact (Committee to Review 
New York State's Siting and Methodology Selection for Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Disposal 1996: 25). Some states, including several populous states with large volumes 
of LLW, opted not to join a compact but to develop their own facilities (Committee to 
Review New York State's Siting and Methodology Selection for Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Disposal 1996: 27). By early 1985, it was clear that no new disposal capacity 
would be available by 1 January 1986, the deadline specified in the 1980 Act when 
compacts with existing facilities could exclude out-of-region wastes. In recognition of 
this problem, the U.S. Congress passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985 (P.L.99-240) to enable the three states with existing disposal 
facilities to open them to the rest of the nation for an additional seven years (from 
1986-1992) in return for which these states were given authorisation to impose a 
surcharge on waste received from generators outside their compacts (Committee to 
Review New York State's Siting and Methodology Selection for Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Disposal 1996: 27). But even in 2001, twenty years after the enactment of the 
Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy 1980, only fourteen states had assured access to 
LLW disposal facilities. Only the eleven states of the Northwest and Rocky Mountain 
Compacts (which used Richland, Washington state’s disposal facility) and the three 
states of the Atlantic Compact (which used Barnwell, South Carolina disposal facility) 
have assured long-term access to LLW disposal facilities. The other thirty-six states rely 
on temporary access to the Barnwell and Utah disposal facilities.        
 
With regard to ILL and HLW, before 1982 there was no major US legislation addressing 
the need for a temporary or permanent high-level waste repository location. By late 
1982, a national dialogue had begun that would provide a legal framework for making 
decisions about the United States’ high-level waste management program. In 1987, 
Congress selected Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the sole candidate site for spent fuel 
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and high level waste. In 2002, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham recommended Yucca 
Mountain as a suitable site to President George W. Bush who approved it. Despite 
Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn exercising his state's right to veto the Yucca Mountain 
project (Eureka County Yucca Mountain Information Office), the project was debated 
and passed first in the House of Representatives and then in the Senate. President Bush 
signed the joint resolution into law, officially designating Yucca Mountain as the 
nation's nuclear waste repository site, and the Department of Energy (DOE) began work 
on its application for a license to build and run the repository. However, after a long 
investigation process, in 2009 the Obama administration stopped the funding for the 
project and the US Energy Secretary announced in the Senate that the Yucca Mountain 
site was no longer viewed as an option for storing reactor waste (Hebert 2009). The 
reasons for this volte face are threefold: first, the Yucca Mountain site is a geologically 
complex location with unsuitable rocks and recent volcano movement; second, the US 
EPA upgraded its performance standard from 10,000 years to 1,000,000 years. Third, 
the US government had earlier neglected strong local opposition to the site. After the 
Yucca Mountain site was abandoned, the new US strategy was to seek alternatives site 
selections with substantial public involvement in an open and transparent 
decision-making process.  
 
With regard to ILW, HLW, and Spent Fuel, DOE’s Office of Civilian Radioactive 
Management is responsible for site selection, site operation and oversight through the 
Nuclear Waste Review Board, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the National 
Academy of Scientific Research. 
 
2.6.2. Canada 
 
Until the late 1980s, Canada’s nuclear industry regularly dismissed public opposition to 
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its policies. Between 1966 and 1992, the focus was on the expansion of nuclear power 
(22 reactors were built), and the industry claimed during this period of time that no  
disposal policy should  delay Canada’s nuclear power program (Durant 2009), 
claiming that public approval of permanent disposal policy was both slow and 
unnecessary. The industry decided that deep geological repositories were the most 
suitable option for storing nuclear waste, and the government was happy to agree to 
whatever the industry proposed.  In 1983, two sites were selected, despite strong 
opposition from local people. However, both these sites were eventually abandoned 
because local people gained the support of local government to oppose them. At this 
point, the nuclear industry in Canada realised that they had to gain public approval in 
order to find a solution for nuclear waste. In 1989, a full public inquiry on the concept 
of disposal of nuclear waste was designed by the Atomic Energy Canada Ltd (AECL), a 
federal -owned company promoter and developer of nuclear power (Durant 2009). This 
enquiry was carried out between 1996 and 1997, and had three phases: phase 1 was to 
conduct a broad discussion of ethical-political positions on nuclear waste issues; phase 
2 was to focus on technical assessments of nuclear waste disposal techniques; and phase 
3 was to allow local communities to address issue about nuclear waste direct to AECL 
through visits to the affected communities (Durant 2009). However, this public enquiry 
did not work well because AECL gave people the impression that only technically issue 
were important, and that support for waste disposal meant support for more nuclear 
reactors.  
 
To get to grips with this problem of site selection for storage of nuclear waste, the 
Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) was established in 2002 by Ontario 
Power Generation Inc., Hydro-Québec and New Brunswick Power Corporation in 
accordance with the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act (NFWA). NWMO was given responsibility 
for the long-term management of Canada’s used nuclear fuel (Durant 2009), and it was 
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mandated to conduct investigations, carry out public consultations, submit to the 
Minister of Natural Resources its suggested approaches for the management of nuclear 
waste overseen by the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, and make 
recommendations to parliament about waste management options. The NWMO 
undertook a consultation program between 2002 and 2005, involving conversations, 
workshops and dialogue among groups that were already involved in nuclear issues. 
NWMO emphasised the openness of the consultation process and the importance of the 
input of citizens. It asked the public which questions they would like to have answered, 
and how they understood the choices that were available for waste management policies. 
However, NWMO attracted criticism for controlling the issues to be discussed and for 
avoiding questions about the future. Nevertheless, NWMO released its proposed 
Adaptive Phased Management (APM) plan in November 2005 which was approved by 
the government in June 2007 (Durant 2009). The APM involves disposing of, or storing, 
used nuclear fuel in geological formations; flexible implementation of nuclear waste 
management strategies in which voluntary schemes would be considered; and public 
consultation to be taken into account in formal political decisions to move the process 
forward. Because site selection is expected within the next 30 years, site assessment 
processes are now underway.  
 
2.6.3 The U.K. 
 
In the UK, principles on nuclear waste management were established in the late 1960s, 
creating a licence system to allow dealing with radioactive waste on a safe basis. But the 
nuclear waste issue did not become politically contentious until the mid-1970s when the 
Sixth Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP), the 
Flowers Report, was published in 1976. Before then, the UK government was 
uncontroversially focusing on developing nuclear technology in order to compete 
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militarily with other countries and to establish a leading status on civil nuclear 
technology. Nuclear waste was sent to Drigg for near-surface burial or dumped in the 
Atlantic or stored as high level waste (HLW) above ground at Sellafield. In the Flowers 
Report, the RCEP urged the government to take a more strategic approach to the 
increasing volume of radioactive waste, and suggested that waste management 
objectives should be clearly identified at the outset of a nuclear programme rather than 
at a later stage when important options might be foreclosed. During the 1980s and 
1990s, the siting of a radioactive waste repository in the UK became a major issue 
attracting a great deal of public attention, both at home and abroad. Several sites were 
named by the Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive (NIREX4), but all were 
abandoned because of strong local opposition. In September 2001, the government 
published a consultation paper ‘Managing Radioactive Waste Safely’ (MRWS) to launch 
an open and transparent process of managing nuclear waste in the UK. 
 
Following the MRWS, the government decided in 2003 to establish a new independent 
body (DEFRA 2002), the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM), to 
review the options for managing the UK’s solid radioactive waste, and to make 
recommendations for the long-term managerial options to DEFRA. CoRWN is also 
responsible for public consultation on the issue of nuclear waste management, while 
another body, the Nuclear Decommission Agency (NDA), is responsible for 
implementing LLW management policy. In its recommendations to the government, 
                                                 
4
 NIREX was created with government approval in 1982 by the four main bodies of Britain’s nuclear 
industry: UKAEA (UK Atomic Energy Authority); CEGB (Central Electricity Generating Board); SSEB 
(South of Scotland Electricity Board) and BNFL (British Nuclear Fuels Limited), so all the staff in 
NIREX were from the nuclear industry mentioned above. The aim of NIREX as stated by the government 
was mainly to construct and operate new land disposal facilities for LLW and ILW. Ownership of Nirex 
was transferred to the UK government’s Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
and Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in 2005 and integrated into the Nuclear Decommissioning 
Authority in 2006.  
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CoRWM stated that ecological disposal is the best available approach for the long-term 
management of all the material categorized; that public involvement is vitally important 
to long-term nuclear waste management policy; and that the government should 
organise a private sector scheme for the siting of the nuclear waste repository. At 
present, CoRWM is holding a public consultation on how this voluntary scheme would 
work. 
 
However, despite CoRWM’s achievements, it has faced criticism for being remote from 
the public. For one thing, its work is still too close to experts - for example, some terms 
and concepts that it uses are not easy for lay people to understand. For another thing, it 
seems to operate in a top-down rather than a bottom-up manner – for example, the 
agenda and setting of the consultation is still dominated by CoRWM members. These 
shortcomings could weaken its effectiveness in implementing its policy at local level, 
because its decision-making process would not satisfy local people. 
 
2.6.4. Germany  
 
During the period 1960s-1980s, the debate in Germany about nuclear waste 
management was focused on which kind of rock formation is most suitable for storing 
nuclear waste. The experts on nuclear energy favoured salt formations as a final host for 
nuclear waste, but this idea was challenged after a site in Gorleben was identified, and 
people who were opposed to the Gorleben site suggested that other rock formations 
should be considered, as a result of which, clay and granite were included in the debate 
over hosting nuclear waste. This incident typifies the early history of siting nuclear 
waste repositories in Germany when transparent procedures were absent; the 
involvement of civil society actors was limited to consultation; and there was no 
obligation on the government to take the results of consultation into consideration in its 
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decision-making. However, since the 1990s, the AkEnd (Arbeitskreis Auswahlverfahren 
Endlagersuche Committee) group, which was established to develop a site selection 
process which included public participation, recognised that without transparency, all 
efforts to make progress would fail. But Akend faced considerable difficulties, including 
the lack of a participatory or deliberative discourse; the absence of interdisciplinary 
research that could bridge the gap between scientific/technical issues and social issues; 
and the hostility expressed by experts who were impatient with long consultative 
processes and showed little enthusiasm for conducting reviews on any new sites. As a 
result, Akend was unable to find a solution to the issue of a nuclear waste repository 
site. 
 
Administrative complexity compounded these difficulties. In the German political 
system, responsibility for nuclear waste disposal is shared between several authorities: 
the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety is 
the central regulator and supervisory authority; the Federal Office for Radiation 
Protection operates nuclear waste repositories; state governments are licensing 
authorities acting on behalf of the federal government; and energy suppliers are 
responsible for the storage of spent fuel. Moreover, the planning procedure is complex 
and hard to understand. Under the German Atomic Energy Act, the construction, 
operation, and closure of a repository must be licensed within the scope of a 
complicated permitting (i.e., licensing) procedure, and this procedure involves an 
environmental impact assessment; a public hearing; and zoning permits issued by the 
local communities (Hocke and Renn 2009). Some discussion about simplifying this 
system has taken place, but proposed reforms were not accepted by the federal 
government. 
 
2.6.5. France 
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In France, the management of nuclear waste in France is regarded as a technical 
problem rather than a social problem, and since the 1950s, the nuclear waste issue has 
been discussed mainly in technical language. The issues of nuclear waste management 
were analysed by groups of researchers holding the view that as long as the relevant 
scientific research continued to be funded, all problems surrounding nuclear waste 
management were technically solvable. During the 1960s-1980s, French scientists 
asserted that geological storage was the most suitable solution for nuclear waste. The 
director of the Agence Nationale pour la Gestion des Déchets Radioactifs (ANDRA) – 
an agency created in 1979, originally as a department of the Commissariat a l’Energie 
Atomique (CEA) – felt that it was time to move into action without any public 
consultation. However, when the French government selected four geologically 
favourable sites and launched preliminary work to create an underground storage centre, 
they faced strong local opposition, and began to realise that public acceptance was 
needed to make the technical solution work. Indeed, the government now acknowledged 
that nuclear waste disposal was more of a political problem than a technical problem. 
Accordingly, the French government started to implement an educational policy 
targeted at ‘laypersons’, ‘allies’ and opponents of nuclear waste and nuclear energy. 
This policy included organising a rational debate to influence people’s perception and 
reduce their fears about nuclear waste. Michel Rocard, the prime minister, suspended 
research on storage and instead launched a more open process in nuclear waste siting. 
Although Rocard was accused of exploiting the nuclear waste issue to woo the 
fast-growing green  electorate in the 1989 municipal and European elections (Barthe 
2009 and Sainteny 1998)5, consultations were organised with all stakeholders rather 
than only scientists.  
                                                 
5
 Quote from Barthe, Y. (2009) “Framing Nuclear Waste as a Political Issue in France”, Journal of Risk 
Research, 12: 7, 941 — 954. originally from Sainteny, G. (1998) “L’émergence d’un nouvel enjeu de 
politique publique: le pouvoir face à l’environnement”. Politiques et Management Public 16: 130–58. 
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In 1991, the government created a national evaluation commission (CNE) composed of 
independent experts, with the annual task of drawing up recommendations to steer 
research towards emergent problems and to maintain the political process open to public 
participation (Barthe 2009). Also, the national commission for public debate 
(Commission Nationale du Débat Public – CNDP), an independent administrative 
authority, was commissioned by the government to organize a broad national 
consultation process on the subject (Barthe 2009). The CNDP noted that geological 
storage is the preferred scientific solution and that this solution could be implemented 
by 2015. But as with many other countries, France is still unable to build a geological 
repository. 
 
2.6.6. Sweden 
 
As we have seen, many democratic countries have failed to secure agreement on the 
siting of nuclear waste repository. However, Sweden is different, in that she has 
managed to construct and operate facilities for low and intermediate level waste and 
interim storage of high level waste. This successful outcome is explained by three 
reasons. First, responsibility for all radioactive waste was given solely to the Swedish 
Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) which was established, and is 
owned, by utility operators who handle LLW, ILW, and HLW. Second, strict legal 
conditions have been imposed on operators to guarantee the safe disposal of their 
nuclear waste. Third, extensive processes of public consultations were carried out in 
localities where sites were proposed.    
 
Before the 1970s, nuclear waste was not considered as a problem in Sweden. But in 
1970s, nuclear power became one of the most politically controversial issues in Swedish 
society. Indeed, in the 1976 parliamentary election, most of the constituents were 
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influenced by their attitude towards the nuclear industry. After that election, a coalition 
was formed between the anti-nuclear Centre Party and the Liberal and Conservative 
parties which favoured the Swedish nuclear power program (Lidskog and Sundqvist 
2004). In order to solve the internal tension in the coalition government, the government 
proposed a law that became the Nuclear Power Stipulation Act which required that 
before building a nuclear power plant, it is the owner’s obligation to show how and 
where the spent fuel would be finally stored with absolute safety (Lidskog and 
Sundqvist 2004). This Act forced SKB6 to conduct investigations into the bedrock in 
different locations in Sweden. During the early 1980s, SKB found that plutonic rock 
gabbros was the most suitable type of bedrock for storing nuclear waste, and selected 
two sites. However, because of strong local opposition further investigation into these 
sites was cancelled, and in 1986, SKB looked instead for sites with gneiss or granite 
where building a repository was more socially acceptable. So rather than choosing the 
best technical solution, SKB switched its search to find a site where the repository 
would be accepted by local people and to construct safety barriers at the site to make 
sure it was safe.  
 
In 1992, SKB’s new strategy was rolled out by sending an open and honest letter to all 
286 municipalities in Sweden, saying that its purpose was to manage and dispose of 
nuclear waste and that if the representatives of the municipalities were interested in 
SKB’s proposal, they should contact SKB. Following SKB’s letter to the municipalities 
in Sweden, a few municipalities expressed an interest, though after some discussion, 
only two sites, Storuman and Malå, agreed to be part of a feasibility study (Lidskog and 
Sundqvist 2004). SKB concluded that these municipalities could offer good possibilities 
as potential sites for a final repository for nuclear waste. But in local referenda in 
                                                 
6
 SKB (Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company) has the responsibility for finding a site 
for nuclear waste. 
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Storuman in 1995 and in Malå in 1997, the inhabitants decided to reject further 
investigations (Lidskog and Sundqvist 2004).  
 
In spring 1995, SKB asked five municipalities which already hosted nuclear facilities 
about their willingness to allow SKB to conduct feasibility studies, and three of them 
(Östhammar, Oskarshamn, and Nyköping) agreed. The reason why SKB targeted those 
nuclear municipalities was that they were more familiar with nuclear issues and 
therefore more likely to be sympathetic to hosting further facilities. Feasibility studies 
were carried out in the three accepting municipalities, and later another three studies 
were conducted in neighbouring municipalities (Tierp, Älvkarleby and Hultsfred) 
(Lidskog and Sundqvist 2004). By December 2000, eight feasibility studies had been 
completed, and SKB decided that further site investigations would be carried out at 
three of them (Östhammar, Oskarshamn and Tierp). During 2001, the municipal 
councils in Oskarshamn and Östhammar agreed to further site investigations, but the 
council in Tierp rejected the SKB proposal (Lidskog and Sundqvist 2004). A five-year 
investigation involving an extended drilling program was carried out, and after a total of 
20 years of effort, Östhammar was chosen in 2009 as a potential site for the final 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel. In 2010, SKB submitted an application to the Swedish 
Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) and to the Environmental Court to build the final 
repository in Östhammar. The SKB strategy has thus become a success story.  
 
The Swedish experience shows that a successful strategy for obtaining sites for nuclear 
waste disposal lies in not insisting on using geological criteria alone. SKB’s 
de-emphasis on finding the best rock for a repository made the focus on the siting 
selection more flexible, releasing it from the rigid assumption that only very few areas 
in Sweden can host nuclear waste. Instead, SKB’s focus on local public acceptance 
together with the notion of a safety engineering barrier to prevent the leaking of nuclear 
 48
waste, resulted in allowing many municipalies in Sweden to host nuclear waste sites if 
they wanted to. Furthermore, by conducting a voluntary strategy, SKB interacted 
directly with local communities face-to-face in framing the issues around a nuclear 
waste repository. Indeed, SKB and local communities were partners, sharing a common 
interest rather than opposed as enemies to each other. In this respect, the SKB 
successfully created trust and social acceptance on the issue of nuclear waste. 
 
2.7 Literature review on the politics of nuclear waste  
 
2.7.1 Single case studies 
 
A significant number of academic studies of the politics of nuclear waste have been 
conducted. Many of these studies are single-country studies. The most common 
approach for a single country study on the politics of nuclear waste management is a 
historical framework to analyse the evolution of nuclear waste disposal in the country. 
For example, Hocke and Renn looked into the decision-making process of nuclear waste 
management policy in Germany by analysing the policy development process in a 
historical content (Hocke and Renn 2009). Similarly, Solomon investigated the 
high-level radioactive waste in the USA by analysing the historical policy development 
in different period of time (Solomon 2009). Other single country studies on the politics 
of nuclear waste used non-historical approaches. For example, Morton, Airoldi, and 
Phillips’ article used a decision analysis perspective in investigating the work of the 
UK’s Committee on Radioactive Waste Management by interviewing its members 
(Morton et al). Durant (2009) studied the political economy of uncertainty of 
radioactive waste in Canada (Durant 2009), examining the Adaptive Phased 
Management (APM) strategy proposed by Canada’s Nuclear Waste Management 
Organization (NWMO) in 2005 as an approach for managing used nuclear fuel. Durant 
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concluded that the APM was the cause of repeated failure of Canada’s nuclear waste 
management since the 1980s because it merely underpinned NWMO’s approach of 
supporting nuclear expansion and ignored inclusive participatory democracy. Hocke and 
Renn (2009) studied the decision-making process of nuclear waste in Germany by 
analysing the relations and attitudes of government agency, political parties, and 
environmental groups. They found that the discourse among experts was on the risk and 
benefit of different disposal options and locations whereas political debates focused on 
the question of nuclear power generation, so the main reason for the failure to find a 
permanent nuclear waste repository in Germany was the disjunction between technical, 
political and procedural discourses. 
 
2.7.2 Comparative studies 
 
There are also some studies which compare two or more countries’ policies on nuclear 
waste management. For example, Kraft (2000) employed theories of policy design to 
compare the process of developing high level nuclear waste disposal policy in Canada 
with the experience of the United States. Durant (2007) comparatively analysed the 
national programs for nuclear waste disposal in the USA, UK, Sweden, and Canada 
using a historical developmental approach.  
 
2.7.3 Studies of oppositional groups 
 
There are many studies of oppositional groups in the literature – i.e. focusing on the 
actions and views of opponents of nuclear waste storage siting decisions. For example, 
Rajeev Gowda and Easterling (1998) studied the resentment among Native Americans 
caused by the siting of nuclear waste facilities, rehearsing the history and logic of US 
government processes which led to the involvement of Native America and the negative 
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reactions of some tribes to the nuclear waste options. Rajeev Gowda and Easterling 
(1998) found that Native America generally distrusted the government, did not 
experience procedural and distributive justice, and felt targeted in the siting process.  
 
O’Hare’s (2011) study on siting nuclear waste and local opposition looked into the Not 
In My Back Yard (nimby) syndrome of local communities opposed to nuclear waste. He 
suggested that to counter such opposition, scientific and engineering analysis must 
ensure that the risks of harm from nuclear waste repositories are low (if not zero); that 
continuous long-term monitoring must be carried out; and that reasonable levels of 
compensation should be offered in acknowledgement that the hosts of a repository are 
acting in the public interest. In other words, O’Hare suggested the government must be 
politically responsive and receptive, and be seen to serve the public interest rather than 
short-term advantage or expediency.  
 
The flip side of studies of oppositional groups is the study of supportive groups. One 
such study was carried out by Sjöberg (2004), who investigated the factors determining 
local acceptance of a nuclear waste repository in Sweden. The article examined the 
attitudes and risk perceptions of people living in four municipalities in Sweden where a 
high-level nuclear waste siting proposal was being intensely discussed at the political 
level, in media, and among the members of public. Data showed that communities 
which already hosted nuclear facilities had relatively high levels of consensus on 
acceptability for further investigation of the sites. People in these areas also perceived 
lower risks for nuclear waste and were more in favour of hosting the proposed nuclear 
waste repository. Sjöberg (2004) concluded that those communities which are more in 
favour of nuclear energy would be good candidates for siting a nuclear waste repository.   
 
2.7.4 Studies on environmental justice  
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There are also some academic studies of the politics of nuclear waste which focus on 
the ideas of fairness and justice, using the concept of environmental justice. These 
studies are particularly helpful to this thesis in developing a theoretical framework for 
the examination of the environmental justice of nuclear waste policy in Taiwan. For 
example, Schrader-Frechette (2002: 24) interpreted environmental justice in terms of 
the principles and practices of distributive and participative justice. She defined 
distributive justice as ‘equal apportionment of social benefits and burdens’; and 
participative justice as ‘equal rights to self-determination in societal decision making’; 
and she employed the principle of political equality because it includes components of 
both distributive and participative justice (Schrader-Frechette 2002: 24).  
Schrader-Frechette (2002: 95 and 117) studied the cases of siting nuclear waste facilities 
in Mescalero Apache and Yucca Mountain, arguing that both cases were 
environmentally unjust because the local economic disadvantage was not adequately 
compensated. Furthermore, because radioactive waste is a long-lived substance, 
members of future generations cannot consent on the issue of hosting nuclear waste 
(since they do not yet exist).  
 
Blowers’ studies on nuclear industry also recognised the importance of equality in a 
discussion of environmental justice. Blowers introduced the term ‘nuclear oases’ in the 
1990s (Blowers et al 1991: xviii ), referring to peripheral communities hosting existing 
nuclear facilities which are highly dependent on the nuclear industry in terms of 
employment and income and were the only places welcoming nuclear waste repositories. 
However, the dependency and lack of power of these communities meant that the 
unequal distribution of nuclear risks and health effects has become a moral problem. At 
the societal level, equality can be restored by means of compensation, which may 
involve a range of economic measures such as relief of taxation, regeneration, 
diversification and infrastructure provisions (Blowers 2003: 75). At the political level, 
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Blowers argued that equality entails a commitment to openness, the provision of 
information, participation in decision-making, and the provision for vetoing decisions 
affecting the community (Blowers 2003: 76). According to Blowers, therefore, nuclear 
oases are entitled to demand and receive compensation and their claims for political 
justice must be acknowledged by society. 
 
Vari’s study on public perceptions about equality and fairness in the siting of low level 
radioactive waste facilities in New York and Hungary also contributed to our 
understanding of fairness and equality in the siting of nuclear waste facilities. Vari 
investigated publicly-expressed responses to low and intermediate level of radioactive 
waste in the USA by analysing 100 letters of protest and petition by residents and 
environmental groups from candidate sites, while in Hungary she conducted 24 
semi-structured interviews with residents, activists, and government officials of the 
potential sites (Vari 1996). From her analysis, Vari (1996) proposed the following 
criteria for fair site selection: technical efficiency (minimal overall risk: choose the 
technically safest site; minimal additional risk: choose an already contaminated site); 
local consent (preference for hosting by those who perceive that the facility results in a 
larger benefit than cost); criterion  of distributive justice (contribution to the problem: 
those who generate the waste should host it); ecological vulnerability (those who have a 
disproportionate share of risks should not be targeted); and socio-economic 
vulnerability (those who are economically-socially disadvantaged should not be 
targeted). Vari also suggested that the main principles and criteria for fair siting process 
should be explored and discussed before the planning process begins in order to achieve 
a mutually accepted outcome (Vari 1996). 
 
Ishiyama’s study on environmental justice and Indian tribal sovereignty provided a 
different perspective on environmental justice and nuclear waste. Ishiyama examined 
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American-Indian tribal sovereignty in the context of environmental justice through an 
analysis of a land-use dispute over the decision to host high level radioactive waste on 
the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians’ reservation in Utah. Based on archival 
research and interviews with local people, she argued that the Skull Valley Goshute 
Indian Reservation has suffered the consequences of unequal distribution of toxic 
hazards and environmental racism over the years. As a consequence of the unequal 
distribution of toxic hazards and environmental racism, the Skull Valley Goshute Indian 
Reserve has been surrounded by chemical deposits, waste incinerators, and low level 
nuclear waste dump sites, making Skull Valley the ‘nation’s greatest concentration of 
hyperhazardous and ultradeadly materials’ (Ishiyama 2003). This prolonged process of 
environmental racism has produced a landscape of injustice in which local people have 
suffered both procedural and distributive injustice. Conflicts over the definition and 
practice of sovereignty also revealed the social, historical, and political-economic 
complexities of environmental justice. Ishiyama (2003) suggested that rather than 
seeking equality in distribution of hazards, environmental justice requires the 
participation of communities in various decision-making processes. In the case of 
Indian country, environmental justice depends on the tribes’ sovereign capacity to 
pursue politically, economically, and ecologically options for substitutable development. 
Therefore the reinforcement of the political and economic sovereignty of tribes will lead 
to the long-term accomplishment of environmental justice (Ishiyama 2003). Hoffman 
(2001) also studied the energy policy, environmental justice, and the politics of nuclear 
waste by analysing the case in Skull Valley Indian Reservation in Utah, focusing on the 
federal government and local government’s attitude towards siting a high-level 
radioactive waste, and the relations between federal government, state government, and 
Indian leaders.  
 
2.7.5. Studies of environmental justice in Taiwan 
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In the past, most researchers on nuclear waste in Taiwan were concerned with the 
technical aspects of the problem. However, some studies of environmental justice in 
Taiwan briefly mentioned the case of Orchid Island (also known as Lan Yu/ Lanyu) 
where the government had dumped nuclear waste from 1982 to 1996 without local 
people’s consent. For example, Chi (1997) referred to Orchid Island (Lan Yu) as a case 
of environmental colonialism in his article about environmental colonialism. Huang 
(2003) was the first to discuss justice in relation to the case of Orchid Island (Lan Yu), 
but his discussion was restricted to how many times the concept of generational justice 
was mentioned in the meetings between people from Orchid Island (Lan Yu) and 
government officials. In 2006, Fan conducted a more thorough-going study of the 
concept of environmental justice in the nuclear waste issue in Taiwan in general and 
Orchid Island (Lan Yu) in particular, conducting focus groups in that community to 
examine local perceptions (Fan 2006a and 2006b), and her two articles on the subject 
are the most valuable studies in the literature for the present thesis. Orchid Island (Lan 
Yu) is 70 miles southeast from Taiwan Main Island where 90% of the local people are 
indigenous Yami people. The focus group data were analysed by Fan employing an 
environmental justice framework which made use of several themes, including the good 
life, duty, the right to life, utilitarianism, fairness and democratic procedures (Fan 
2006a). On the issue of fairness, Fan’s study suggested that Yami fishermen and 
housewife groups regarded it as bullying the ethnic minority to dump nuclear waste on 
Orchid Island (Lan Yu)(Fan 2006a and 2006b). Yami participants did not regard 
compensation as a means to achieve fairness or make the decision of dumping nuclear 
waste on Orchid Island (Lan Yu) legitimate (Fan 2006a). In order to achieve 
environmental justice in the nuclear waste management in Taiwan, Fan (2006a) 
suggested that environmental pragmatism could be employed to identify common goals 
and establish an alliance among different ethnic groups, defusing tension among groups 
of different ethnicities through dialogue processes.  
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2.8 Conclusion 
 
Radioactive waste disposal is a unique problem, generated from every step of the 
nuclear fuel cycle, and potentially capable of causing immense damage to the health of 
humans, animals, and plants. Moreover, this potential damage could be inflicted for 
hundreds or even thousands of years. Attempts to guard against such risks have 
involved very elaborate strategies of containment, storage, and disposal. However, such 
strategies raise difficult questions about the ethics of siting policy, which in turn causes 
major political headaches about how to devise ways of dealing with them. A central 
assumption is that the public must participate in such decision-making, and as we saw in 
the comparative analysis of the six countries, the only country that has succeeded in 
establishing a nuclear waste repository - Sweden – is the only country to focus more on 
winning over public opinion in local areas rather than on enforcing the optimum 
technical solution. The lesson that Sweden teaches us - to respect public opinion – is 
one of the elements of environmental justice that we explore in more detail in the next 
chapter. In this chapter, we have also carried out a literature review on topics central to 
this thesis – case studies and comparative of the politics of nuclear waste disposal; 
studies of oppositional groups; studies on environmental justice; and studies of 
environmental justice in Taiwan. Many of these studies – especially in the last 
category – have been helpful to me in clarifying the issues of my thesis, and I am 
grateful to acknowledge that I have built on their insights. However, none of them has 
examined the issue of environmental justice in the politics of nuclear waste facility 
siting in Taiwan as comprehensively and deeply as I do in this thesis.    
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Chapter 3.  Storing Nuclear Waste- An Environmental Justice 
Perspective 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, the discussion moves from technical considerations of nuclear waste 
disposal to normative considerations. Its focus is on the concept of environmental 
justice and its application to the issues of siting nuclear waste repositories. The chapter 
begins by explaining the origin of the concept in the environmental justice movement in 
the USA and (briefly) its place in Taiwan; then discusses at length its meaning in its two 
forms - distributive and procedural justice.      
 
3.2 The origin of environmental justice in the USA 
 
The concept of environmental justice is derived from the environmental justice 
movement which emerged in the US in late 1970s and early 1980s. It originated in the 
concern felt by groups of people whose environment and health were affected by the 
dumping of toxic wastes in their neighbourhoods. Dobson states that 2 August 1978 
could be marked as the starting point of environmental justice movement, because that 
was the day when the CBS and ABS TV networks first carried the news of the effect of 
toxic waste on the health of people who lived in a place called Love Canal (Dobson 
1998: 17). 
 
3.2.1 Love Canal 
 
Between 1942 and 1952, the Hooker Chemical Company used Love Canal (a 
blue-collar housing development in Buffalo, New York) as a site for waste disposal. 
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They disposed of more than 21,000 tons of various chemical wastes at the site in a depth 
of twenty or twenty-five feet (Levine 1982: 10). Many of the substance were known to 
be dangerous, including chloroform, benzene, toluene and tricoloroethylene (Maples 
2003: 215). In 1953, the Hooker Chemical Company covered over the dumpsite and in 
1953 the site was sold to the Niagara Falls Boards of Education. Despite warnings from 
Hooker Chemicals, the surrounding land was developed into a residential area in which 
a school and many homes were built (Maples 2003: 214). 
 
In providing affordable housing for low-to middle-income families, the Love Canal area 
was one of many lower-middle class communities, populated with the families of 
first-generation homeowners employed in the paint, chemical, pesticide, and related 
industries that gave them an opportunity to achieve the American Dream (Maples 2003: 
218). However, trouble began in 1978 when children started telling their mothers that 
their feet burned when they played barefoot on the lawn. At the same time, many people 
in the area complained to the City of Buffalo about the leaking of black ooze in their 
basements, skin irritations, and some people even said that rocks which were dug up in 
the neighbourhood exploded when dropped on a hard surface. The city officials ignored 
the complaints by covering up the fact that the area had been built on a landfill operated 
by the Hooker Chemical Company (Dowie 1995: 128). 
 
Residents began to take action after the three-year-old son of Love Canal resident Lois 
Maris Gibbs developed a serious respiratory problem, and many people discovered their 
children had the same or another medical problem. Lois Maris Gibbs started the Love 
Canal Houseowners’ Association and complained to the state government which sent 
epidemiologists to visit Love Canal, who discovered abnormally high rates of birth 
defects, miscarriages, epilepsy, liver abnormality, rectal bleeding, and headaches 
(Dowie 1995: 128). In August 1978, the New York State Health Commissioner 
 58
announced that the landfill ‘constitutes a public nuisance and an extremely serious 
threat and danger to the health, safety, and welfare of residents’ (Dowie 1995: 128). In 
August 1980, when federal government inspectors from the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) arrived at Love Canal, Gibbs and other residents held them for several 
hours demanding a commitment to take remedial action. Two days later, President 
Jimmy Carter arrived and declared Love Canal a national disaster area. He agreed that 
the federal government would purchase all homes in the contaminated area and relocate 
the residents to a safer neighbourhood (Dowie 1995: 128).  
 
Love Canal is a significant event because it transformed the environmental movement in 
the USA in four ways. First, whilst environmentalism previously focused on preserving 
nature, wildlife, and natural habitats, Love Canal was focused on human health affected 
by toxic waste. Second, while previous US environmental campaigners had been 
predominantly middle class, the Love Canal campaign was run mainly by working class 
people. Third, while previous US environmental campaigns focused on environmental 
health, the Love Canal campaign widened the debate to focus on issues of justice, 
drawing attention to the fact that the people who suffered from the health effect of toxic 
waste were generally those who are poor and less advantaged. Fourth, unlike 
mainstream environmental groups, the Love Canal group did not create large, 
Washington-based, bureaucratic organisations. In contrast, they developed networks, 
made connections, and created solidarity out of understanding and a respect for both 
similarities and differences, and worked from a variety of places with a wide array of 
tactics (Schlosberg 1999: 108). For many people, Love Canal originated the 
environmental justice movement. However, there was a fifth element in its development 
that was initiated in another area - Warren County – the anti-racial element that made it 
into a full-scale civil rights movement.  
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3.2.2 Warren County 
 
In 1978, three men from the Ward Transfer Company driving liquid tanker trucks which 
contained polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) along state roads in North Carolina, drained 
30,000 gallons of PCB contaminated oil into the roadside (Bullard 2002: 177 and 
Maples 2003: 234). The state had to clean up the oil spill and find a place to dump the 
toxic soil. A bankrupt farmer in Afton, Warren County agreed to sell his land to the state 
government which proposed to use the land as landfill (McGurty 2000 and Maples 2003: 
234). At that time Afton Community was more than 84 percent African American; one 
of the poorest counties in North Carolina; and had an employment rate of 13.4 per cent 
and a median income of $6,983 in 1982 compared with $9,283 for the rest of the state 
(Bullard 2000: 30 c.f. Maples 2003: 237) Local residents contested the landfill proposal 
on grounds that the site was geographically unfit, but in 1982 state workers began to 
prepare the site for dumping. To prevent dumping, a coalition of local landowners and 
civil rights activists mounted  a campaign of civil disobedience, organising marches, 
demonstrations, and roadblocks to deny access to the trucks transporting the toxic soil 
into the site, and in September 1982, over four hundred protesters were arrested (Maples 
2003: 235). Although the protest failed and the landfill site was established, it is the first 
significant national environmental protest by African Americans (Edwards 1995: 36). 
Also, the events in Warren County marked the beginning of a coalition of civil right 
activists, environmentalists, churches and local residents. Edwards (1995) commented 
that ‘almost overnight environmentalism became accessible to wide segments of the 
African American communities, churches, and civil rights organisations. In the process, 
African Americans redefined environmentalism and provided a powerful and 
overarching narrative capable of unifying a range of life quality grievances in 
communities of colour’. As Sandweiss remarked, it galvanised a nationwide grassroots 
social movement demanding environmental justice (Sandweiss 1998: 31). 
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3.2.3 Consolidation of the environmental justice movement in the USA 
 
The cases of Love Canal and Warren County together marked the beginning of the 
environmental justice movement. However, these two are not the only cases, and with 
more and more examples cases coming to light, the environmental justice movement 
was consolidated. Its main assertion is that poorer people are the victims of 
environmental injustice. As Szasz put it, ‘Why don’t I see a toxic waste dump in 
Beverly Hill or next to the Governor’s house?’ (Szasz 1994: 152). The protestors from 
Love Canal and Warren County believed that their situation was due to the uneven 
distribution of environmental hazards, and numerous studies have confirmed that people 
who live close to noxious facilities are disproportionately people of low income and 
dark skins (Shrader-Frechette 2002: 5). Szasz observed that ‘Toxic victims are, typically, 
poor or working people of modest means. Their environmental problems are inseparable 
from their economic condition. People are more likely to live near polluted industrial 
sites if they live in financially strapped communities’ (Szasz 1994: 151; c.f. Dobson 
1998: 19). Evidence indicates that minorities who are disadvantaged in terms of 
education, income and occupation not only bear a disproportionate share of 
environmental risk and health but also have less power to protect themselves 
(Shrader-Frechette 2002: 5). Studies consistently show that socio-economically 
deprived groups are more likely than affluent groups to live near polluting facilities, eat 
contaminated fish, and work in risky occupations (Shrader-Frechette 2002: 7). Research 
also confirms that they are less able to prevent and to remedy such inequalities 
(Shrader-Frechette 2002: 3). Some social scientists have found that race is a factor, 
linked together with socio-economic status, in predicting the distribution of air pollution, 
municipal landfills and incinerators, toxics waste dumps, and lead poisoning in children 
(Hofrichter 1993: 5). Member of communities facing such threat typically are too poor 
to move elsewhere. 
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The uneven distribution of resources and development that characterizes US society 
finds a strong parallel in the distribution of ecological hazards, particularly among 
underrepresented, disenfranchised populations such as African Americans, Asian 
Americans, Latino Americans, Native Americans, the poor, and women (Hofrichter 
1993: 8). A 1983 report by the U.S General Accounting Office documented the 
socio-economic and racial characteristics of communities where hazards-waste landfills 
are sites (Shrader-Frechette 2002: 23)7, and concluded that three-quarters are poor, 
African Americans, and Latino Americans. These populations typically receive 
inadequate public health and social service facilities, and live in economically 
undeveloped areas with high rates of unemployment (Hofrichter 1993: 10). Often the 
sources of environmental injustice are the corporations and governments who site 
questionable facilities among those least able to be informed about, or able to stop, 
them.  
 
From this account of environmental justice in the USA we can see a strong call for more 
thorough and participatory local input into, and control over, environmental decisions. 
Members of the environmental justice groups do not want mainstream environmental 
NGOs to represent them: they wish to be consulted from the start, speak for themselves, 
and work with other agencies to form partnerships in decision-making (Schlosberg 2003:  
2003: 78). Moreover, rather than creating large, Washington-based bureaucratic 
organisations, they use social networks to make connections, creating solidarity out of 
understanding and mutual respect, and work from a variety of places with a wide array 
of tactics. By using strategies from the civil-rights, anti-war, anti-nuclear movements, as 
well as from other movements for social justice, these communities where people live 
and work are taking a leadership role in redefining the scope of the environmental 
                                                 
7
 Quote from Shrader-Frechette, K. (2002) Environmental Justice: Creating Equality and Reclaiming 
Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
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movement to include social conditions that people experience in everyday life 
(Hofrichter 1993: 25). Furthermore, beyond fighting against environmental hazards, 
they are uncovering connections between undemocratic production and investment 
decisions, energy policies, international trade, and lending policies, environmental 
effects of nuclear radiation and military power, and the inequalities of race and class 
that affect the quality of their lives and the world in which they live (Hofrichter 1993: 
21). Whereas mainstream environmental group are predominantly white, middle-class, 
and male, environmental justice groups are generally formed on a grassroots basis with 
most members from low-income or ethnic minority communities, and women and 
people of colour often take on the leading roles. While mainstream environmental 
NGOs protect natural environment, wildlife, and natural resources, the movement for 
environmental justice wants to reframe the policy debate over hazardous waste and shift 
the public agenda away from its current preoccupation with waste disposal towards 
reducing waste production at the sources (Edwards 1995: 36). Furthermore, they fight 
not only for the environment but also for justice because environmental injustice comes 
from an unequal distribution of environmental hazards. Therefore, environmental justice 
campaigns seek change in the social order to bring about more meaningful participation 
in environmental decision-making. They also want industry to shoulder the full social, 
health, and ecological costs of their products, including waste products, because that 
would create a strong economic incentive for non-toxic alternatives (Edwards 1995: 36). 
 
So the grassroots movement has succeeded in raising the stakes, making it more 
difficult and expensive for irresponsible industries to pass the costs of chemical 
contamination on to those who live further down the waste stream. In the first 10 years 
in the USA, they did so without any new legislation, by engaging in the legal and 
scientific debates over regulatory policies, and by entering electoral politics (Edwards 
1995: 36). But in 1991, the broad agenda, which included the input of Native Americans, 
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Asians Americans, Hispanics, and other people of colour, was formalised in the 
statement of purpose and call to action drafted by delegates to the People of Colour 
Environmental Leadership Summit. The draft is called the Principles of Environmental 
Justice, and contains 17 principles covering a range of ecological, social, political, 
cultural, and strategy issues. These principles have become part of governmental 
practice in that the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (USAEPA) includes a subcommittee on Public 
Participation, which in 1996 produced a Model Plan for Participation and 
Environmental Justice containing a participation checklist for government agencies to 
follow. The Model Plan indicates that policymaking procedures must encourage active 
community participation, institutionalise public participation, recognise community 
knowledge, and utilise cross-cultural formats and exchange to enable the participation 
of as many diverse groups as exist in a community (Schlosberg 2003: 95). 
 
3.3. Environmental Justice in Taiwan 
 
In Taiwan, the idea of environmental justice is connected to the anti-pollution 
movement and the anti-nuclear movement. Taiwan has not developed an environment 
movement such as in the US or even in the UK, but an idea of how environmental 
justice has spread in Taiwan can be seen in the 2001 research paper by Hsiao et al. 
entitled ‘Taiwan Environmental Consciousness: Indicators of Collective Mind toward 
Sustainable Development’ which reports on a survey of the knowledge and attitudes of 
Taiwan adults. The researchers listed nine statements about environmental justice, and 
respondents were asked whether they disagreed or agreed with each of them (Hsiao et al. 
2001). The results which are set out in Table 3.1, show that the questions which got the 
most support were those which endorsed the general principles of environment justice. 
These are question numbers 6 and 8, the answers to which confirmed that most people 
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(96.9% and 81.8% respectively) supported the notion of environmental justice.  
 
Also, only a minority of respondents (32.5% and 28.5% respectively) were in favour of 
the siting of nuclear waste repositories (question 1) or waste incinerators (question 9)  
if local residents were given compensation, and only a minority (33.1%) were in favour 
of siting industrial developments near aboriginal settlements (question 3). However, on 
other issues, there was little support for environmental justice. For example, on question 
4, a large majority (75.7%) of respondents approved the government’s right to build a 
reservoir to solve a water shortage many miles away from the site where local residents 
strongly objected to the project. Similarly, only 25.8% were in favour of aboriginal 
rights to make use of national park resources (question 2), while 55.5% supported the 
shipping of nuclear waste from Taiwan to other countries (question 7), and 44.9% were 
willing to sacrifice some people’s living environments for the sake of economic 
development (question 5).   
 
So the picture of environmental justice in Taiwan is patchy: general support for the 
principle of environmental justice, but lack of support on some issues where many 
respondents were prepared to accept environmental injustice as the price for economic 
development. However, although Taiwan might not like the UK and the U.S.A, have 
developed a radical and complete environmental movement, the people in Taiwan are 
aware of the importance of the environment generally, and in some respects Taiwan is 
more environmentally successful than the UK and the USA: for example, it started a 
recycling programme in every school and household in the early 1990s and banned the 
use of plastic bags in 1999. 
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Table 3.1 Results of Taiwan Environmental Consciousness Survey 2001 
Positive or 
Negative 
Question 
number 
Question % 
Negative  1.  Government has the right to store nuclear 
wastes in an area if local residents are given 
financial compensation.  
32.5% 
Positive  2 Aborigines living in national parks are 
entitled to use park resources (e.g. hunting, 
living in tribal habitats). 
25.8% 
Negative 3 It is acceptable for the government to permit 
cement and quarrying industrial zone near 
aboriginal residential areas. 
33.1% 
Negative 4 Though Mei-Nong’s residents strongly 
disagree, the government has the right to 
build a reservoir to solve the water shortage 
problem in the south of Taiwan. 
75.7% 
Negative 5 For the sake of economic development in 
Taiwan, some people’s living environment 
might have to be sacrificed.  
44.9% 
 
Positive 6 People have a basic right to enjoy clean air 
and water. 
96.9% 
Negative 7 It might be a good idea to ship and store 
Taiwan’s nuclear waste in other countries, 
such as North Korea or mainland China.  
55.5% 
Positive 8 It is not fair to locate incinerators and 
landfills disproportionately in poor 
81.8% 
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communities.  
Negative 9 So long as financial compensation is given 
to residents, it is acceptable to locate waste 
incinerators in poor communities. 
28.5% 
Source: Hsiao et al. 2001 
 
3.4 The meaning of environmental justice 
 
The US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) office of environmental justice has 
provided the following definition of environmental justice:  
 
‘to ensure that all people, regardless of race, national origin or income, 
are protected from disproportionate impact of environmental hazards. 
To be classified as an environmental justice community, residents must 
be a minority and / or low income group; excluded from the 
environmental policy setting and /or decision-making process; subject 
to a disproportionate impact from one or more environmental hazards; 
and experience a disparate implementation of environmental regulation, 
requirements, practices and activities in their communities’ (USEPA 
2000). 
 
Within this definition we can discern two distinct elements of justice: distributive and 
procedural. Distributive justice is related to issues of unequal distribution of 
environmental ‘bads’ and ‘goods’. Procedural justice is related to issues of access to 
decision-making processes which give rise to these unequal distributions of 
environmental bad and goods. In the case of nuclear waste, it is argued that local 
communities suffered disproportionate health risks from hosting disposal sites in their 
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areas because they lacked power in the decision-making process. It is worth noting that 
these two kinds of environmental injustice are situated within three more general senses 
of injustice: (1) economic injustice (inequality of economic resources between the rich 
and the poor); (2) political injustice (inequality of political power between the elite and 
the mass); and (3) cultural injustice (inequality of social respect between favoured and 
unfavoured ethnic communities). As we shall see, each of these broader senses of 
injustice is touched on by the principles of distributive and procedural environmental 
justice.   
 
3.4.1 Concept of Risk 
 
As I stated in the previous chapters, people’s fear of radioactive waste is because of the 
risk from radiation. But the concept of risk is problematic. As Fischhoff (1990) has 
suggested, people respond to risks depending on how they perceive those risks, and 
especially their perception regarding how large those risks are, how painful their 
realisation would be, what opportunity exist for controlling them, and how costly the 
control would be. People’s perception of risks could be affected by their own 
experiences, how the information of risks has been communicated, and the 
psychological mechanisms for processing uncertainty. (Renn 2004).  
 
As for environmental risks, these issues sometimes can be very technical therefore 
uncertain and unfamiliar for people. In this respect, people rely on experts to inform 
them and to make decisions regarding the likelihood of risks. But people also perceive 
risk according to their psychological make-up and social-economic circumstances 
(Henwood et al. 2008). What people choose to fear and how to fear depends on their 
personalities and relationships, leading them to downplay or overplay certain risks 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Therefore, while the experts’ perceived risks are based 
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on scientific evidence, members of the general public could have different views on the 
same risks. This conflict between subjective and objective perceptions of risk has often 
arisen over environmental hazards.  
 
3.5. Distributive environmental justice 
 
3.5.1. Who are the recipients of environmental justice? 
 
The first issue to be considered is the scope of the discussion on distributive 
environmental justice: how far do we extend the notion?  We have to determine who 
are the recipients of environmental justice. As we have seen, the environmental justice 
movement began at a local level in the USA when local communities stood up to fight 
against the pollution in their area condoned by state authorities, so the original 
recipients of distributive environmental injustice were the members of local 
communities. However, during the last decades, with more and more environmental 
injustice cases occurring between communities and between countries (such as the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident), the range of recipients of distributive environmental 
injustice has widened considerably. Dobson has suggested that the communities of 
environmental justice should include present and future generations, all sentient beings, 
and the ‘agent- affected8’ (Dobson 1998: 63). However, for the purpose of this thesis, 
the recipients of environmental justice will be confined to the present generation and the 
next generation of the population in Taiwan.  
 
3.5.2. What should be distributed? 
 
                                                 
8
 ‘Agent-affected’ means anyone or thing affected by environmental conditions caused by the actions of 
another.   
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The second issue to be clarified is what should be distributed? There are two candidate 
categories: (1) the distribution of environmental ‘bads’ or burdens; and (2) the 
distribution of environmental ‘goods’ or benefits. The early campaigns for 
environmental justice were mainly preoccupied by the first category. As we have seen, 
the environmental justice movement first started in the USA because environmental 
hazard, toxic or pollution was disproportionately distributed to low-income or ethnic 
minority communities. These are the cases where an unequal distribution of 
environmental ‘bads’ led ethnic minorities or low income communities to suffer from a 
disproportionate burden of health threats. A 1983 report by the US General Accounting 
Office documented concluded that three-quarters of the landfill sites in the USA were in 
communities of low-middle income, African Americans, or Latino Americans, and that 
these populations typically received inadequate public health and social services and 
lived in economically undeveloped areas with high rates of unemployment (Hofrichter 
1993: 6). Similarly, research in the UK found that 66 per cent of carcinogen emissions 
in England were in the most deprived 10% of wards (Friends of the Earth 2001 and Bell 
2002).  
 
One solution to this problem would be to redistribute the environmental bads equally 
across the whole population, requiring everyone to share the same amount of 
environmental hazards. But such a fair distribution of environmental bads may be 
impracticable in that some environmental hazards (including nuclear waste hazards) 
cannot be evenly located throughout communities. 
 
More recently, the idea of distribution has embraced not only environmental bads or 
burdens but also environmental goods or benefits. For example, Wenz claimed that 
environmental justice is about the distribution of benefits and burdens among all those 
affected by environmentally-related decisions and actions (Wenz 1998:4 and Warren 
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1999). Miller has defined environmental goods as ‘any aspect of the environment to 
which a positive value may be attached’ (Miller 1999: 152). Hartley has claimed that 
environmental justice is the fair distribution of environmental quality (Hartley 1995: 
287 and Warren 1999). Environmental justice is thus seen as not only about stopping 
‘bads’ but also about promoting ‘goods’ such as being able to experience quality 
environments and environmental quality (Agyeman 2002). So while a fairer distribution 
of environmental hazards is the first aim of distributive environmental justice, every 
person is also entitled to have a fair share of environmental goods. The next section 
discusses principles of distribution to understand how to achieve a fairer distribution of 
both environmental hazards and environmental goods. 
 
3.5.3. Principles of distribution 
  
3.5.3.1 Equality   
 
The most obvious distributive principle of environmental justice is equality – that 
everyone should experience the same amount of environmental bads, and receive the 
same amount of environmental goods. Shrader-Frechette (2002: 24) wrote that 
‘presumably the principles ought to requires that, all things being equal, rich and poor, 
coloured and white, educated and non-educated, be treated equally in the distribution of 
society’s environmental benefit and burdens’, and enunciated the ‘principle of Prima 
Facie Political Equality’ (PPFPE) which comprised the following four propositions:  
 
1. The comparison class is all humans, and all humans have the same capacity for a 
happy life. 
2. Free, informed, rational people would agree to a principle of political equality 
3. This principle provides the basic justification for all schemes involving justice, 
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fairness, rights, and autonomy 
4. It presupposes equality of treatment for persons similarly situated 
(Shrader-Frechette 2002: 26). 
 
Shrader-Frechette explained that she “presumes that equality is defensible and that only 
different or unequal treatment requires justification”, and so the goals of PPFPE are to 
‘help to ensure equal distribution of environmental impacts and to place the burden of 
proof on those attempting to justify unequal distributions’ (Shrader-Frechette 2002: 28). 
 
Bell (2004) stated that the advocates of environmental justice have employed three 
principles of distribution: (1) equality; (2) equality plus a guaranteed standard; and (3) a 
guaranteed minimum with variation above that minimum according to personal income 
and spending choices. Bell started from the point that the environmental justice 
movement drew attention to the unequal distribution of pollution – i.e. that those who 
suffer a disproportionate burden of environment bads do so because they are 
economically poorer or ethnic minorities. Therefore, the first principle of environmental 
justice is equality, or more specifically, ‘to be polluted equally’. This argument echoes 
Shrader-Frechette’s last two PPFPEs. Then as the idea of distribution is extended from 
environmental bads or burdens to include environmental benefit or goods, Bell added 
the second and third principles of distribution to not only require an equal distribution 
of environmental bad but also to require that people have a guaranteed standard of 
environmental quality both to survive and to have an opportunity to lead their lives in 
accordance with their preferences. The latter requirement echoes Shrader-Frechette’s 
first principle of PPFPE.  
 
Equality is thus a central principle of distributive environmental justice. Applying this 
principle to the issue of nuclear waste, dumping nuclear waste in certain area(s) of a 
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nation creates an unequal distribution of health risks to the members of communities 
which host nuclear waste. While people in the society all benefit from the electricity 
which is generated from nuclear power plants, people who live in the communities 
which host nuclear wastes are the only ones to suffer from the risk of radioactive 
material. In the USA, according to Easterling and Kunreuther (1995: 35)9, nuclear waste 
repositories are usually located in Western States despite the fact that Eastern States 
have a greater population and a greater use of electricity (Easterling and Kunreuther 
1995: 36 and Marshall 2005). Likewise in Canada, according to Lois Wilson, the south 
produces nuclear waste while the north is more often the location of repositories for 
nuclear waste (Wilson 2000 and Marshall 2005). Similarly in Taiwan, over 80% of 
nuclear waste is stored in an indigenous people’s island situated 75 km from the main 
island (Oon 2001: 262), while in the UK, most nuclear waste is stored in Sellafield in 
northwest England and Dounreay in the north of Scotland (Institution of Engineers and 
Technology 2005: 6-9) - both of which are communities in disadvantaged areas. This 
inequality also produces identifiable health problems. In the previous chapter, evidences 
have shown the higher possibilities of leukaemia for people who live near nuclear waste 
facilities in the U.K, France, and Germany.  
 
In relation to nuclear waste, the risk is strongly associated with distributive 
environmental injustice. The risk here means the health risk which could affect the 
members of local communities, since evidence has shown a higher incidence of 
negative health effects for people living near nuclear facilities. If nuclear waste is sited 
near a community, a health risk is unequally distributed to the members of that 
                                                 
9
 Easterling, D., and Kunreuther, H. (1995) The Dilemma of Siting a High-Level Nuclear Waste 
Repository, Boston: Kluwer. pp35. See also   
Marshall, A. (2005) “The Social and Ethical Aspect of Nuclear Waste,” Electronical Green Journal, 21. 
http://egj.lib.uidaho.edu/egj21/marshall1.html, 17 May 2008. 
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community, thereby creating distributive injustice. However, this risk is often 
downplayed by some experts who claim that engineered barriers such as deep disposal 
faculties could prevent the potential health risks. This is a good example of the fact that 
local people have different perceptions regarding nuclear waste risks to the experts. This 
dispute could be solved by procedural means such as providing accurate information 
and participation in order to build up trust between experts and local people in the siting 
processes. 
 
For a utilitarian, such distributive injustice in particular communities might be justified 
because of the greater good experienced by the rest of society. But for an egalitarian, it 
is a different matter: egalitarians hold that ‘it is in itself bad if some people are worse off 
than others’ (Temkin 2003: 62 and Parfit 1998: 3) In other words, egalitarians see 
equality as an intrinsic value. In the case of nuclear waste, communities which host 
nuclear waste would be worse off than communities far away from radioactive waste, 
but egalitarians would not accept that this inequality can be offset by a greater benefit to 
the whole of the country. 
 
However, egalitarians have to face up to the so-called ‘levelling down problem’, which 
arises if we choose to level down the position of one of the better-off groups to make the 
position of all the groups equal. In order to achieve fairer distribution, can we really 
distribute nuclear waste equally to every person by requiring every community to host 
the same amount of nuclear waste? Not only is this technologically impossible because 
managing nuclear waste needs very specific technology, but it would encounter the 
normative problem that it would inflict harm on the majority without materially 
benefiting the minority.  
 
3.5.3.2. Priority  
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One way of dealing with the levelling-down criticism is Parfit’s ‘priority view’ (Parfit 
1998: 3). According to Parfit, the priority view is that the well-being of worse-off 
people is more important than the well-being of better-off people. Prioritarians are not 
concerned about the relative positions of people in society, but hold that it is simply 
wrong if people are very badly off – i.e. at a low absolute level of well-being. 
Prioritarians argue that helping such people is the highest priority for the society. In the 
case of radioactive waste, those who suffer from hosting radioactive waste are very 
badly off, therefore, to improve their condition is a high priority for the society.  
 
3.5.3.3 Sufficiency  
 
Another way to escape from the egalitarian’s levelling-down problem is to make use of 
the principle of sufficiency. Harry Frankfurt argued that ‘what is important from the 
point of view of morality is not that everyone should have the same but that everyone 
should have enough’ (Frankfurt 1988: 134; c.f. Rosenberg 1995: 56). For Frankfurt, the 
idea of sufficiency requires a certain level of well-being, and once this level of 
well-being has been reached, no further action needs to be taken. So if people are below 
the threshold of sufficiency, then it is the sole distributive duty of society to bring these 
people up to the level of sufficiency. The central concern for the sufficiencirians, 
therefore, is that people have enough rather than the same. As long as all have at least a 
sufficiency, any inequality between them can be tolerated. The idea of sufficiency not 
only provides a basic level of well-being to enable everyone to survive, but it also an 
opportunity for people to compete for further resources in order to fulfil their personal 
preferences. This idea echoes Bell’s second and third principle of distribution which is 
equality plus a guaranteed standard; and a guaranteed minimum with variation above 
that minimum according to personal income and spending choices. In the case of 
nuclear waste, those who suffered an unequal distribution of health risk from nuclear 
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waste would thereby experience well-being below the sufficiency level – in some 
extreme cases lacking the minimum standard of health necessary for survival. Therefore, 
action would be needed to bring up their well-being to the sufficiency level (i.e. not 
only to survive, but to fulfil their preferences). This raises the question of how and what 
we should give to these severely disadvantaged people in order to raise them to the 
sufficiency threshold – i.e. what compensation they should receive. 
  
3.5.3.4. Compensation  
 
Both prioritarians and suffiencirians demand measures to compensate people who are 
either very badly off or below the sufficiency threshold, because of the siting of nuclear 
waste repositories in their communities. In order to meet the principle of either priority 
or sufficiency, therefore, it has been deemed necessary to compensate people who host 
radioactive waste by offering them such benefits as money (including grants or tax 
rebates), employment, or investment in public infrastructure (Openshaw et al: 11). In 
many countries, governments and nuclear industries have provided financial 
compensation to local communities which host nuclear waste. Although estimating 
levels of compensation for future generations is next to impossible, many countries have 
established funds for expenditure on nuclear waste management in the future. In our 
case study country of Taiwan, the government-owned nuclear industry, Taiwan Power 
Company, as discussed at section 2.5.3.3, has provided fund which to be used only for 
the final disposal of nuclear waste and decommissioning of nuclear power plants. 
Because the amount of money accumulated is quite high, it has attracted considerable 
interest among local communities and other countries to compete for the contract for a 
nuclear waste repository.  
 
3.6. Procedural environmental justice  
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Turning to the second aspect of environmental justice – procedural justice – we focus on 
the process of decision-making rather than the outcome of those processes (which is the 
subject of distributive justice). Procedural environmental justice is as important as 
distributive environmental justice. Indeed, at times, activists in the environmental 
justice movement seem to be more exercised by procedural issues than by distributive 
issues. This may be because they hold that procedural injustice is the cause of much 
distributive injustice. For example, the reason why people suffer from a 
disproportionately high level of health risk from nuclear waste is often believed to be 
because those people lack the power to participation in the decision-making process, 
which, as we shall see, is a form of procedural injustice. There are five elements in 
procedural environmental justice: non-discrimination; participation; information; local 
knowledge; and trust.      
 
3.6.1 Non-discrimination 
 
The first element in procedural environmental justice is non-discrimination. Bullard 
describes this element as ‘the extent to which governing rules and regulations, evolution 
criteria, and enforcement are applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Unequal 
protection result from non-scientific and undemocratic decisions, such as exclusionary 
practices, conflicts of interest, or public hearings held in remote locations and at 
inconvenient times’ (Bullard 2000: 10).   
 
3.6.2. Participation 
 
The second element in procedural environmental justice is political participation. 
Schlosberg states that ‘without a doubt, the demand for political participation in 
decisions governing communities is central to the environmental justice movement’ 
 77
(Schlosberg 2003: 92). In Freudenberg and Steinsapir’s study of the environmental 
justice movement, it is suggested that the first and major shared perspective among the 
grassroots is the ‘right of citizens to participate in making environmental decisions - 
emphasis on process as well as content of decision making’ (Schlosberg 2003: 92)10. 
Participation is certainly an essential principle of procedural justice. Environmental 
justice groups not only seek particular and incremental policy changes but also 
fundamental change in the processes of environmental and economic decisions that 
affect their communities. They call for a more thorough participatory local input into, 
and control over, environmental decisions, demanding ‘participation in assessment, 
planning, and implementation’ so decisions on environmental issues are properly 
discussed before decisions are made. For example, in the USA, the Southwest 
Organizing Project’s ‘Community Environmental Bill for Right’ stated ‘We have the 
right to participate as equals in all negotiations and decisions affecting our lives, 
children, home and jobs. We have the right of access without cost to information and 
assistance that will make our participation meaningful, and have our needs and concerns 
as the major factor in all policy decisions. Government agencies at all levels should be 
responsive to our needs, provide us with necessary data and include us in all 
negotiations with polluters. We have the right to sit at the negotiation table’ (Intel 
Corporation, SouthWest Organizing Project, and Electronics Industry Good Neighbor 
Campaign 1995: 20). 
 
This emphasis on public participation reflects the frustration of environmental justice 
                                                 
10
 Quote from Schlosberg, D. (2003) “The Justice of Environmental Justice: Reconciling, Equality, 
Recognition, and Participation in a Political Movement” in Light, A. and De-Shalit, (eds) Moral and 
Political Reasoning in Environmental Practice, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 77-106. Original in 
Freudenberg, N., and Steinsapir, C. (1992) “Not in My Back Yard: the Grassroots Environmental 
Movement” in Dunlap, R., and Mertig, A. (eds) American Environmentalism: The U.S. Environmental 
Movement, 1970-1990, New York: Taylor & Francis. 
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groups with the traditional governmental practice of undertaking public consultation 
after decisions have been made. This practice has been dubbed the 
Decide-Announce-Defend approach (Hunt 2001: 223; Marshall 2005). The government 
decides in advance which of the alternative policies its officials and experts think is 
appropriate, and then they announce their decision in parliament to allow debate and 
inform the public. As a result of the debate in parliament and the reaction from the 
public, the government adjusts its policy and finalises its decision. This approach has 
attracted heavy criticism by environmental justice groups, because people from local 
communities can only express their opinion on the decision through their MPs in 
parliament during a debate when they are facing a decision that has largely been taken. 
In some cases, the local communities are not even informed before the government 
announces their decision. The most notorious example of this practice in relation to 
nuclear waste in Taiwan occurred in the 1980s when the government took the decision 
to build a repository in an indigenous people’s island. The local people did not realize 
that a nuclear waste was to be built on their land until the nuclear waste repositories 
began to operate.  
 
3.6.3 Information 
 
The third element in procedural environmental justice is access to information, without 
which environmental justice groups would be hamstrung in their campaigns. In the case 
of nuclear waste, access to information not only means obtaining information, but 
getting that information disseminated in local communities in order to keep people 
informed about latest developments, and extending public discourse to everyone 
affected by decisions. It also means ensuring that people understand the information, 
because nuclear issues are very complex and technical, and even when information does 
get into local communities, local people might not be able to grasp its significance or 
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implications for them. Scientists and local people may use very different terminology 
when they describe the same nuclear phenomena. The UK government has produced 
many documents about radioactive waste management which contain technical terms 
which are hard for lay people to follow. Such technical communication gaps need to be 
filled by regular visits from government agencies and industry representatives to local 
communities to explain the meaning of such documents, and by the establishment of an 
environmental information centre. 
 
However, in some instances, misunderstandings are cultural rather than technical, as 
Schlosberg points out in the case of Cora Tucker, an African-American activist, who, at 
a town board meeting, when white women were addressed as Mrs. So and so, she was 
addressed as Cora (Schlosberg 2003: 89). Also When Lois Gibbs one of the leading 
environmental justice campaigner told her stories about Love Canal, the representatives 
appeared not to have listened to her testimony (Schlosberg 2003: 89). In other cases, 
misunderstandings may have been deliberately fostered, as when the Taiwan 
government appeared to have duplicitly gained the consent of the people of Orchid 
Island (Lan Yu) to store radioactive waste in their area, because Orchid Island (Lan Yu) 
local communities claimed that they were told that the government was going to build a 
fish canning factory.  
 
3.6.4 Local knowledge  
 
The fourth element in procedural environmental justice is local knowledge. Most 
environmental justice movement activists come from communities that have suffered a 
disproportionate burden of environmental hazards, and their knowledge of the problems 
arises out of their own experiences, by contrast to the knowledge of the problems 
possessed by the scientists, which arises out of their site investigations, laboratory 
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analyses, and computer simulations. Such contrasts are common in environmental 
controversies, often resulting in opposing views about the seriousness of the problem, 
with scientists claiming that the environmental impact is less significant to human 
health but local people claiming the environmental impact is very serious. An example 
of such a conflict in Taiwan concerned the rusty barrels of radioactive waste stored at 
Orchid Island (Lan Yu) which the scientists at the government-owned nuclear power 
company Taipower claimed did not leak or constitute a danger, but the local people 
suspected discharged radioactive material. 
 
One way to resolve such an impasse, typically urged by environmental groups, is to ask 
the various parties to visit the site to help people from outside to understand the nature 
of the environmental injustice which members of local communities were suffering. 
Another way of resolving the deadlock is for the community’s knowledge to be included 
in the assessment of environmental impact. As Schlosberg explains, ‘this participatory 
research or popular epidemiologist approach uses community members to help to 
understand and explain several environmental illnesses’ (Schlosberg 1999: 164, Brown 
1992, Brown and Tandon 1983, Bryant 1995, and Gaventa 1991). Such local knowledge 
could be institutionalised by establishing an environmental justice centre in a nearby 
university to encourage respect for community knowledge. These centres could conduct 
participatory research as well as educate local people on environmental justice issues. 
 
3.6.5 Trust  
 
The fifth element in procedural environmental justice is trust. Trust is an essential 
pre-requisite of a fair process for resolving nuclear waste management controversies, 
and many of the other elements of procedural environmental justice such as 
participation and information depend upon it. Trust in scientific experts in the nuclear 
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waste issue is particularly important, as nowadays they are rarely seen as neutral: local 
communities often discount experts’ evidence because of whom the experts work for, 
especially when, as in many countries, nuclear industries are state-owned. Indeed, 
whenever local communities are not in favour of the decision which government has 
made on nuclear waste management, they invariably do not believe the evidence 
presented by industry experts. Significantly, the Eurobarometer opinion poll found that 
29% of European citizens were very worried about the way that nuclear waste is 
handled in their own countries and only 10% trusted the information provided by 
nuclear industries (European Commission 2002 and Marshall 2005). 
 
Lack of trust increases public anxiety over the health risks of nuclear waste siting. In 
decision making of nuclear waste siting, Slovic et al. 1991 claimed that the lack of a 
trustworthy process for siting, developing, and operating a nuclear waste repository in 
the US nuclear waste management had created a ‘crisis of confidence’. This e crisis of 
confidence refers to the breakdown of trust in scientific governmental and industrial 
managers of nuclear technology. A restoration of trust by a transparent policy process, 
dissemination of information, and thorough public participation would improve people’s 
perception of environmental risks, and thereby help to achieve public acceptance of 
equitable proposals for hazardous waste siting.  
 
3.7. Economic injustice 
 
In the previous section, the most common elements of environmental justice were 
presented. However, when we look into the case study of politics of nuclear waste, 
procedural injustice and distributive injustice are often situated within more general 
injustices issues. This section presents these more general injustices which are economic 
injustice, political injustice, and cultural injustice. 
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Economic injustices exist in most societies. Many studies have suggested that poorer 
people and ethnic minorities tend to live near waste facilities and bear a 
disproportionate share of health risks from exposures to toxins. Taylor (2000) 
discovered that deprived and minority communities were more likely to be exposed to 
environmental hazard, more likely to suffer the disproportionate impact of 
environmental process, and more likely to be targeted for siting noxious facilities 
(Walker et al 2003: 25)11. In the UK, Friends of the Earth (1999) was the first to 
examine the relation between income and pollution facilities. They found that 662 of 
pollution sites including waste facilities in England and Wales were located in areas 
where the annual household incomes were less than £15,000. By contrast, there were 
only 5 pollution sites located in areas where the annual household incomes were 
£30,000 or more (Walker et al 2003:25)12. Following the study in 1999, Friends of the 
Earth (2001) study confirmed that 66 percent of the total carcinogenic emissions in 
England in 1999 were in the 10 percent most-deprived electoral wards and only 8 
percent of emissions were in the least-deprived 50 percent of the wards (Walker et al 
2003: 25)13. In 2004, Friends of the Earth (2004) also discovered that 8 out of 16 
                                                 
11
 Quote from Walker, G., Fairburn, J., and Smith G. (2007) Addressing Environmental Inequalities: 
Waste Management, Bristol: Environmental Agency. 
http://publications.environment-agency.gov.uk/PDF/SCHO0507BMRV-E-E.pdf (Accessed: 31 August 
2011). Originally from  
Taylor, D (2000) “The Rise of the Environmental Justice Paradigm,” the American Behavioral Scientists, 
43(4), 508-580. 
12
 Quote from Walker, G., Fairburn, J., and Smith G. (2007) Addressing Environmental Inequalities: 
Waste Management, Bristol: Environmental Agency. 
http://publications.environment-agency.gov.uk/PDF/SCHO0507BMRV-E-E.pdf (Accessed: 31 August, 
2011). Originally from 
Friends of the Earth (1999) Pollution Injustice and the Geographic Relation between Household Income 
and Polluting Factories, London: Friends of the Earth.  
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/income_pollution.html (Accessed: 31 August 2011). 
13
 Quote from Walker, G., Fairburn, J., and Smith G. (2003) Addressing Environmental Inequalities: 
Waste Management, Bristol: Environment Agency. 
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municipal incinerations in England were located in the 10 percent most-deprived 
electoral wards (Walker et al 2003: 25)14. So people who are poorer or lack resources 
would be more likely to live in the areas where there are more shares of environmental 
bads. Similarly, environmental risks are more likely to be imposed on 
economically-disadvantaged communities as we can see from the evidence in the 
previous section. Environmental risk factors are integrally linked to these economic 
injustices. Although environmental risks do not necessarily cause economic injustices in 
the first place, environmental injustices occur because such risks are imposed on 
economically disadvantage people and areas. And because the environmental risks have 
been distributed unequally, they make disadvantaged people and areas even become 
more economically disadvantaged. For example, in Lan Yu, Taiwan, it was one of the 
poorest places in Taiwan before nuclear waste was dumped there, and over the years 
people’s living standard in Lan Yu has not improved (as promised by Taipower) but 
deteriorated If it is true that economically-disadvantaged people would be likely to trade 
off the health risks of nuclear waste siting in their areas for better living standards, in 
Lan-Yu they were exposed to the health risks but cheated of the economic benefits.  
 
In the case of nuclear waste siting, deprived areas might have been targeted by the 
policy makers because they have fewer resources to use for resistance. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                               
http://publications.environment-agency.gov.uk/PDF/SCHO0507BMRV-E-E.pdf, (Accessed: 31 August 
2011). Originally from 
Friends of the Earth (2001) Pollution and Poverty: Breaking the Link, London: Friends of the Earth. 
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/briefings/pollution_and_poverty.pdf, (Accessed: 31 August 2011). 
14
 Quote from Walker, G., Fairburn, J., and Smith G. (2003) Addressing Environmental Inequalities: 
Waste Management, Bristol: Environment Agency. 
http://publications.environment-agency.gov.uk/PDF/SCHO0507BMRV-E-E.pdf, (Accessed: 31 August 
2011). Originally from  
Friends of the Earth (2004) Incinerators and Deprivation. Brief, London: Friends of the Earth. 
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/briefings/incineration_deprivation.pdf, (Accessed: 31 August 2011). 
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economic inequalities increase the vulnerability for local people to host nuclear waste, 
and weaken their power to obtain compensation to improve their living standards.  In 
chapter six, the economic situations in the two case study communities will be 
presented, and how the economic inequalities affected their decisions on hosting nuclear 
waste will be examined in the interviews with residents.  
 
3.8. Political injustice 
 
A political injustice is another more general injustice which leads to environmental 
injustice. Political injustice is linked with lack of public participation, and in most 
democratic countries, to participate in elections, and enjoy freedom of assembly, 
freedom of expression, and freedom of speech are regarded as universal human rights. 
However, even in democratic countries, because of the unequal political power and 
influence people suffer from, the burden of environmental risks is likely to be shared 
unequally. Similar to economic justice, environmental risks are more likely to be 
imposed on communities where political injustice exists, because politically powerless 
people cannot fight back.  
 
Political inequality can be present in various forms in terms of nuclear waste siting. 
First, information provided by nuclear industries could be misleading. Second, there 
could be failure to thoroughly inform local communities about the option to host nuclear 
waste. Third, lack of thorough discussion inside or outside local communities increases 
the likelihood of unfairness in the siting of nuclear waste repositories. Fourth, those 
communities which suffer from political inequality often are deprived and minority 
communities, and their voices are often neglected by decision makers. Fifth, when the 
powerful nuclear industry uses its vast economic resources to exercise its power in order 
to obtain the acceptance of its proposals for hosting nuclear waste, members of local 
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communities can hardly compete with them even in a democracy. Deprived and 
minority communities are often targeted for hazard waste siting because they have less 
power to influence the decision makers. Even though many countries require 
referendums for local people on decisions over hosting nuclear waste, unequal political 
power can mislead local people in referendums. The next two chapters will explore how 
opponents of nuclear waste from local communities suffered political inequality in the 
decision-making process of choosing nuclear waste storage sites, and how they 
struggled to articulate their opposition in such an unequal political situation.  
 
3.9. Cultural injustice 
 
Culture environmental justice is another aspect of the injustice issue which this research 
would like to point out in the discussion of dumping nuclear waste or other 
environmental hazard in indigenous people’s areas. 
 
Cultural injustice is often linked with recognition. The concept of recognition means 
sensitivity to differences, especially cultural differences, between groups of people. 
Misrecognition can easily lead to an unequal distribution of environmental risk. As Iris 
Young has argued in ‘Justice and political differences’, ‘where social group differences 
exist and some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, social justice requires 
explicitly acknowledging and attending to those group differences in order to undermine 
oppression’(Young 1990: 81; c.f. Schlosberg 2004). According to Schlosberg, lack of 
recognition, which ‘could be demonstrated by various forms of insults, degradation, and 
devaluation at both the individual and cultural level, inflicts damage to both oppressed 
communities and the image of those communities in the larger cultural and political 
realms’ (Schlosberg 2004). Honneth (1995: 190) connects recognition and participation, 
stating that ‘citizens are subject to a form of personal disrespect when they are 
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structurally excluded from the possession of certain rights within a given society….The 
experience of being denied rights is typically coupled with a loss of self-respect, of the 
ability to relate to oneself as a partner, and to interact in possession of equal rights on a 
par with all other individuals’ (Honneth 1995: 190; c.f. Schlosberg 2003: 84). But 
recognition is also an independent element of procedural environmental justice in that, 
for example, even where there is full public participation, there could still be lack of 
respect for an aboriginal or indigenous group by a failure to pay sufficient attention to 
their cultural identity. Moreover, for such groups, lack of recognition is not only an 
environmental issue: it is a matter of cultural survival. Lance Hughes, director of Native 
Americans for a Clean Environment has stated that ‘we are not an environmental 
organisation, and this is not an environmental issue. This is about our survival’ 
(Schlosberg 2003: 84). In terms of nuclear waste siting, failure to recognise cultural 
differences of local communities would result in cultural inequality. This often reflects 
decision makers’ attitude towards local people especially ethnic minorities. The case 
study of Da-Ren in Taitung County, has over 90% indigenous Paiwan people. How they 
suffer from cultural injustice will be explored through interviews in order to understand 
the opposition to nuclear waste in Taiwan. Here it is important to note the distinctive 
nature of cultural environmental injustice and its relationship to risk.  
 
Environmental risks which disproportionately affect ethnic minorities not only cause 
damage to local people as individuals but also damage their collective culture. As 
people’s perceptions of risk are based on their experiences and social-economic 
perspectives, environmental risks imposed on individuals and members of ethnic 
minorities have different effects. For example, O’Neill showed how contaminated fish 
in the Puget Sound and Columbia River brought different impacts to two local 
communities. As Puget Sound is Native American land, whereas the Columbia River is 
not; and Native Americans in the Puget Sound area consume more fish than do residents 
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in the Columbia River area , the impact of contaminated fish is much greater for them  
(O’Neill 2000; Yamamoto and Lyman 2001). Environmental risks imposed on ethnic 
minorities, therefore, is not only an issue of political and economic disadvantage but 
also an issue of cultural and ethnic survival. This is why, in the case of Lan Yu, the local 
Yami people see their fight against nuclear waste as an existential fight for their cultural 
future. 
 
 Environmental risks which are disproportionately allocated to different ethnic areas 
cause not only procedural, but also distributive injustice. And this distributive injustice 
goes beyond environmental injustice to exemplify a deeper form of injustice – cultural 
injustice. In fact, environmental injustice is both cause and effect of cultural injustice: 
cause, since environmental injustice inflicted on an ethnic minority reinforces cultural 
discrimination; effect, since cultural maltreatment makes an ethnic minority vulnerable 
to environmental discrimination.  
 
So there are three more fundamental justice issues which may lie behind the 
environmental justice - economic, political and cultural injustice. Economic injustice 
and political injustice explain how disadvantaged people often lack time, resources and 
power to participate in decision making, making them easily targeted for hazardous 
waste siting. However, cultural injustice has a different order of magnitude in that not 
only does it render a community vulnerable to nuclear waste siting and consequent loss 
of economic well-being and political autonomy, but it exposes a community to 
existential annihilation. 
 
3.10 Understanding the opposition: using an environmental justice framework 
 
In order to understand the opposition to a nuclear waste repository, this section will 
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provide a picture about how should we approach the idea of opposition in the siting 
process. Not in my back yard (NIMBY) is the term which is often used to describe 
opposition to local unwanted development, ranging from waste sites to wind farms 
(Devine-Wright 2008 and Burningham et al 2007) 15 . Many commentators have 
suggested that a person holding a NIMBY position is self-interested and opportunist. 
This is because Nimbys would not allow a development which did not suit their 
self-interest even if it is for the public good. However, there are scholars who suggest 
that Nimbys  have their own principles, usually attached to their land and identity. 
Nevertheless, Nimbyism can help us to understand the opposition of nuclear waste in 
terms of how the opposition has been conceptualised and developed. 
 
By conducting interviews with opponents of nuclear waste in the local communities, we 
can determine whether the opposition is based on Nimbyism or not. Of course, 
opponents might start from a Nimby position and then switch to demanding 
environmental justice in the process. Therefore, listening to the opponents of nuclear 
waste repository is important. The interviews were carried in two communities in 
Taiwan, and the evidence will be analysed in chapter seven.  
 
3.11. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined the concept of environmental justice in some detail to 
establish a framework for its application to the case of Taiwan. This examination has 
traced the origin and development of the concept, showing how it has evolved from a 
                                                 
15
 Devine-Wright, P. (2008) “Rethinking Nimbyism: The Role of Place Attachment and place Identity in 
Explaining Place-protective Action”, Journal of Community and Applied Social phylogeny, 19, 426-441. 
Burningham, K., Barnett, J., and Thrush, D. (2007) The Limitation of the NIMBY Concept for 
Understanding Public Engagement with Renewable Energy Technology: A literature Review, Manchester: 
Manchester Architecture Research Centre, University of Manchester.  
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realisation that previous environmental groups were more concerned with the 
conservation of nature than the inequitable distribution of risks to human health. By 
contrast, environmental justice groups demanded a more egalitarian approach to 
environmental policy in order to protect vulnerable communities of low-income and 
disadvantaged ethnicity. The important distinction between distributive and procedural 
environmental justice is explained, focusing especially on the distributive principles of 
equality and sufficiency, and the procedural principles of participation, trust and 
recognition. Also, the wider forms of injustice that often lie behind instances of 
environmental justice, as both causes and effects – economic, political, and cultural 
injustice – have been explored and their implications discussed.   
 
In chapter seven, these principles will be applied to the case of Taiwan. The next chapter 
(four) begins the analysis of the Taiwan nuclear waste case by explaining its 
geo-political context.     
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Chapter 4. Taiwan – The Geo-Political Context 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to understand Taiwan in its geo-political context. The chapter 
has five parts: (1) the geography and demography of Taiwan; (2) the political history of 
the country; (3) its path of economic development; (4) its foreign policy; and (5) its civil 
society.  
 
4.2 The geography and demography of Taiwan 
 
4.2.1 Geography 
 
Taiwan is an island located in the Western Pacific, 160 kilometres (96 miles) from 
China across the Taiwan Strait to the west, with Ryukyu Islands (Japan’s most southerly 
island) to the north, and the Luzon islands of the Philippines to the south. Taiwan 
comprises 86 islands, including Taiwan main island, Penghu(澎湖 ) (Pescadore), 
Kinmen (金門), Matzu (馬祖), Green Island (綠島), and Orchid Island(蘭嶼) (Lanyu/ 
Lan Yu). The total land area is approximately 36,000 square kilometres (13,900 square 
miles) – approximately the same size as Holland. Taiwan Main Island is about 400 
kilometres (230 miles) long and 145 kilometres (85 miles) from east to west at its 
widest (Government Information Office 2009). It is situated between 22° 45’ and 22° 
50’ north latitude. Mountains occupy nearly two-thirds of Taiwan with more than two 
hundred peaks rising higher than 3,000 metres above sea level, including the highest 
peak of East Asia, Jade Mountain (玉山) at 3,952 metres (13,114 feet) (Government 
Information Office 2009). The mountain ranges lie in the middle and towards the east of 
Taiwan. The west coast is made up of basins and plains, which are the most productive 
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farming (mainly rice) areas (Copper 1999: 4). The climate of Taiwan is subtropical, with 
hot, humid weather from June to September, which is also the typhoon season.  Sitting 
on the boundary of the Eurasian and Philippine plates, Taiwan is also prone to 
earthquakes.  
 
Table 4.1: Maps of Taiwan 
 
Source: World Atlas .com http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/tw.htm 
 
4.2.2 Demography 
 
In 2010, the population of Taiwan was 23,165,878 (Directorate General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics). With two thirds of the land area covered by mountains, the 
distribution of the population in Taiwan is very uneven. Thirty-one per cent of the total 
population lives in 2.9% of the total land area, mostly in big cities on the west coast 
plains. In 2009, the population density was 640.09 people per square kilometre, making 
Taiwan the fifteenth most densely populated country in the world. Taiwan’s population 
has two main ethnic groups: over 95 per cent of the population are Han Chinese and 
around 2 per cent (503,259 in 2009) are aborigines, belonging to the Austronesian 
language group (Department of Household Registration Affairs). The Han(漢) Chinese 
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population includes Holo(河洛), Hakka (客家), and Mainland Chinese groups(外省), of 
which the Holo (or Fukienese 福建人) are the largest subgroup (about 70 per cent of 
the population) with significant economic power (Government Information Office 2011). 
From the 14th to the 17th century, the Holo migrated to Taiwan in large numbers and 
pushed many Hakka inland to the hills who in turn pushed the aborigines into the 
mountains or east plains. The Hakka, who came to Taiwan from southern Fukien or 
Canton province in China and make up 19.6 per cent of the population, (Council of 
Hakka Affairs 2009) were a persecuted minority in China, driven from northern China 
about 1500 years ago (Copper 1999: 11). By AD 1000, there were significant numbers 
of Hakka in southern Taiwan and the last large-scale Hakka migration to Taiwan was in 
the 1860s (Copper 1999: 11). The Mainland Chinese came to Taiwan with Chiang 
Kai-Shek (蔣介石) when the Nationalist government was defeated by the Communist 
Party in October 1949. Today, they are about 8.9 per cent ( Council of Hakka Affairs 
2009) of the population, and they dominated Taiwan politics and culture between 1945 
and 1980s, holding key positions, including senior posts in the government, military, 
and bureaucracy.   
 
The aboriginal population is even more divided: the Taiwan government recognises 14 
aboriginal tribes, most of whom live in the central mountains or on the east coast plains. 
The main exception is the Yami people (雅美族), who live on Orchid island (Lan Yu), 
which is about 73 km off Taiwan’s southeast coast. There has been a history of conflict 
between aboriginal communities and settlers, with aborigines forced from the western 
coastal plains (Government Information Office 2011). Most aborigines are engaged in 
agriculture, fisheries and, more recently, tourism. Generally, they are isolated from the 
main social, political and economic institutions in Taiwan. 
 
4.3 Political history of Taiwan  
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We turn now to the second part of Taiwan’s geo-political context – its political history. 
This section is divided into six timeframes: pre-1945; 1945-75; 1975-88; 1988-2000; 
2000-08; and 2008-to present.   
 
4.3.1 Pre-1945 
 
The first people who settled in Taiwan were those of Malay-Polynesian descent about 
12,000 to 15,000 years ago. Historical evidence suggests that the interaction between 
Taiwan and the rest of the world was infrequent before the 7th century A.D. Taiwan was 
successively under the rule of Mongols, the Dutch, the Spanish, and the Chinese until 
1894. However, China lost the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and, in the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, ceded sovereignty of Taiwan and Pescadores to Japan. Under Japanese 
colonial rule, which lasted until the end of World War II, Taiwan’s agricultural 
productivity increased, its infrastructure was improved, and modern banking and 
Japanese currency were introduced (Brown 2004: 61). From 1899 to 1942, the railway 
network was extended from 30 miles to more than 300 miles, and the highways system 
was extended from 4,184 miles to 10,816 miles (Brown 2004: 31 and Copper 1999: 31). 
Japan also introduced compulsory primary education in Taiwan. By 1944, there were 
944 primary schools in Taiwan with total enrolment rates of over 70 per cent (Brown 
2004: 31). However, the Japanese exploited Taiwan’s natural resources and, by the 
1930s, much of the rice and sugar production in Taiwan was exported to Japan (Copper 
1999: 25) . In the late 1930s, Japan promoted industrialization in Taiwan to support its 
preparations for war with new machinery, shipbuilding, petrochemical, textiles, and 
cement industries being developed in Taiwan (Brown 2004: 66). When Japan lost the 
war in 1945, Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China.  
 
4.3.2 1945-1975: Chiang Kai-Shek 
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The Republic of China (ROC) was founded in 1912 after the fall of the Imperial Ching 
Dynasty. At this time, Taiwan was under Japanese colonial rule, but after World War II, 
the Cairo Declaration stated that ‘all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, 
such as Manchuria, Formosa (Taiwan), and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the 
Republic of China’ (National Diet Library of Japan). In October 1945, Chiang Kai-Shek 
sent Nationalist Chinese officials and troops to Taiwan. There was considerable tension 
between the Taiwanese people and the mainland Chinese troops (Copper 1999: 35). This 
tension exploded on 27 February 1947, when a Taiwanese woman was beaten by a 
Mainlander policeman with his pistol on suspicion of selling smuggled cigarettes. This 
incident aroused the ill-feeling of the surrounding Taiwanese crowds towards the 
mainland troops, and the Taiwanese people protested against the government and police 
authority but the government did not respond. On the next day, Chinese troops were 
called in and fired on unarmed protestors. As the situation intensified, Chinese troops 
targeted those opposed to the Nationalist government, and between February and May 
1947 at least 6,000 people died in clashes between troops and the anti-government 
movement, while 10,000 were executed for joining the anti- government movement 
(Lee 1998: 35). This violent episode had a very significant influence on Taiwanese 
domestic politics, providing a historical focus for ethnic tensions in Taiwan for most of 
the second half of the twentieth century.  
 
In October 1949, the Nationalist government relocated from the mainland to Taiwan 
after Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist force had been defeated by the Chinese Communist 
Party forces in China. The Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang國民黨 KMT) had 
been founded by Sun Yat-Sen (孫逸仙) in 1894 as a revolutionary organisation. In 
October 1911, Sun and his followers successfully defeated the Imperial forces of the 
Ching Dynasty and subsequently established the Republic of China (ROC) in 1st 
January 1912. Sun died in 1925, and Chiang Kai-Shek, a military general and an ally of 
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Sun, succeeded as the leader of KMT, and Taiwan was under KMT rule until 2000. 
 
The KMT regime introduced martial law in order to deal with the national security 
threat from Communist China. The members of the Legislative Yuan and National 
Assembly16 who had been elected in mainland China before 1949 became life-long 
members and remained in parliament until December 1991. The military and 
intelligence agencies dominated politics and anti-government (pro-socialist, 
pro-communist and pro-independence) movements were prohibited. The KMT 
government controlled the trade unions and the media; rights to freedom of speech, 
assembly and association were curtailed; and there were no genuine civil society 
organisations. During Chiang Kai-Shek’s rule in Taiwan (1949-1975), approximately 
140,000 people in Taiwan were imprisoned or executed for their real or perceived 
opposition to the KMT government, according to a report of Executive Yuan of Taiwan 
(Wei 1997: 47). However, the KMT government allowed limited political participation 
to people in Taiwan, and in March 1966, the government decided to replace the 
deceased members of Legislative Yuan and National Assembly with popularly elected 
members, and supplementary elections were duly held for both bodies in 1969, 1972, 
and 1975. In 1969, there were 11 seats for supplementary election for the Legislative 
Yuan and 15 seats for the National Assembly. As a result, non-KMT member captured 3 
out of 11 seats in the Legislative Yuan election but KMT won all the 15 seats in the 
National Assembly election. In 1972, the eligible seats for supplementary election to 
Legislative Yuan and National Assembly increased to 51 and 53 seats, respectively. 
Non-KMT members won 9 out of the 51 seats in the Legislative Yuan election and 10 
out of the 53 seats in the National Assembly. In 1975, non-KMT members gained 9 out 
                                                 
16
 The Legislative Yuan is the highest legislative organ of the country, and the main function of the 
National Assembly was to elect the President and Vice President. However, constitutional amendments in 
1992 established the direct popular elections for the President and Vice President. The constitutional 
amendments in 2005 abolished the National Assembly and its other responsibilities have been transferred 
to Legislative Yuan. 
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of 52 seats. Although the newly elected members of Legislative Yuan and National 
Assembly comprised less than 10 percent of each body, the elections gave the 
Taiwanese people at least some degree of political participation. 
 
4.3.3 1975-88: Chiang Ching-Kuo (蔣經國) and the end of martial law 
 
After Chiang Kai-Shek’s death on 5 April 1975, his Vice President Yen Chia-Kan (嚴家
淦) succeeded as President until his term ended in 1978. However, Chiang Kai-Shek’s 
son Chiang Ching-Kuo, who succeeded Chiang Kai-Shek as KMT’s chairman after 
Chiang Kai-Shek’s death, became President after Yen's term ended in 1978. Chiang 
Ching-Kuo abandoned his father’s dream of returning to power in China. Instead, he 
focussed on economic development and modernising public infrastructure and, in his 
final years in power, he started the process of democratisation in Taiwan. He launched 
an anti-corruption campaign, which led to some government officials being jailed. He 
also increased the number of supplementary elections for members of the Legislative 
Yuan from 97 seats in 1980 to 129 seats in 1989.  
 
In the 1970s, an opposition movement for democratisation developed in Taiwan despite 
the continuation of martial law. By the late 1970s, although illegal, the Formosa 
Magazine was the most popular opposition publication in Taiwan, a rallying point for 
opposition Legislators and other opposition politicians who played key roles in the 
opposition movement. Their attempts to hold a public meeting to demand democratic 
reform on International Human Rights Day, 10 December 1979, led to the ‘Kaohsiung 
Incident” (高雄事件) when many opposition leaders were arrested and received long 
prison sentences. However, the opposition movement continued to develop in the early 
1980s, and Chiang Ching-Kuo began a slow process of political democratisation in 
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response to both internal and international pressure 17 , seeing democratisation as 
Taiwan’s best strategy for resisting China’s demand for re-unification. In 1984, Chiang 
Ching-Kuo appointed Lee Teng-Hui (李登輝), a Taiwanese loyal to KMT, as vice 
president – a  symbolic move indicating  Chiang’s intention to transfer political 
power from the mainland Chinese to the Taiwanese. In 1986, the KMT allowed the 
establishment of the first official opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP)(民進黨), which took part in national elections for the first time in 1986, when it 
won 12 seats out of 100 seats in the supplementary Legislative Yuan ballot - which 
matched the achievements of the pre-DPP opposition movement in 1980 (Cheng 1989). 
In 1987, Chiang Ching-Kuo ordered the end of martial law with effect from 15 July 
1987, and allowed Taiwanese residents to visit mainland China for the first time since 
1949. Finally, just before his death in 13 January 1988, he significantly increased the 
freedom of the press by ending state control of the media and allowing new TV stations 
and newspaper to be created. 
 
4.3.4 1988-2000: Lee Teng-Hui and Democratisation 
 
After Chiang Ching-Kuo’s death in January 1988, Vice President Lee Teng-Hui 
succeeded as President of ROC – the first Holo (Taiwanese) to become President of 
Taiwan. Lee worked with the opposition DPP and began a process of constitutional 
reform in 1989. The so-called ‘elder parliamentarians’, who had been elected in 
Mainland China before 1949, were retired and the first genuine general elections for the 
National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan took place in 1991 and 1992 respectively, 
with all seats contested. In the 1991 National Assembly elections, the KMT received 71 
percent of the vote and 254 seats while the DPP received 24 percent and 66 seats 
                                                 
17
 Taiwan lost its seat at the United Nations in October 1971, by which time it had lost its official 
diplomatic ties with most major countries such as USA, the UK, Japan, France, and Germany.  
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(Rubinstein 2007b: 455). In the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections, the KMT did less well 
but still managed to gain a majority of both votes (53%) and seats (95 out of 161) with 
the DPP winning 31.7 per cent of the vote and 51 seats (Copper 1999: 143).  
 
Table 4.2: Vote Shares of Major Political Parties in Legislative Yuan Elections, 
1992-2008 (%) 
 
Year 
 
KMT 
Seats  
Percentage 
of vote 
DPP 
Seats  
% 
NP 
Seats  
% 
PFP 
Seats  
% 
TSU 
Seats  
% 
Non18 
Seats  
% 
Total 
seats 
1992 95  
53.02% 
51  
31.03% 
   15 
15.95% 
161 
 
1995 85 
46.1% 
54 
33.2% 
21 
13% 
  4 
7.7% 
164 
 
1998 123 
46.4% 
70 
29.6% 
11 
7.1% 
  21 
 
225 
2001 68 
28.6% 
87 
33.4% 
1 
2.6% 
46 
18.4% 
13 
7.8% 
10 225 
2004 79 
32.83% 
89 
35.72% 
1 
0.12% 
34 
13.9% 
12 
7.79% 
10 
5.94% 
225 
2008 
Districts 
 
2008 
61 
53.48% 
 
20 
13 
38.65 
 
14 
0  
 
 
 
1 
0.3% 
 
 
0 
0.96 
 
 
4 
6.18% 
79 
 
 
34 
                                                 
18
 This column includes small party and non-party candidates 
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PR 
 
51.23% 31.53% 3.95%  
 
3.53%  
total 113 
Sources: Central Election Commission.  
 
In May 1992, Lee significantly increased the freedom of the press and expression by 
promulgating  a revision of Article 100 of the Criminal Code, which provides for 
imprisonment of people convicted of anti-state activities (Amnesty International 1992), 
and had been used by the KMT government to control the society for over 45 years. 
Since 1992, any expression of opinion regarding the independence of Taiwan is 
considered to be legal, so long as it is not violent. While Lee was in office, 
constitutional amendments in 1992 and 1994 made provision for the direct election of 
the President and city mayors in Taipei City and Kaohsiung City. This weakened the 
National Assembly because its most important function was to elect the President and 
the Vice President and to propose and ratify constitutional amendments.  
 
However, the speed of democratisation and the apparent abandonment of the possibility 
of re-unification of the Republic of China led to divisions in the KMT. In 1993, some 
Mainland Chinese members of the KMT left to establish the New China Party (NP), and 
in the 1995 Legislative Yuan election, the NP gained 21 seats with 13 per cent of the 
votes and the KMT were reduced to 85 seats (46.1% of the vote). The DPP slightly 
increased both its share of the votes (33.2%) and its number of seats (54).   
 
In 1996, Taiwan held its first direct presidential election, before which China conducted 
military exercises over the Taiwan Strait in what was widely seen as an attempt to 
influence its outcome. In response, the USA sent an aircraft carrier battle group to the 
region. Despite the threat from China, Lee Teng-Hui secured 54 per cent of the popular 
vote for the KMT to become the first directly elected President of the Republic of 
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China.   
 
Table 4.3: Results of the 1996 Presidential Election in Taiwan. 
Voter turnout: 76% 
President candidate Vice Presidential 
Candidate 
Political Affiliation Votes 
 
 % 
Lee Teng-Hui 
(李登輝) 
 
Lien Chan 
(連戰) 
 
KMT 
5,813,699 
 
54% 
Peng Ming-Min 
(彭明敏) 
Frank Hsieh 
(謝長廷) 
 
DPP 
2,274,586 
 
21.1% 
Lin Yang-Kang 
(林洋港) 
Hau Pei-Tsun 
(郝柏村) 
 
Independent  
1,603,790 
 
14.9% 
Chen Lu-An 
(陳履安) 
 
Wang Ching-Feng 
(王清峰) 
 
Independent  
1,074,044 
 
   9.9% 
Invalid votes/blank 
votes 
  
117,160 
Sources: Central Election Commission.  
 
However, the DPP did win 12 out of 23 local county/city mayoral elections in 1997, 
which put it in the position of running local government, giving it jurisdiction over 70 
percent of the total population in Taiwan. By contrast, the DPP did not perform well in 
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the 1998 Legislative Yuan election, because of the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis. 
Although Taiwan was not directly affected by the crisis, voters were convinced that the 
KMT could do better than the DPP in bringing economic stability. Therefore, the DPP 
lost nearly 4 percent of the total vote and managed to win only 70 out of 225 seats while 
the KMT retained its share of the vote by winning 46.4 per cent of the total vote and 
capturing 123 out of 225 seats.  
 
In the run-up to the 2000 Presidential election, the KMT suffered further internal 
divisions, with competition for the Presidential nomination between Vice President Lien 
Chan(連戰) (a Taiwanese Holo) and James Soong(宋楚瑜) (a mainlander Chinese).  
Lee supported his Vice President for the nomination and Soong decided to run as an 
independent in the 2000 Presidential election. The result was a significant split in the 
KMT vote and the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-Bian (陳水扁), was elected President. 
Chen received 39.3 per cent of the total votes, just 2.5 per cent more than Soong. Chen’s 
victory marked the first democratic transition of power in Taiwan and ended the 
half-century of KMT rule in Taiwan.  
 
Table 4.4: Results of the 2000 Presidential Election in Taiwan  
Voters’ turnout rate: 82.69% 
 
President  
Candidate 
Vice President 
Candidate 
Political Affiliation Votes 
 
      % 
Chen Shui-Bian 
(陳水扁) 
Annette Lu 
(呂秀蓮) 
 
DPP  
 
4,977,737 
39.3% 
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James Soong 
(宋楚瑜) 
Chang 
Chau-Hsiung 
(張昭雄) 
 
Independent  
4,664,932 
 36.8 % 
Lien Chan 
(連戰) 
 
Vincent Siew  
(蕭萬長) 
 
KMT 
2,925,513 
  23.1% 
Hsu Hsin-Liang  
(許信良) 
Josephine Chu  
(朱惠良) 
Independent 
7 9,429 
 0.63% 
Li Ao 
(李敖) 
  
Elmer Fung  
(馮滬祥) 
 
Independent  
16,782 
0.13% 
Invalid votes/blank 
votes  
  122,278 
Sources: Central Election Commission.  
 
4.3.5 2000-2008: Chen Shui-Bian and the DPP Government  
 
After the 2000 Presidential election, the DPP President Chen had to work with a KMT 
majority in the Legislative Yuan (115 of 225 seats). The 1997 constitutional amendment 
had introduced a French style semi-presidential system in Taiwan. The government is 
headed by a Prime Minister appointed by the President without the need for the consent 
of the Legislative Yuan. The Prime Minister is responsible to the Legislative Yuan and 
the legislators can cast a vote of no confidence in the government, but the President has 
the power to dissolve the Legislative Yuan should a vote of no confidence be passed 
(Wu 2001). In 2000, conflict between the DPP President Chen and the KMT-led 
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Legislative Yuan created political gridlock. This gridlock manifested itself in the nuclear 
debate when President Chen Shui-Bian sought to stop the construction of the 4th Nuclear 
Power Station19 in order to fulfill his campaign promises. Prime Minister Tang Fei (唐
飛) did not agree with Chen’s decision and resigned after only four months in office. 
Chen appointed his political ally Chang Chun–Hsiung (張俊雄) as Prime Minister, and 
announced an end to the construction of the 4th Nuclear Power Station – a decision 
which negatively affected the economy, because the stock market lost 47.7 percent of its 
value over fears of an energy shortage that would slow down economic development 
(Lin 2001). The DPP government had lost support in the business community, and 
foreign companies began to question Taiwan’s ability to honour its long-term contracts. 
In January 2001, the Council of Grand Justices intervened and declared that it was the 
legislature and not the cabinet that had the power to decide on the issue, and the next 
month Prime Minister Chang allowed the construction of the 4th Nuclear Power Station 
to continue. However, this volte face undermined the relationship between DPP and 
environmental groups which were allies when DPP was in opposition, but  felt that the 
DPP government had betrayed them for failing to deliver their anti-nuclear promises 
after they won the election. 
 
The result of the presidential election in 2000 also brought changes to party politics in 
Taiwan. After the election, the former Taiwan Governor, James Soong, established the 
People First Party (PFP), attracting several KMT members and legislators who did not 
like Lee Teng-Hui’s approach to democratisation. Angry supporters of KMT gathering 
outside KMT headquarters demanding that Lee Teng-Hui step down as party chairman – 
he duly obliged, but only to found the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) recruiting the 
Taiwanese Holo people who had worked closely in KMT with Lee, to fight the 
Legislative Yuan election campaign in 2001. In that election, KMT lost its majority in 
                                                 
19
 The construction of 4th Nuclear Power Station began in 1997 
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the Legislative Yuan, only winning 68 out of 225 seats, and DPP became the biggest 
party in the parliament with 87 out 225 seats. Both the PFP and TSU performed well in 
their first-ever elections - PFP captured 46 out of 225 seats in the Legislative Yuan with 
18.4 per cent of the total vote, while TSU captured 13 seats with 7.8 per cent of the 
votes. 
 
After the 2001 election, the KMT, NP and PFP worked together in the Legislative Yuan 
to form the ‘Pan Blue Camp’ - an anti-DPP opposition coalition which adopted a 
pro-unification platform. For their part, the DPP and TSU also worked together in the 
Legislative Yuan in order to support the DPP’s independence platform, and were dubbed 
the ‘Pan Green Camp’. Taiwan party politics had come to the stage in which two broad 
coalitions lined up against each other in the Legislative Yuan as well as in elections in 
Taiwan. As the Pan Green Camp held 100 out of 225 seats, the DPP government faced 
less opposition in the Legislative Yuan, and President Chen Shui-Bian focused on 
economic development, talks with China, and his campaign for a second term in office. 
When Taiwan was rejected by the World Health Organisation (WHO) for observer 
status and not allowed to participate in the WHO summit in 2003, Chen decided to 
initiate a referendum in the expectation that such a referendum would help to mobilise 
the DPP party base and excite Taiwanese patriotism and so win the election in 2004 
(Rigger 2004).  
 
The 2004 presidential election brought a major shock to Taiwan: just one day before the 
poll on 19th March, President Chen Shui-Bian was shot in the stomach while 
campaigning in southern Taiwan. Although Chen was only lightly injured and left the 
hospital in less than a day, he won the presidency (by a margin of 0.22 per cent of the 
total votes) despite the fact that the referendums were invalid because the turnout rates 
were lower than 50 per cent. The Pan Blue Camp candidates Lien Chan and James 
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Soong demanded a recount, accusing the DPP of engineering the shooting incident to 
influence the results. For their part, the Pan Green supporters saw the assassination as a 
China-led conspiracy to damage Taiwan's democracy. Despite the turmoil, Chen and his 
running mate, Annette Lu, duly took office in May 2004 (Chan 2005). 
 
Table 4.5: Results of 2004 Presidential Election in Taiwan. 
Voters turnout rate: 80.28% 
President candidate Vice President  
Candidate 
Political Affiliation Votes 
 
 % 
 
Chen Shui-Bian 
 
Annette Lu DPP  
6,471,970 
 
50.11% 
 
Lien Chan  
 
 
James Soong  
 
KMT-PFP 
6,442,452 
49.89% 
 
Invalid 
votes/Blank Votes  
  337,297 
Sources: Central Election Commission.  
 
However, in December 2004, the result of the Legislative Yuan election brought a 
setback to Chen and his DPP government. Although DPP won 89 out of 225 seats and 
was still the largest single party in Legislative Yuan, the Pan Blue Camp won 114 seats, 
which was 10 more than the Pan Green Camp won. In 2005, the DPP also suffered a 
major loss in the county/city mayor election when KMT won 17 out of 23 county/city 
mayor elections. With government bills often rejected in the Legislative Yuan, and the 
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loss of local control, the DPP government was in a very difficult situation. Moreover, 
since late 2005, a series of corruption accusations were launched against Chen, his wife, 
and his family, including charges of insider trading, money laundering, and improper 
use of government funds. Chen denied any wrongdoing, and to minimize the impact of 
these allegations, he raised the issue of Taiwan’s independence, speaking publicly about 
abolishing the National Unification Guidelines and the National Unification Council. In 
fact, the National Unification Council had not been functioning for years, and Chen’s 
strategy backfired – by May 2006 his approval rating had dropped to 5.8 per cent (Li 
2006), and in September, nearly 90,000 demonstrators gathered outside the Presidential 
Palace in Taiwan demanding that he step down. In response, Chen continued to deny 
any wrongdoing, and insisted that he would not step down until his second term of 
office ended. 
  
In 2007, the unpopular President planned a referendum on Taiwan’s membership in the 
United Nations (U.N.) in order to boost Pan Green’s support in the 2008 presidential 
and Legislative Yuan elections. Despite objections from the USA and China, Chen 
insisted that the referendum on Taiwan’s joining the U.N. must go ahead. As a 
counterweight, the KMT initiated its own referendum to return Taiwan to the U.N. 
under the name of either Taiwan or the ROC. The two referendums were held on the 
same day as the presidential election in March 2008, but both were declared invalid 
because their turnout rates were lower than 50 percent.  
 
In January 2008, the number of seats in the Legislative Yuan were reduced from 224 to 
113 under a constitutional amendment in 2005 in order to have a more efficient 
legislative process. Taiwan politics turned a new page when the KMT captured an 
overwhelming victory in the Legislative Yuan election with 81 out of 113 seats. By 
holding two-third of the seats in Legislative Yuan, KMT would be able to impeach the 
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president by its own votes. In March 2008, KMT’s Ma Ying-Jeou (馬英九) defeated 
DPP’s Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) in the presidential election by 58 per cent to 41 per cent 
The scale of KMT’s victory showed DPP’s inability to handle the economic downturn, 
cross-strait relations, and corruption allegations, during the previous eight years, and 
Taiwan experienced a democratic power transfer for the second time.  
 
Table 4.6 Results of 2008 Presidential Election in Taiwan 
Voters turnout rate: 76.33% 
 
President candidate Vice Presidential 
Candidate 
Political Affiliation Votes 
 
 % 
 
Ma Ying-Jeou 
 
Vincent Siew  KMT 
7,659,014 
 
58.45% 
 
Frank Hsieh 
  
 
 
Su Tseng-Chang 
(蘇貞昌) 
 
DPP 
5,444,949 
 
41.55% 
Invalid 
votes/Blank Votes 
  117,646 
Sources: Taiwan. Central Election Commission.  
 
4.3.6 Ma Ying-Jeou (馬英九) 2008- 
 
When the newly-elected President Ma Ying-Jeou took office in May 2008, he ended the 
 108 
government gridlock of 2000-2008. Since KMT held two-thirds of the seats in 
Legislative Yuan, it would be easier for Ma to push through his agenda. Ma believed 
that to improve the Taiwan economy, it was necessary first to improve relations between 
Taiwan and China, and he made clear to Chinese leaders that the two sides should 
resume talks under the ‘1992 Consensus’20. China welcomed Ma’s gesture, and the talks 
between Taiwan and China restarted, while direct flights, shipping, and trade with China 
were established in December 2008.  
 
However, Ma faced strong challenges from the Pan Green Camp, and in October 2008, 
many people organised by DPP held demonstrations against China’s representative 
Chen Yun-Lin’s (陳雲林) visit to Taiwan. In November 2008, the Taiwan government 
ordered the police to tighten security, and the subsequent police conduct became violent. 
Several journalists reported that the police broke the national flags held by peaceful 
protesters, hitting the journalists and protesters in the face, breaking into private hotel 
rooms and taking away private property, shutting down local stores by force or threats, 
and arresting large numbers of innocent demonstrators. Taiwan police’s violent 
behaviour drew strong criticism at home and abroad, and college students launched a 
peaceful sit-out demonstration demanding an end to the police violence and a more 
reasonable law guaranteeing the right of assembly. Freedom House, an international 
NGO which conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom, and 
human rights, issued a statement calling for an inquiry into the incident, which badly 
damaged the image of Taiwan’s democracy (Freedom House 2008).  
 
In 2009, Ma faced further criticism after the worst typhoon in 50 years - typhoon 
                                                 
20
 In 1992, the meeting between Taiwan and China representatives in Hong Kong reached agreement to 
recognise the ‘One China principle’, under which both sides recognise there is only one China – in that 
both mainland China and Taiwan belong to the same China - but that both sides agree to interpret the 
meaning of that one China according to their own individual definitions. 
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Morakot - hit Taiwan on 8 August. Ma was criticised by both the Pan Blue Camp and 
the Pan Green Camp for not responding to the disaster quickly and effectively.  Ma’s 
KMT government failed to mobilise the military to join the rescue team, and this failure 
was held to have resulted in the loss of more than 200 lives. Ma was forced to apologise 
publicly for his government’s failure and bad management. Finally, Ma was also 
criticised for lack of success in his flagship economic policy of closer relations with 
China:  Taiwan’s economy suffered another downturn in 2009 with minus 1.93 per 
cent of growth, the worst in 50 years. With the unemployment rate still high at 5.85 per 
cent in 2009, Ma did not achieve his election promise to improve the economy in 
Taiwan.  
 
4.4 Political Economy  
 
This leads us to the third part of Taiwan’s geo-political context – its political economy.  
 
4.4.1Taiwan’s economy 1945-1988 
 
The KMT government initiated the economic development of Taiwan in the 1950s with 
the help of the USA, beginning with land reform and an import-substitution strategy in 
1953 (Rubinstein 2007a: 367). As a result, agricultural productivity improved, and food 
products were successfully exported, bringing in half of the nation’s foreign exchange 
during the 1950s and early 1960s (Cooper 1999: 132). Much of this foreign currency 
was used to import industrial machinery in order to develop the industrial sector. During 
the 1960s, the government placed emphasis on labour-intensive export industries, basic 
services, financial reform and energy development in order to fit Taiwan into the 
world’s economy. The government established export-processing zones near major ports 
in Taiwan which enabled foreign companies to import materials and use the cheap and 
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capable labour force to assemble their products then to export the finish products to the 
rest of the world. Foreign investment into Taiwan increased dramatically this period 
from US$ 20 million between 1952 and 1959 to more than US$ 950 million between 
1966 and 1973. The Taiwanese began to set up small businesses producing toys, shoes, 
textiles, and sports equipments, and these became the suppliers for transnational or 
foreign retailing companies. As a result, Taiwan’s GDP grew nearly four times from 
US$ 1,783 millions in 1961 to US$ 6,662 millions in 1971, and GDP per capita 
increased 272 per cent, from US$164 per capita in 1961 to US$447 per capita in 1971.  
 
However, because Taiwan had no natural resources to draw upon to supply sufficient 
energy for its economic development, the government initiated the project of building a 
nuclear power plant in 1971. On this and other major projects such as steel mills, 
shipyards, petrochemical refineries, motorways, railroads, airports, and harbours 
(Copper 1999: 135), the Taiwan government invested US$ 92 billion to modernise 
Taiwan’s infrastructure under the command of Prime Minister Chiang Ching-Kuo ( who 
later became President in 1978). 
 
The oil crises in the 1970s led the government to promote industries which were 
low-energy consumption, high technology, and high value-added. As a result, the 
economy of Taiwan was gradually transformed from labour-intensive industries to 
capital-intensive industries, which contributed to spectacular economic growth during 
the 1970s and 1980s. For example, between 1984 and 1988, the value of 
made-in-Taiwan computer hardware products rose from US$ 1 billion to 5.15 billion 
(Rubinstein 2007: 375), and from 1971 to 1988, GDP per capita increased more than 
seven times, while the nation’s income per capita grew from US$ 419 to US$ 5,948. 
This impressive economic performance was dubbed the ‘Taiwan Miracle’ and radically 
improved living standard in Taiwan. 
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4.4.2 1988-2000 
 
During the 90s, Taiwan maintained its high rate of economic growth supported by 
government policies. However, evidence of the negative consequences of environmental 
degradation began to surface, and after the government lifted the ban on trade relations 
with China in 1987, labour-intensive industries in Taiwan began to invest in China and 
South East Asia. Nevertheless, even during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, 
Taiwan’s economy still enjoyed considerable growth in production, exports, and trade 
surpluses, largely because of its technology-based industries. In 1986, the 
technology-intensive industries had occupied 59.96 percent of the total value of 
manufacturing output, while in 1999 technology-intensive industries accounted for 76.1 
percent of the total value of manufacturing output and 76.1 percent of the total export 
value (Government Information Office). 
 
In short, during the period 1988-2000, Taiwan’s economy under President Lee Teng-Hui 
was spectacularly successful, with an annual average economic growth rate of 6.24 per 
cent, and an increase in GNP of 57 per cent, raising GNP per capita from US$ 6,318 to 
US$ 14,909 (Government Information Office). 
 
4.4.3 2000-2008 
 
However, in 2000, Taiwan experienced the beginnings of an economic downturn: the 
restructuring of the economy and the relocation of businesses led to a rise in 
unemployment, while political instability led to a fall in investment. As a result, 
Taiwan’s economy performed poorly in 2001: the economic growth rate was minus 1.65 
(the first negative figure for post-war Taiwan); exports dropped 17.2 per cent 
(Government Information Office ); and the unemployment rate rose to 4.57 (the highest 
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for four decades). In addition, the gap between the rich and poor in Taiwan widened: the 
ratio of the income share of the highest 20 per cent household to that of the lowest 20 
percent reached its highest point (6.39 times) since the 1960s.  
 
In order to rescue the failing economy, the DPP introduced a series of measures 
including the continuation of the fourth nuclear power station; a relaxation of the upper 
limit on investment in China; and permission for direct investment (Rigger 2003). 
However, although these and other measures helped the economy to recover, and 
Taiwan enjoyed 5.26 per cent economic growth in 2002, small businesses continued to 
leave the country because of lack of confidence in the DPP government and concern 
over the political situation in Taiwan. As a result, in Chen’s second term, Taiwan’s 
economic growth rate was lower than that in Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea. 
Moreover, between 2000 and 2007, the growth of wages was 7.1 per cent while the rate 
of inflation increased by 8.9 per cent, so the real level of wages declined. With 
businesses complaining about the restriction on cross-strait trade and people’s real wage 
levels falling, the DPP government’s eight years in power did not have the desired effect 
of maintaining the strength of Taiwan’s economy. 
 
4.4.4 2008-to present  
 
One of the reasons why the KMT won the presidential and legislative elections in 2008 
was that the public believed that the KMT had more experience than the DPP of dealing 
with economic issues. However, the KMT government has not performed well in 
economic terms since 2008 despite the ever-closer economic relations between China 
and Taiwan. President Ma Ying-Jeou expected that signing the Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China would improve Taiwan’s exports and bring 
economic growth, but Taiwan’s economy suffered another reverse, with economic 
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growth down to the worst level in 50 years (minus 1.93 per cent) and the highest-ever 
unemployment rate at 5.85 per cent in 2009. 
 
So after a long period of highly successful growth, Taiwan has entered the second 
decade of the 21st century with an economy in difficulty. The following tables track this 
decline in detail, and compare Taiwan’s performance with other competitor countries. 
   
 
Table 4.7. Main economic indicators for Taiwan 1951-2009 
Year  
 
Economic 
Growth 
Rate 
(%) 
GNP 
Millions  
USD$ 
GNP per capital 
(USD$) 
National 
Income 
per capita 
 USD$   
Unemployment 
rate % 
1951 11.85 1,227 158  154 4.52 
1961 6.32 1,783 162 153 4.10 
1971 12.45 6,662 447 419 1.66 
1981 3.97 48,958 2,715 2,455 1.36 
1988 5.57 125,338 6,318 5,948 1.69 
1991 7.88 189,924 9,263 8,473 1.51 
2000 5.80 330,674 14,909 13,299 2.99 
2001 -1.65 299,391 13,401 11,821 4.57 
2002 5.26 308,101 13,716 12,077 5.17 
2003 3.67 320,312 14,197 12,549 4.99 
2004 6.19 351,104 15,503 13,602 4.44 
2005 4.70 373,870 16,449 11,412 4.13 
2006 5.44 385,957 16,911 14,724 3.91 
 114 
2007 5.98 403,207 17,596 15,192 3.91 
2008 0.73 410,108 17,833 15,194    4.40 
2009 -1.93 389,921 16,895 14,271    5.85 
Sources: The World Bank. World Development Indicators (WDI) and Globe 
Development Finance (GDF). 
 
Table 4.8. GDP per capita in Taiwan and other countries since 1961                             
US$ 
Year Taiwan China Hong 
Kong 
Singapore South 
Korea 
Japan Euro 
Zone 
USA UK 
1961 164 77 483 438 92 564 1036 1452 976 
1971 447 117 1102 1061 302 2201 2519 5360 2524 
1975 978 176 2251 2506 608 4514 5082 7517 4205 
1981 2730 195 5979 5489 1846 10062 8469 13526 9142 
1988 6146 281 10591 8932 4466 24230 14845 20698 14951 
1991 9016 330 15444 13768 7123 28121 19484 23493 18387 
2000 14704 949 25374 23019 11347 36789 20099 35081 25089 
2001 13147 1041 24812 20700 10655 32210 20297 35898 24885 
2002 13404 1135 24285 21152 12093 30745 21976 36797 27172 
2003 13773 1274 23559 22651 13451 33113 26977 38196 31238 
2004 15012 1490 24454 26319 15028 36051 30704 40309 36782 
2005 16051 1731 26092 29401 17751 35627 31709 42534 37859 
2006 16491 2069 27699 32960 19707 34178 33408 44663 40251 
2007 17154 2651 29898 38523 21653 34264 38134 46627 45901 
2008 17399 3413 30833 39950 19162 38268 41648 47209 43361 
2009 16353 3744 30065 36537 17078 39738 38084 45989 35165 
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Sources: The World Bank. World Development Indicators (WDI) and Globe 
Development Finance (GDF). 
  
Table 4.9. Unemployment rates in Taiwan and other countries 1981-2009 
Units: USD$ 
Year Taiwan China Hong 
Kong 
Singapore South 
Korea 
Japan Euro 
Zone 
USA UK 
1981 1.36 3.80 3.55 2.90 4.51 2.28  n/a 7.61  n/a 
1988 1.69 2.00 1.36 3.61 2.52 2.53 11.13 5.51 8.80 
1991 1.51 2.3 1.81 1.95 2.40 2.06 8.47 6.83 8.38 
2000 2.99 3.1 4.92 5.96 4.42 4.77 9.20 3.99 5.48 
2001 4.57 3.60 5.09 2.92 4.00 5.03 8.20 4.73 4.74 
2002 5.17 4.00 7.28 4.43 3.28 5.38 8.58 5.78 5.07 
2003 4.99 4.30 7.86 4.70 3.56 5.22 8.81 5.99 4.84 
2004 4.44 4.20 6.74 5.80 3.67 4.68 9.12 5.53 4.63 
2005 4.13 4.20 5.58 5.60 3.73 4.41 9.01 5.08 4.60 
2006 3.91 4.10 4.77 4.48 3.44 4.10 8.35 4.62 5.35 
2007 3.91 4.00 4.00 3.90 3.23 3.88 7.46 4.62 5.64 
2008 4.14  n/a 3.56 3.95 3.17 3.99 7.49 5.78 5.28 
2009 5.85 4.3 5.22 5.86 3.65 5.03 9.42 9.26 7.71 
Sources: The World Bank. World Development Indicators (WDI) and Globe 
Development Finance (GDF).  
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Table 4.10 Average disposable income per household by disposable income quintile in 
Taiwan from 1964-2009                                        (Units: NT$) 
Year Average 
disposable 
income 
per 
household 
Average disposable income per household of each fifth Ratio 
of 
income 
share 
of 
highest 
20% to 
that of 
lowest 
20% 
  lowest 20 
percent 
Second 
20 
percent 
Third 20  
percent 
Forth 20  
percent 
Highest 
20 
percent 
 
1964 28,591  11,022 17,969 23,759 32,493 58,712  5.33 
1976 92,813  41,048 62,589 78,886 102,268 179,295  4.18 
1988 410,483 161,874 275,655 360,257 469,525  785,101 4.85 
2000 891445 315,172 571,355 778,556 1,043,508 1,748,633 5.55 
2001 868,651  279,404 524,766 740,054 1,013,478 1,785,550 6.39 
2002 875,919 292,113 538,584 743,888 1,005,274 1,799,733 6.16 
2003 881,662  296,297 545,465 745,231 1,021,325 1,799,992 6.07 
2004 891,249 297,305 555,452 775,719 1,035,972 1,791,796 6.03 
2005 895,574 297,694 556,117 779,044 1043131 1796884 6.04 
2006 913,092 304,274 564,865 795427 1073,507 1,827,387 6.01 
2007 923,874 312,145 571,128 799,418 1,069,885 1,866,791 5.98 
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2008 913,687 303,517 564,893 796,225 1068,804 1835,994 6.05 
2009 887,605 282,260 544,531 771,571 1,049,242 1,790,418 6.34 
Sources: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 2010.  
 
4.5 Civil Society and Social Movement in Taiwan 
 
We turn, finally, to the fifth part of Taiwan’s geo-political context – civil society and 
social movements. In this part, the Presbyterian Church, the women’s movement, the 
labour movement, aboriginal movements and the anti-nuclear movement will be 
discussed.  
 
4.5.1. Presbyterian Church 
 
The Presbyterian Church plays a very important role in the democratisation in Taiwan. 
It was established in Taiwan in the 19th century by the Presbyterian Church in England 
and the Presbyterian Church in Canada. The missionary work of the Presbyterian 
Church was carried out not only in the cities but also in rural areas and aboriginal 
villages. The uniqueness of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan is to preach and operate 
in local dialects; indeed, missionaries from the Presbyterian Church translated Bibles 
into Hokkien dialects and other aboriginal languages, and as a result, the Presbyterian 
Church is very popular among aboriginals. However, the use of local dialects violated 
the KMT government’s mandarinisation policy during the martial law rule period. The 
Presbyterian Church’s support for humanitarianism and human rights also caused 
unease in the KMT government, as did its issuing in the 1970s, of a series of documents 
claiming that Taiwan’s fate should be decide by Taiwanese rather than outsiders (such as 
the KMT government) (Fell 2011: 176). Under the martial law rule in Taiwan at that 
time, these documents were seen as very radical and not welcomed by the KMT 
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government. Thus, the Presbyterian Church was strongly associated with opposition to 
the KMT government and was very important in the democratisation in Taiwan. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Presbyterian Church played an important role in the Lan 
Yu anti-nuclear waste movement and the anti-nuclear waste movement in Daren 
Taitung. 
 
4.5.2. Women’s movement 
 
Together with democratisation in Taiwan, civil society also emerged. Many scholars 
noted that the lifting of martial law in 1987 opened the gate for large scale development 
of social movements in Taiwan. The transition to democracy in Taiwan began in the 
1980s, and with it social movements became very vibrant. 
 
In Taiwan, politics were traditionally dominated by men: women were excluded from 
key decision- making institutions of the government and inside the KMT before 1980s 
(Fell 2011: 178). During  the early 1980s, a women’s movement in Taiwan emerged,  
led by groups of middle- and upper- class women who formed several volunteer 
organisations to promote women’s right such as gender equality legislation (Fan 2004: 
178). Despite lacking political experience, women’s groups such as Awakening 
Foundation (婦女新知基金會) focused on legal lobbying and adopted a non-partisan 
strategy. For example, in 1984, women’s groups demanded that the laws relating to 
legalised abortion be retained, despite originating in the early stage of the Eugenic 
Protection Act (Fan 2004: 179). During the 1980s, women’s groups have initiated eight 
important bills, four of which were entirely new proposals. For instance, in 1987, 
members of Awakening Foundation began to drafting Equal Employment Act in order to 
improve the gender equality in employment. Despite strong opposition from the 
business sector, this act finally passed in 2001 - the first time in Taiwan that civil 
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associations had drafted a law themselves and submit it to the Legislative Yuan (Fan 
2004: 179). Since the 1980s, the women’s movement in Taiwan has helped to pass  
legislation against child prostitution , domestic violence, sexual harassment and rape 
within marriage, and legislation protecting women’s property rights after divorce (Fell 
2011: 179). So in terms of legal lobbying, the women’s movement in Taiwan is a 
successful story. 
 
Moreover, the women’s movement together with the democratisation movement 
facilitated benefits for women during a period of rapid social and economic change in 
Taiwan. For example, the number of women joining the work force increased 
significantly: in 1961, 35.8 per cent of Taiwanese women held jobs outside the home, 
whereas there were 44.5 per cent in 2000 (Copper 2003: 89), and in 2012, there are 
more than 50 per cent, most of them working full time.  
 
In politics, because of the pressure from women’s groups that was exerted on the 
multi-party system since the 1990s, political parties employed more women in election 
campaigns in order to show their support for gender equality and to attract large number 
of female voters. DPP and KMT started to recruit women’s movement leaders into 
executive or policy advisors when gained office in local government. In 2000, when the 
DPP first won the presidential election, Annette Lu, the vice president, assumed the 
highest position a woman ever had in Taiwan political history. Also, in the cabinet, 25 
per cent of the members were women. In 2008, when KMT won the presidential 
election, there were also around 25 per cent of the cabinet members were women. 
Furthermore, when the DPP held power between 2000- 2008, the women’s movement 
had much greater access to government ministers (Fell 2011: 180), which increased the 
opportunity that the leaders of women’s movement had to promote gender issues.  
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Overall, therefore, the status of women in Taiwan ha improved greatly since the 1960s, 
making Taiwan one of the most gender-equal societies in Asia, and much of the credit 
for this transformation must go to the Taiwan’s women’s movement. .  
 
4.5.3. Labour movement  
 
The labour movement in Taiwan emerged later than other social movements. This was 
mainly because, before the 1980s, KMT strongly controlled the labour sector, having 
created trade unions and industrial unions in the state-owned companies since the 1950s, 
in order to keep the workforce subservient to the state. KMT dominated the personnel of 
these unions, prescribing that only those persons who were loyal to the KMT could be 
the members of unions (Ho 2006a). 
 
However, a free labour movement in Taiwan emerged in the late 1980s along with the 
lifting of the martial law and democratization. With a more and more industrialised 
economy, the labour movement in Taiwan focused on the ‘bread –and butter’ issues 
such as overtime and annual bonus (Ho 2006a). Activists established unions in the 
private sector, and tried to gain control over the pro-KMT unions in the public sector. 
The labour movement also sought to bring unions together and to link up with 
international workers’ organizations to improve its effectiveness in campaigning. For 
example, in May 1988, the National Federation of Independent Trade Union was 
established and it became a member of the World Federation of Labour (Fell 2011: 
182). 
 
However, despite these efforts of labour activists, the KMT government was still very 
strong in its pro-business position, and in 1989, a strike in the Far Eastern Chemical 
Fibre Company was suppressed by the police (Ho 2006a). The KMT government 
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announced its intention to further restrict the legal protection of labour rights by 
amending the Labour Union Law, the Labour Dispute Law and the Labour Standard 
Law. As a consequence, compulsory union membership was removed, legalising 
parallel unionism in the same workplace so as to minimise the influence of the ‘free’  
unions, banning unions from certain industries, imposing a higher threshold for  
industrial action, and importing foreign workers (Ho 2006a; Fell 2011: 189).  
 
In order to face this situation, the labour movement had to change its focus from 
grassroots activism to opposition to proposed legislation, and to do so it had to ally 
itself with the opposition DPP. This strategy was effective, in that the labour movement, 
working together with the DPP, successfully blocked KMT’s pro-business legislation 
policies. Although the labour organisations did not make any significant legal gains in 
the 1990 (Fell 2011: 183), in 2000, the DPP’s victory brought a new momentum to the 
labour cause (not unexpectedly, since traditionally, the DPP are much closer than the 
KMT to labour activists), which ended the KMT’s control over the trade unions. In 2000, 
independent unions for the first time had the chance to establish a Taiwan Confederation 
of Trade Unions (TETU) and were recognised by the government. From 2000-2004, 
under the DPP regime, the labour movement achieved some legislative success, 
including  the passing of the Equal Employment Law (with women’s groups), the 
Protective Act for Mass Redundancy of Employees, the Protection for Workers 
Incurring Occupational Accident Act, and the Employment Insurance Act (Fell 2012: 
183).  
 
However, the labour movement suffered some setbacks during the period of DPP rule 
from 2000 to 2008. For instance, in the private sector, unions criticised the DPP for 
increasing the number of foreign workers. In the public sector, privatisation of 
state-owned companies such as the telecommunication company and banks by the DPP 
 122 
government was criticised by unions for resulting in job losses and cutting wages. 
DPP’s privatisation policy gave the impression to the unions that both governments - 
DPP as well as KMT - would focus on economic development rather than labour 
welfare. Moreover, with the return to power of KMT in 2008, the labour movement in 
Taiwan faced a strong challenge from the government’s pro-business economic position. 
 
4.5.4 Aboriginal movement  
 
Aboriginals in Taiwan have been marginalised and de-rooted since the Japanese rule 
period from 1894-1945. During KMT’s rule from 1945 until the 1980s, the government 
KMT centralised policy and promoted the national culture, discriminating against the 
indigenous culture in Taiwan.  
 
As with other social movements, the 1980s was the era in which the Taiwan aboriginal 
movement began. . In December 1984, the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines (ATA) was 
established with the help of the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan by groups of aboriginal 
political activists as the first aboriginal people’s movement group under martial law 
(Tien 2010: 17). ATA campaigned about the problems which aboriginals in Taiwan had 
experienced for many years such as prostitution, economic disparity, land rights, and 
official discrimination in the form of forbidding the use of aboriginal tribal names 
(Faure 2001: 99). 
 
In 1988, the ATA launched the first large-scale movement demanding the return of lands 
to the original inhabitants whom are the indigenous people in Taiwan. There were 1500 
indigenous people from all different tribes who joined the demonstration in Taipei in 
August 1988 in their traditional costumes. This event marked the first emerging 
awareness of self identity and self consciousness among aboriginals in Taiwan. Since 
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then, many aboriginal groups have been launched, including the group formed to 
remove nuclear waste from Orchid Island. 
 
The government responded to the demands of aboriginal people in Taiwan very slowly. 
For the KMT government until 2000, aboriginal issue were never a priority. However, in 
1995, the KMT regime started to recognise the romanised spellings of aboriginal names 
in official documents - a process which was not completed until 2005 when the new 
identity cards were issued. In 1996, government established the Council of Indigenous 
Peoples, and in 1998, the official school curriculum in Taiwan has started to include 
more stories of aboriginals. KMT also relaxed it mandarinised policy on aboriginals in 
the 1990s which helped the indigenous people in Taiwan to become prouder of their 
own identity.  
 
Although in  2000, when DPP got into  power, aboriginal policy was still not a  
priority, after  aboriginal activists held many protests against economic development  
on their traditional ground, the government enacted the ‘Indigenous People’s Basic 
Law’ in 2005 in which it stated that the survival of the tribes and their traditional ways 
of living would be protected by the government. However, the DPP government at that 
time did not pass the regulations required to implement the ‘Indigenous People’s Basic 
Law’, and it left open the question of whether or not the ‘Indigenous People’s Basic 
Law’ would take preference when it conflict with other law or regulations.  
In short, although the aboriginal movement in Taiwan did not have a very large base of 
support, aboriginal rights did improve as result of its demands, and while the indigenous 
people are still fighting to improve their social status, they are more and more proud of 
their own identities and cultures. 
 
4.5.5. Environmental movement 
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Since the 1950s, Taiwan has enjoyed rapid economic growth and industrialisation.  
This has resulted in serious environmental degradation in Taiwan that until the 1980s 
attracted little public attention in Taiwanese society. Widespread of environmental 
protests started in early 1980s despite martial law rule, and local residents organised 
themselves to protest against local pollution from factories and dumpsites. These 
protests were usually small scale and based on the Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) 
principle. Often these disputes were resolved through compensation distributed by local 
politicians. (Fell 2011: 185) 
 
Many scholars see the anti-Du Pont incident in 1986 as the turning point for the Taiwan 
environmental protection movement. Local leaders, local officials, and local resident in 
Lukang (鹿港), Changhua County (彰化縣) organised together to protest against the 
proposal of Du Pont’s petrochemical plant to be built in their community (Tang and 
Tang 1997). At the time, Du Pont’s proposal was the biggest single foreign investment 
ever made in Taiwan, and unsurprisingly, the central government supported it. Local 
anti-Du Pont groups held demonstration in Lukang and also in the capital city Taipei in 
1986 and 1987 (Tang and Tang 1997). The demonstrations were supported by many 
opposition politicians and for the first time received extensive attention from the media 
(Fell 2011: 185). Despite the illegal nature of the demonstration under martial law, the 
central government was rather restrained (Tang and Tang 1997), and finally, Du Pont 
withdrew its plan voluntarily. After the Du Pont incident, the environmental protest 
movement became more and more active: between 1980 and 1987, there was an  
average of 13.75 environmental conflicts per year, but this number increased to 31.33 
between 1988 and 1990 and to 258 in 1991 (Hsiao 1994).  
 
As a result of the increasing number of environmental protests after the Du Pont 
incident, the relations between environmental groups and the DPP became closer, 
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because the environmental movement’s protests were strongly targeted against the KMT. 
By supporting the environment movement, DPP member therefore gained publicity 
locally and nationwide. Conversely, environmental groups benefited from DPP’s 
resources to help fund its organisation, manpower, and campaigning strategy. The 
establishment of the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU) in 1987 was a 
good example of the ever closer relations between DPP and environmental groups: 
members of TEPU were also DPP members in some local branches and even shared the 
same offices (Ho 2005). TEPU played an important role in education, organising 
protests, lobbying the government, and conducting research. In the 1990s, therefore, it 
was common to see the DPP allied with environmental groups fighting against the 
pro-business KMT regime on various environmental issues such as nuclear power. 
 
On the other hand, the KMT government made some responses to the challenge from 
environmental groups. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was 
established at cabinet level in 1987 by elevating the Environmental Protection Bureau 
from its local government level. The EPA drafted the ‘Law to Settle Public Nuisance 
Disputes’ and established the notion of environmental impact assessment (EIA) in 
Taiwan. Furthermore, the KMT regime introduced more stringent pollution control 
regulations and tax incentives to encourage industries to invest in pollution control 
facilities. Upgrading the state-owned industries to decrease their pollution levels, and 
setting up longterm monitoring systems were also introduced by the KMT regime. 
Despite the pro-business posture of the KMT regime, KMT had realised the importance 
of environmental protection, while the increasing numbers of DPP legislators had 
weakening the KMT’s dominance on all issues including environmental protection. 
 
Year 2000 marked another big change for the environmental movement in Taiwan. 
When the DPP won the presidential election, environmental protests turned a new page, 
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because environmentalists had now gained procedural participation under the DPP 
government (Ho 2005). Firstly, Edgar Lin (林俊義) an anti nuclear and conservationist 
biology professor was appointed as EPA director. This was the first time that an 
environmental activist had occupied the highest government position in environmental 
regulation. Furthermore, environmentalists were recruited on to the EIA committee, 
including the National Advancement for Sustainable Development Committee, the top 
advisory organ of environmental policy in Taiwan, which incorporated eight 
environmentalists into its membership in 2002 (Ho 2005). However, the participation of 
these environmentalists in the government did not achieve any policy changes because 
the above institutions in the government were relatively powerless comparing with the 
pro-development and pro-business Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Council for 
Economic Planning and Development especially during the economic downturn in 
Taiwan since 2001. 
 
A major illustration of the relative powerlessness of the environmental lobby was the 
reversal of the decision to cancel the building of the 4th nuclear power plant in Taiwan 
by the DPP.  The DPP government announced its decision to stop the construction of 
the 4th nuclear power station in October 2000, but due to the strong opposition from the 
KMT, business sectors, and foreign companies, the DPP reversed this decision in 2001 
favour of continuing the construction Environmental groups criticised the DPP for 
betraying their election commitment to environmental groups, and relations between 
DPP and environmental groups have not been close ever since. 
 
This policy reversal on the 4th nuclear power station by the DPP reflected a more 
general shift into a more pro-business position after 2000. DPP’s President Chen  
promised the business community, in response to their complaints about the long 
process of  EIA, to reduce obstacles to economic development, and in 2007, he  
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ordered the Vice Premier to intervene in the EIA process on the steel plant proposal 
from Formosa Plastic Groups (Fell 2012: 187). In 2007, several environmentalists on 
the EIA committee and the National Advancement for Sustainable Development 
Committee resigned to protest DPP’s pro-business position. 
 
When the KMT returned to power in 2008, environmental groups had fewer chances to 
be included in government institutions because of KMT’s even-stronger pro-business 
position. Environmental groups tried to keep their distance from the government in 
order to retain support from members of the public. Nevertheless, despite these 
disappointing developments for the environmental movement in recently years, people 
in Taiwan are now more aware than before of environmental protection issues. This is 
the biggest transformation in Taiwan, because it means that politicians are at least 
pretending to be greener even though they may hold pro-development views. 
 
4.5.6. Anti-nuclear movement 
 
The anti-nuclear movement has been one of the most discussed among the 
environmental movements in Taiwan.  The anti-nuclear movement in Taiwan can be 
traced back as early as 1979 when Professor Edgar Lin published an article criticising 
the KMT government’s nuclear policy. At that time, the first nuclear power plant had 
begun operation and the second and the third ones were under construction. Professor 
Lin pointed to the government’s lack of ecological considerations, and disregard of the 
problems of nuclear power and nuclear waste.  The article faced strong opposition 
from Taipower nuclear engineers, thereby generating the first nuclear debate in Taiwan 
(Ho 2003). For ten years, the anti-nuclear movement in Taiwan was led by a group of 
American-trained academics, who because of martial law, focused on publishing articles 
which were very technical. Taipower nuclear engineers responded to these anti-nuclear 
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articles with counter articles that also contained lots of technical terms. So at this early 
stage of the anti-nuclear movement in Taiwan, the issues around nuclear energy were 
not easy for members of the public to understand, though at least the nuclear debate in 
Taiwan had started.  
 
In the late 1980s, the anti-nuclear movement began to ally with the political opposition 
(which in 1987 became the DPP). As we saw earlier, the DPP needed to endorse the 
ideas of social movements in order to create a powerful opposition bloc against the 
KMT’s authoritarian regime. In this concern, anti-nuclear movement served a purpose 
of antagonism to KMT’s secrecy in its nuclear deals, hiding possible corruption. Since 
1986, opposition magazines have published anti-nuclear articles in which criticism was 
made of wider aspects of government policy on nuclear policy making and nuclear 
weapons. This situation also made the anti-nuclear movement more politicised than 
other social movements (Ho 2003), adopting a strong partisan position.  Even the 
KMT began to have reservations about the 4th nuclear power station, with some young 
KMT legislators opposing it, and in April 1985, 55 KMT legislators with 6 opposition 
legislators signed an appeal to suspend the construction of fourth nuclear power plant. 
The Prime Minister Yu Kuo-Hua (俞國華) later issued a statement noting that ‘the 
fourth nuclear power plant was not in a hurry to build’ (Ho 2003). As a result of the 
efforts of anti-nuclear activists, several large-scale public debates were held, as people 
in Taiwan were becoming aware of the issue of nuclear energy. 
 
Moreover, because of democratisation in Taiwan, anti-nuclear scholars changed their 
strategy since anti-government protests became more acceptable. In October 1986, 
inspired by the Du Pont incident, anti-nuclear scholars with opposition legislators held 
the first anti-nuclear demonstration outside Taipower’s headquarter (Ho 2003),  
signifying the increasing cooperation between anti-nuclear activities and the opposition.  
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With the support of DPP, local politicians and anti-nuclear scholars, the locally-led 
Yenliao, the Anti-Nuclear Self-Defence Association (YSDA) (鹽寮反核自救會), was 
established in 1988 in Gongliao (貢寮) which is the site for the fourth nuclear power 
plant. Anti-nuclear scholars and TEPU played a very important role in helping YSDA in 
its relations with local people. After YSDA was established, TEPU and YSDA together 
with DPP to organise a large-scale anti-nuclear demonstration in Taipei (Ho 2003). This 
marked the beginning of the annual anti-nuclear demonstrations in Taiwan in April or 
May each year ever since. 
 
The KMT government responded to the anti-nuclear movement and other social 
movement with harsh measures. In May 1990, an ex-military officer Hao Po-Tsun (郝柏
村) became prime minister, and he strongly associated the increasing influence of the 
anti-nuclear social movement with falling economic performance. Hao thought that 
building the fourth nuclear power station was the most important way re-establishing 
the government’s authority and strengthening the investment environment (Ho 2003). 
This hardline position of the KMT government served to unite the anti-nuclear 
movement with DPP, TEPU and YSDA. In 1991, when the government passed the EIA 
on the fourth nuclear power station, local people staged the most serious protest in 
Gongliao. Local people claimed that the EIA excluded anti-nuclear EIA members, not 
even contacting them about its meeting. When the situation intensified, one policeman 
was killed and after the event 17 persons involved in the protest were sentenced, one of 
them accused of killing the policemen was given a life sentence. This was the so- called 
‘1003 incident’ recorded in the documentary ‘Gongliao, How Are You?’ 
 
However, such governmental repression did not weaken the anti-nuclear movement. 
DPP started to flex its power by holding referendums in counties which they controlled 
despite the fact that at that time there was no legal basis for referendums in Taiwan. 
 130 
Between 1994 and 1998, there were four referendums held in Gongliao, Taipei County, 
Taipei City, and I-lan County (宜蘭縣) respectively21. Over 70 per cent was opposed to 
the construction of fourth nuclear power station in Gongliao. Of course, the KMT would 
not recognise the result. While the DPP started to gain more seats in the parliament 
since the 1990s, TEPU also sought support in lobbying with young KMT legislators 
who were more aware of the environmental issues, and significantly, between 1992 and 
1996, the budget bill on the fourth nuclear power station faced strong challenges each 
year. Outside the parliament, thousands of anti-nuclear protestors staged sit-in, hunger 
strikes, and a host of other activities (Ho 2003). However, the anti-nuclear movement 
now faced the problem that the DPP was not strong enough to persuade the majority to 
vote against nuclear power, not least because it was very difficult to attract non-DPP 
party members/voters to support the anti-nuclear movement. 
 
Far worse for the anti-nuclear movement, since the later 1990s, the DPP started to 
switch its position on the 4th nuclear power station because they saw an opportunity to 
win the presidential election. They realised that they needed to abolish their 
anti-business image and be less radical to stand a chance of winning that election. Also 
in 1996, the DPP saw there was no way they could prevent a vote in parliament in 
favour of the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant. So the DPP abandoned its 
anti-nuclear position, and tacitly traded its new-found support for the nuclear bill in 
return for KMT’s support within the parliament (Ho 2003). Although the DPP 
Presidential candidate Chen Shui-Bian continued to speak publicly in his election 
campaign of stopping the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant and signed a 
contract with the Lan Yu people promising to remove nuclear waste, anti--nuclear 
activists and scholars felt being betrayed by the DPP, and established a new Taiwan 
                                                 
21
 Gongliao was the town located in Taipei County. Taipei City and I-lan County are the neighbouring 
county/city of Taipei County. At that time, all these 3 counties were controlled by DPP. 
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Green Party.  
 
Indeed, the biggest disappointment for the anti-nuclear movement in Taiwan was the 
DPP’s reverse of its decision on the construction of the fourth nuclear power station. 
When the DPP government announced to halt the construction, YADA, TEPU, and other 
social movement groups all thought they had accomplished the most difficult task. 
However, the reversal of the decision not only damaged the relationship between the 
DPP and anti-nuclear movements, but also the relation between the DPP and other 
social movement groups. But the fact is that the DPP never won the parliamentary 
majority to enable them to stop the nuclear build, and, the economic consequences of 
stopping the fourth nuclear power station were too huge for Taiwan especially in the 
economic downturn. The result was that the anti-nuclear movement thereafter kept its 
distance from both DPP and KMT governments, and since 2002, DPP have not been 
welcomed by the annual anti-nuclear protest held by TEPU and YSDA.  
.  
After 2008, since the KMT returned to power, the anti-nuclear movement has become 
relatively quiet. It seems that the public and the media have been exhausted by the 
political instability and the economic recession. However, after the Fukushima nuclear 
power plant discharged radioactive substance into the surrounding environments in 
Japan at the earth quake on 11 March 2011, anti-nuclear ideas have won much support 
among members of the public in Taiwan. In the 2012 presidential campaign, DPP 
presidential candidate Miss Tsai Ing-Wen (蔡英文) declared her support for ending 
nuclear power by 2025. The KMT also responded to the issue by saying it would 
reconsider the use of nuclear energy. So it seems that nuclear issue is not a priority for 
the present KMT government, but that public debates on nuclear issue are not going to 
disappear.  
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Along with the anti-nuclear movement, there is an anti-nuclear waste movement which 
also started in the late 1980s when people in Lan Yu held their first protest against the 
government for dumping nuclear waste on their land. The details of this movement will 
be discussed in chapter 5 and chapter 7.  
 
Generally speaking from 1945 to 1987 during the first 45 years of this period, civil 
society was kept under tight control by the KMT regime. Indeed, before 1980, martial 
law prevailed, and there was no genuine civil society (Hsiao 2006) because the KMT 
regime monitored every aspect of social life. The only social groups that existed were 
those established by KMT or under very specific surveillance by the regime. Only after 
1980 did social movements begin to emerge, when Taiwan began to experience the 
damaging effects of rapid industrialisation such as environmental degradation, labour 
exploitation, and increasing urban house prices. These social evils were compounded by 
inequalities between the sexes and discrimination against ethnic minorities such as 
aborigines. 
 
In 1987, martial law was lifted, and the number of NGOs increased rapidly because the 
restrictions on freedom of association and expression had been removed. These NGOs 
included groups campaigning for consumer protection, labour and farmer rights, 
environmentalism and natural conservation, gender equality, human rights, urban 
housing, minority identity, and ethnic cultures. The anti-nuclear and anti nuclear waste 
movements were also born at this time, and they organised protests regularly since the 
late 1980s around Taiwan. Many of the NGOs allied themselves to the opposition DPP 
to demand social and political reforms. A series of strikes took place in Taiwan, 
organised by workers demanding fewer working hours and higher wages. Farmers also 
held demonstrations, asking for reform of the social insurance system, and 
environmentalists began to campaign against pollution. Moreover, middle class people 
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inspired by the DPP mobilized themselves to demand more political participation, 
including a popular vote for the entire Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and a 
direct vote for the president. During, the late 1980s and 1990s, the power of these social 
movements was too strong to be ignored by the KMT government, and was the driving 
force behind reforms in all aspects of people’s lives in Taiwan.   
 
In 2000, the opposition DPP won the presidential election, marking the first transition of 
power to an opposition party in Taiwan history. This change in the ruling party made the 
relationship between the government and the NGOs even closer. During Chen’s first 
term as President, many ideas which derived from social movements and NGOs were 
implemented by the government’s policy. For example, the DPP government enacted 
several reformist laws despite its minority status, including the Protection for Workers 
Incurring Occupational Accident Act (in 2001), the Gender Equality in Employment Act 
(in 2002), the Employment Insurance Act (2002), the Protective Act for Mass 
Redundancy of Employees (2003) and the Basic Environmental Act (in 2002) (Ho 
2010). Also, Chen’s minority government established several institutions consonant 
with the agenda of the social movement in the mid-1990s, including the Council for 
Hakka Affairs, the Council of Indigenous People, the National Human Rights 
Commission, and the Committee for a Nuclear-Free Homeland (Ho 2010). In addition, 
the DPP government appointed veteran activists to become ministers in the 
Environmental Protection Administration, the Ministry of Education, the Council of 
Indigenous People, and the Council of Labour Affairs, and nominated members of 
NGOs for the Environmental Impact Assessment Committee, the Committee on 
Women’s Right Promotion, and the National Council for Sustainable Development (Ho 
2010).  
However, the economic downturn forced the DPP to shift its focus to economic 
development, and this shift led many social movement activists to criticise the DPP, 
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among them labour and environmental NGOs who were the most disappointed by the 
DPP. Labour NGOs and labour activists claimed that the DPP failed to cut the working 
hours of workers as it promised in the election campaign, and it also failed to increase 
the allowances of elderly workers on the labour insurance pension scheme (Hsiao 2006). 
Environmental NGOs criticised the DPP government for failing to halt the construction 
of the 4th nuclear power plant22 despite its nuclear-free homeland policy. Environmental 
activities and NGOs could not believe that the DPP compromised on nuclear power. 
Moreover, the DPP government was criticised for approving many development 
projects in order to create jobs – a policy which led members of the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Committee to resign in protest against the DPP’s pro- economic 
priorities. 
 
However, despite these criticisms from activists and NGOs, the number of large-scale 
demonstrations decreased rapidly because many NGOs and activists became enmeshed 
into the DPP government, and their co-opted status weakened their capacity to mobilise 
and organise campaigns.  
 
When the KMT recaptured the presidency in 2008, it might have heralded a setback for 
the NGOs and social activists, because the KMT is traditionally a party which is 
pro-economic and less caring for social welfare, labour, and environmental issues than 
is the DPP. However, paradoxically, it marked a re-birth for social movement activists, 
because it made them detach themselves from too close an association with government, 
and thereby regain their moral high ground of radical autonomy. In 2008, students 
protested against police brutality to people expressing their ideas about independence 
                                                 
22
 When the DPP got into power in 2000, they announced an immediate end to the construction of the 
nuclear power plant. After the announcement, the stock market dropped rapidly. In the Legislative Yuan, 
the KMT (who held a majority) boycotted the government’s annual budget; and many businesses lobbied 
to KMT. Faced with such pressure, the DPP withdrew its decision to stop the construction of nuclear 
power plant in order to restore economic and political instability. 
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for Taiwan when officials from China visited Taiwan. This protest marked the comeback 
of genuine social movements in Taiwan. In addition, in September 2009, a campaign o 
against building a casino in Penghu successfully won the referendum against the 
pro-casino KMT politicians. During 2009 and 2010, social movements and NGOs have 
again actively played an important role in Taiwanese society on many issues, and they 
are now more organised and careful to keep their distance from political parties. The 
most obvious case of this distancing was the anti-nuclear demonstration in May 2011. 
After the Fukushima nuclear power plant discharged radioactive substance into the 
surrounding environments, the Taiwanese anti-nuclear movement and anti-nuclear waste 
movement organised a rally which they allowed politicians to join, but on condition that 
they did not show their flags and names. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided the geo-political context which will help us in the next 
chapters to better understand the way in which Taiwan has dealt with its nuclear waste 
disposal problem. Its geographical situation makes it clear why policy makers favoured 
an island location; its demographic composition shows why an ethnic minority was an 
easy target; its political history indicates how a long period of authoritarian rule bred a 
top-down approach to nuclear waste decision-making, but how the more recent politics 
of democracy heralded a much greater sensitivity to public opinion and the claims of 
local communities; its political economy demonstrates how the outstanding growth 
trajectory of the late 20th century led to environmental damage that rang alarm bells for 
unfettered economic development; and its experience of the growth of civil society 
explains how channels of social power have opened up that wield significant influence 
over governmental decision–making on nuclear waste issues.   
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 Chapter 5. History of Nuclear Waste in Taiwan 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter examines the historical development of nuclear waste policy in Taiwan and 
explores the issues of decision-making on the nuclear waste repository in Orchid Island 
(also called Lan Yu) and the proposed siting of the final repository for Taiwan’s nuclear 
waste inside and outside Taiwan. The chapter draws on public opinion in the 
communities which host nuclear waste to probe the problem of public acceptance and 
involvement in the siting of repositories, and public attitudes to radioactive waste 
management in general. What follows in this section is a short synopsis of the chapter.  
 
Taiwan has six reactors in three nuclear power stations located in the north and south of 
Taiwan. These three power plants generate 5,144MW electricity per year. In 2010, 
nuclear power accounted for 17.2 % of total electric power generation in Taiwan 
(Taiwan. Energy Bureau 2010: 36). Taiwan’s nuclear power stations are owned and 
operated by the state-owned Taiwan Power Co. Ltd (Taipower). In 1982, the Taiwanese 
government started to ship radioactive waste to Orchid Island, which is 70 miles 
southeast from Taiwan Main Island and occupied by the indigenous Yami people. The 
Yami people did not know the government had built a national repository for radioactive 
waste on their island until an environmental NGO discovered that the government had 
stored radioactive waste on their land. Since then, the Yami people have protested and 
negotiated with the government for many years with little success. In 1999, the 
government claimed that the repository for radioactive waste on the island was only a 
temporary repository, and promised to remove it by 2002, and it has been searching ever 
since for replacement repositories for nuclear waste both domestically and 
internationally. Domestically, Taipower conducted a voluntary scheme which offered 
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money to any communities which were willing to host radioactive waste. Many 
communities initially agreed to host the radioactive waste, but later withdrew because of 
local opposition. Internationally, Taiwan signed agreements in 1997 and 1998 with 
North Korea, the Marshall Islands, and Russia to ship nuclear wastes to these countries, 
but because of strong opposition around the world, none of these agreements came to 
fruition. With no place willing to host radioactive waste within Taiwan, and the 
international agreements opposed by other countries, the Taiwan government has so far 
failed to keep its promise to the Yami people.  
 
5.2 Regulatory framework  
 
Taiwan’s nuclear power stations are all administered by the state-owned company, 
Taiwan Power Co Ltd. (Taipower) that is under the management of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (MOEA). The first law associated with nuclear energy was the 
Atomic Energy Act, promulgated by President Chiang Kai-Shek (蔣介石) in 1968. 
Because tension between Taiwan and China led to the USA fearing that Taiwan would 
use nuclear energy as a means of producing nuclear weapons, the Act explicitly 
restricted the use of nuclear energy in Taiwan to peaceful purposes. Article 1 stated that 
‘The purpose of the act is to promote research, development, resource exploitation and 
peaceful use of the science and technology on atomic energy’ (Taiwan. Atomic Energy 
Act 1968: Article 3). Another important aspect of this Act is that it is the first time that 
the Taiwanese government had assigned the responsibility for nuclear energy to a 
non-departmental body – the Atomic Energy Council (AEC). In Article 3 the Act 
stipulated that ‘the complete authority over atomic energy is the Atomic Energy Council 
(AEC)’ (Taiwan. Atomic Energy Act 1968: Article 3); and in Articles 21 and 22 it 
stipulated that ‘the import, export, transit, carry, use, discard, and assign of nuclear 
source material and nuclear fuel shall be filed with and approved by AEC and AEC 
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might carry out the inspections’ (Taiwan. Atomic Energy Act 1968: Article 21 and 22). 
Also the Act is significant because it is the first official governmental document to 
highlight the issue of radioactive waste in Taiwan (Taiwan. Atomic Energy Act 1968). 
Although the Atomic Energy Act 1968 referred to radioactive waste, at that time there 
was only a very small reactor in National Tsing-Hua University(國立清華大學) for 
research purpose, so hardly any radioactive waste existed in the country, and the 
Taiwanese government did not have any plans for its management.   
 
The first attempt by the Taiwanese government to regulate the management of 
radioactive waste was when it set up a project unit on radioactive waste management 
under the AEC in 1971.  The Director of Fuel Circle and Materials Administration 
(FCMA), Dr. Chin-Tien Yang(楊清田), said that ‘AEC and Taiwan government had 
noticed the radioactive waste issues in a very early stage. The first nuclear power station 
began construction on November 197023. Five months later, there was a project unit 
about radioactive waste management formed in the AEC’ (Oon 2001: 252). The 
establishment of this project unit was the first indication that the Taiwanese government 
was aware of the radioactive waste problem. In order to respond to the issues of 
radioactive waste more efficiently, this project unit was enlarged by the government and 
became the FCMA under AEC’s command on 1st January 1981. The responsibilities of 
FCMA include planning, supervision, and control over the management of radioactive 
waste in general and the operation of the Orchid Island (Lan Yu) National Repository of 
Radioactive Waste in particular (Oon 2001: 116). Responsibility for controlling 
radioactive waste and enforcing policies is assigned to FCMA, while research into 
techniques of dealing with radioactive waste belongs to another AEC subsidiary, the 
Institute of Nuclear Research. 
 
                                                 
23
 Interview with the Director of FCMA on 30 December 2003. 
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During the mid-80s, many people in Taiwan became aware of the dangers of radiation 
and nuclear waste and anti-nuclear and anti-nuclear-waste movements were formed 
which pressed the government to act more positively. In its response, the government 
published several policy guidelines: for example, in 1988, FCMA’s Radwaste 
Management Policy and Guidelines stipulated the following six strategies: 
 1. to ask the producer of radioactive waste to reduce the amount and volume; 
2. to require the producer of radioactive waste to pay all the relevant expenses; 
   3. to control the management and transport of radioactive waste to ensure security. 
4. to devise a plan for the final disposal of radioactive waste 
5. to enforce a management system and create an information system. 
6. to support research studies and provide education for the general public.(Oon  
2001:116) 
    
Following the publication of the FCMA’s guidelines and strategies, the management of 
the Orchid Island (Lan Yu) National Repository of Radioactive Waste was transferred 
from AEC to Taipower in July 1990, and in October 1992, FCMA established an 
information system to monitor all the data of radioactive waste. Table 5.1 shows the 
amount of radioactive waste accumulated since Taiwan started nuclear energy 
production in the 1980s. In 1993, FCMA adopted a strategy to reduce the amount of 
radioactive waste in 1993 – a task which it has  carried out spectacularly well  since 
the total amount of radioactive was reduced from 11,814 barrels in 1983 to 234 barrels 
in 2010 (See Figure 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1 Amount of radioactive waste 1983-2010 
Year 1983 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Barrels 11,814 4,756 3,363 2,231 1,716 1,603 1,346 1,081 963 819 
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Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Barrels  765  664 601 337 259 253 251 234 
Source:  AEC 2003 and FCMA 2010 
 
The guidelines were revised in September 1997, adding the requirements that 
radioactive waste management was designed to ensure the safety of everyone in the 
country, to safeguard the environment, and to prevent present and future generations 
suffering harm from radioactive waste (Taiwan. FCMA 2003: 13). The last requirement 
was the first time an official government document had mentioned the impact of 
radioactive waste on present and future generations, which was a big step for the 
Taiwanese government. However, the government’s approach was top-down and 
bureaucratic, neglecting the role of public participation and thereby causing disputes 
with local people and groups which led to the emergence of the anti-nuclear and anti- 
nuclear waste movement.  
 
5.3 Orchid Island (Lan Yu) national repository for radioactive waste  
 
5.3.1 Decision options 
 
Orchid Island (Lan Yu/ Lanyu) is located 65 kilometres off Taiwan’s southeast coast 
(See Table 5.2). The island is the homeland of the Yami people (雅美族), one of the 
aboriginal tribes in Taiwan. The Yami people number around 4,000 of whom 3,390 
people live in Orchid Island (Taiwan. Council for Indigenous People) supporting 
themselves with agriculture and fishing. They have no written language, but young 
people can communicate in Mandarin and some attain higher education on Taiwan Main 
Island. Many Yami are Christian, especially Presbyterian. 
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Table 5.2. Map of Taiwan 
 
Source: Lonely Planet, Map of Taiwan.  
 
According to AEC, after the Taiwanese government decided to build the first nuclear 
power station in November 1970, AEC invited its nuclear research centre, the Ocean 
Research Institute of National Taiwan University, the Atomic Science Institute of 
National Chin-Hwa University, and the Taiwan Power Company (Taipower), to study all 
the alternatives for radioactive waste management to recommend the best policy option 
and to identify the optimum radioactive waste storage site (Oon 2001: 251). In 1972, 
scholars from the Ocean Research Institute concluded that because, unlike countries 
such as the USA and Canada, Taiwan is a highly populated island where it is impossible 
to find a large area of land with no population, the following five other possible options 
had to be considered: 
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1. Store in a discarded mine; 
2. Store in former underground military facilities built during Japanese rule; 
3. Store in the high mountains; 
4. Dump at sea;   
5. Store on a remote island (Oon 2001: 251).   
 
Among these five options, only the last one - storing on a remote island - was regarded 
as feasible. Storage in a discarded mine was considered to be too close to residential 
areas; the mines were not in very good condition; their atmospheres were very humid 
because they contained large amounts of underground water; and none of the mines had 
salt rocks (from experience in the USA, the best option is to store radioactive waste in 
salt rocks). For all these reasons, the project unit rejected the option of storing 
radioactive waste in discarded mines. 
 
The second option - to store radioactive waste in former underground military facilities 
built during Japanese rule, was rejected by the project unit because the tunnels in the 
former military facilities were too narrow; they were only twenty metres below the 
surface; and they did not have sufficient space. The third option - storing in the high 
mountains - was rejected because access is very difficult; it would cost a considerable 
amount of money to build a new road; and if radioactive wastes leaked into the rivers 
originating in these high mountains, they would pose a serious threat to human health. 
The fourth option – dumping at sea – was rejected because internationally there were 
too many disputes over the environmental risks posed by sea dumping. On the fifth 
option – storage on a remote island - after conducting several surveys in Penghu islands 
and Orchid Island (Lan Yu), Taipower and AEC both suggested that this seemed the best 
option.  
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On 17 January 1974, AEC held a seminar on ‘Management of Low Level Radioactive 
Waste’ at which it presented its surveys of all the islets around Taiwan, and suggested 
that for the following reasons the Long Men area in Lan Yu (Orchid Island) was the 
most suitable site for a radioactive waste repository: 
1. It is economically efficient, because the total area is bigger than one square 
kilometre, and so there would be more than 100 hectares to use, which is 
sufficient to store all solid radioactive waste from the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy and radioactive waste from the six reactors owned by Taipower,  
2. There is no population within 5 kilometres of the repository: the nearest village 
is located more than 5 kilometres away;  
3. The possibility of polluting the living environment is very low because the area 
faces the sea and mountain;  
4. The route of transportation is by sea, in which the level of radiation is very low 
and so would not pollute the environment; and  
 5. It provides easy access for future sea dumping if the international 
condemnation of sea dumping is lifted (Oon 2001: 251).   
 
Therefore in February 1974, AEC asked permission from Executive Yuan to reserve the 
land in the Long Men area for a solid radioactive waste repository, and the Orchid 
Island (Lan Yu) project was thereby officially started. However, the government 
hesitated because of worries about the negative impact of the site on tourism, so it asked 
for investigations to be carried out on other islands using the following (stricter) criteria 
of assessment:     
 
1. The island should be sparsely populated or not populated at all, and the further its 
distance from Taiwan Main Island the better. 
2. The island should be easy to reach for maintenance work in the repository to be 
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carried out especially after typhoons or earthquake hits, and there should be a natural 
barrier such as water, mountains, or rocks, making it easy to control the entrance and 
exit to the site, and prevent damage to people’s health and the ocean by radiation.  
3. In order to reduce the cost of transportation, there should be roads and a harbour 
already on the island.  
4. The area should be large enough to store solid radioactive waste for one hundred 
years. 
5. The location should have easy access for sea dumping in the future (Oon 2001: 252) . 
 
There are lots of islands around Taiwan Main Island, but most of them were either 
developed, highly populated, or very near the main island, and no island met all the 
above conditions except Orchid Island (Lan Yu). On 4 March 1976, AEC together with 
other government officials including the Director of the Tourist Bureau, and the Director 
of the Traffic Research Institute came to Orchid Island and confirmed that the proposed 
repository would not affect tourist development on Orchid Island (Lan Yu). So on 24 
Apr 1976, AEC decided to build a repository for LLW and ILW in the Long Men area of 
Orchid Island. The necessary surveys and investigations began immediately, and in 
September 1978, the Orchid Island (Lan Yu) National Repository of Radioactive Waste 
was under construction (Oon 2001: 252). The Orchid Island (Lan Yu) project was 
designed to build two repositories which could store nuclear waste for one hundred 
years. Repository I required six phases of construction works in order to build 98 
ditches to host 338,040 barrels. Repository II required three phases in order to build 58 
ditches to host 227,568 barrels. Construction works of the first phase of Repository I 
finished in 1982, and on 20 May 1982, the Orchid Island (Lan Yu) National Repository 
of Nuclear Waste began operation (Oon 2001: 264). 
 
5.3.2 A fish canning factory or a radioactive waste repository? 
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The decision to build a radioactive waste repository on Orchid Island (Lan Yu) was 
controversial. Whether the government had the consent of the local communities is a 
matter of dispute. The government claimed that the signature of Orchid Island’s District 
Commissioner proves that local people did understand the building of the radioactive 
waste repository. However, some reports showed that the people in Orchid Island did 
not know the government was building a repository for radioactive waste during the 
construction, but were led to believe that a fish canning factory was planned. 
 
When the Yami people discovered the truth that the government had built a repository 
for nuclear waste in Orchid Island, a resident missionary, Reverend Dong Sen-Yun (董
森永), together with other Yami missionaries and youngsters read numerous book and 
articles on nuclear energy and radioactive waste, and published articles in newspapers, 
church communiqués and magazines to express their anger about the threat of 
radioactive waste and the unfairness of siting the waste repository on Orchid Island 
(Lan Yu). In both Taiwan and Orchid Island, these activists educated the Yami people 
and elders to understand nuclear power and radioactive waste, thereby bringing the 
Yami community together to fight against the repository. 
 
Although the Yami missionaries’ efforts could not stop the construction and operation of 
the radioactive waste repository, by the mid 1980s, most Yami people understood the 
dangers they were exposed to (Lin, Lin, and Liu 1993: 1). Some elderly Yami leaders 
asked ‘why did the government not dispose of radioactive wastes in Taiwan Main Island 
if it is as safe as the government claims? If the radioactive waste is harmless why not 
distribute each barrel to each household or store at the basement of the Presidential 
Building in the capital city Taipei?’(Kuan 1987) This kind of public reaction spread all 
over Orchid Island (Lan Yu). 
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Whether or not the people of Orchid Island (Lan Yu) were told that what was being built 
was a repository of radioactive waste or a fish canning factory, it is clear that local 
people feel that they were misled by the government (including AEC and Taipower). It 
is also clear that local people were not given the chance to participate in the 
decision-making about the repository for radioactive waste, and that AEC also did not 
consult local people. It is hardly surprising, therefore that since 1987 there have been 
many demonstrations held both in Taiwan and Orchid Island (Lan Yu) organised by 
people from Orchid Island against radioactive waste and demanding that the 
government remove the radioactive waste from Orchid Island. 
 
5.3.2.1 Lack of trust in the government 
 
This was not the only source of mistrust felt by the Taiwanese people toward the 
government and Taipower on radioactive contamination issues. The irradiated steel bars 
incident was another reason for the low level of trust in the government and Taipower. 
Irradiated steel bars used in apartment blocks in Taiwan were first discovered in 1983 
(Bih and Kou 1999). In 1985, a dentist detected dangerous amount of radiation when he 
set up an x-ray machine at his clinic in northern Taiwan. These two cases were reported 
to the AEC, however, AEC covered it up and did not carry out any future investigation 
(Taipei Times 2003), and it was not until 1992 that the issue of irradiated steel bar for 
building apartment blocks drew serious public attention. A Taipower worker 
accidentally brought a radiation detector home and surprisingly discovered that the 
radiation level was higher than safety limits in 1992. Liberty Time revealed that 
Minsheng Villas (民生別墅) in Taipei contained irradiated bars in their buildings (Bih 
and Kou 1999). After the demand by local people, AEC started a complete investigation 
in 1992, and it was found that by October 1997, there were more than 100 public 
buildings including schools and kindergartens, and more than 1400 apartment units in 
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Taiwan contaminated by the irradiated steel bars (Bih and Kou 1999). However, no 
coordinated effort has been made to demolish the affected buildings and to rebuild them, 
and local residents blamed AEC and the government for managing the issue with 
secrecy and slowness to react. In 1993, three officials were censured for neglect of duty 
having learned in 1985 that Minsheng Villas was seriously contaminated by radiation, 
and in 1994, the Taipei District Court accepted lawsuits for state compensation from 65 
residents of Minsheng Villas (Taipei Times 2001).  
 
Moreover, AEC’s attitudes towards this issue of irradiated steels bars created 
controversy. . From November 1995 to June 2000, a research team at National Yang 
Ming University (陽明大學) tracked more than 4,100 residents who once lived in 
buildings that had been constructed between 1982 and 1983 using irradiated steel bars. 
The researchers concluded that a high incidence of diverse cancers was evidenced 
among samples taken from this group of residents (Taipei Times 2001). However, the 
AEC did not agree with the results, and claimed that a low dose of radiation has been 
proved to be beneficial to humans (Taipei Times 2001).  
 
To date, AEC still have not carried out an investigation into irradiated steel bars in every 
building in Taiwan, and some legislators believed that the amount of radiation 
contaminated buildings could be higher than expected. The response of AEC to the issue 
of irradiated steel bar reflected the secrecy on issues related to nuclear energy shown by 
government institutions. Also, it severely damaged the credibility of AEC, and 
contributed to the low level of trust among members of general public towards the 
government on the issue of nuclear waste. 
 
5.3.3 Protest against nuclear waste  
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The Yami organised their first protest on Orchid Island on 7 December 1987 when 30 
aboriginal Yami youth gathered at Orchid Island airport to protest against AEC’s bribing 
aborigines and representatives of the local council with trips to Japan (Kao 2000). The 
Yami youth also accused people who went on such trips of ignoring public opinion in 
Orchid Island. The protest was effective in that 17 representatives of the local council 
cancelled their trip to Japan (Danafu 1989). Importantly, this was the first time that the 
people from Orchid Island (Lan Yu) had publicly expressed their anger about the 
deception and unfair treatment they had received from the government since the Orchid 
Island (Lan Yu) project started. The people who joined in this protest would become the 
leaders in subsequent protests and play an important role in the anti-nuclear waste 
movement in Orchid Island. Although this protest was small-scale, it had attracted the 
attention of many local people, and made more of them aware of the fact that Orchid 
Island (Lan Yu) had been hosting radioactive waste for many years, and encouraged 
them to join the campaign.  
 
On 20 February 1988, six years after the repository began operation, about 350 Yami 
people held their first large-scale demonstration with the slogan ‘Repel the Nuclear 
Evil’, on the site of the repository in Orchid Island (Kao 2000). The Yami requested the 
government to stop plans for expansion of the site and set a timetable for removal of 
radioactive waste from Orchid Island. The news of this demonstration spread all over 
Taiwan and drew much attention from people in Taiwan making them aware of the 
radioactive waste issues in Orchid Island. Two months later (22 April 1988) at the 
annual anti-nuclear demonstration in the capital city Taipei, Yami youth leaders Chang 
Hai-Yu (張海嶼) and Kou Chien-Pin (郭建平) handed a petition from the Orchid Island 
people to the AEC and Taipower. However, the government did not change its attitude 
and did not respond to the Yami people. Instead, AEC offered compensation of $30 
million New Taiwan Dollars (NTD) (approximately £600, 000) to build a pipeline of tap 
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water and buy engines for fishing boats for the Yami people (Kao 2000). But the Yami 
elders reacted strongly against the compensation: Mr. Shaman, a Yami artist, recalled 
his memories in an interview conducted in 2003 on what elderly Yamis said about the 
compensation: ‘the government try to buy us with approximately NTD$30 million. 
Building a pipeline of tap water and buying engines for fishing boat is not what we need. 
We are facing a survival challenge. We will return the money to AEC’.   
 
Although the first large-scale demonstration did not change the government’s attitude, 
the people of Orchid Island (Lan Yu) did not give up. On 20 February 1991, Yamis led 
by Kou Chine-Pin conducted a similar demonstration in Orchid Island, during which 
about one hundred Yami people and representatives from environmental groups 
marched to the repository where they presented the petition again and made a 
declaration requesting the government to: 
1. Immediately stop the expansion of the second phase of the storage site; 
2. Immediately stop transporting radioactive waste to Lan Yu (Orchid Island); and 
3. Set a timetable for removing nuclear waste from Lan Yu (Orchid Island) (Kuan 
1991). 
 
The declaration also called on Taipower to respond to their demands to the Yami people 
in written documents by 30 June 1991. If the government or Taipower ignored these 
demands, the Yami demonstrators threatened to conduct more radical action, such as 
blockading the repository and harbour until the radioactive waste is removed from 
Orchid Island (Kuan 1991).  
 
5.3.4 A two-faced approach?  
 
The United Nations Year of Indigenous People was 1993. Under the pressure of strong 
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local resistance, on 20 March 1993, the Chairman of AEC, Dr. Hu Chin-Piao (胡錦標) 
Hu, declared in the Legislative Yuan that ‘the radioactive waste stored in Orchid Island 
will start to be removed by 2001’ (Lin 1995). But Taipower had just sent plans to AEC 
to build another six ditches in Orchid Island to host another 100,000 barrels of 
radioactive waste. The Yami people asked Legislators (MPs) to oppose this expansion 
plan and put pressure on the government to stop it. On 26 Apr 1993, Dr. Hu insisted in 
the Legislative Yuan that ‘there will be no more expansion of the radioactive waste 
repository’ (Lin 1995). The vice-general manager of Taipower also spoke publicly on 12 
May 1993 saying that ‘Taipower guaranteed we will negotiate with Taitung County 
Council beforehand and any works will not start without the approval of local people’ 
(Lin 1995). Yet at the same time (the beginning of May 1993), Taipower applied to the 
Executive Yuan for a ‘Significant Public Project’ permit (Lin 1995), because in 
Taiwanese Law, the central government can approve a ‘Significant Public Project’ 
without the consensus of local government, local council or local communities for the 
purpose of benefiting all people in the nation. This two-faced approach brought the 
people of Orchid Island (Lan Yu) to Taipei again on 20 May 1993, where a total of 
20,000 people joined the demonstration. The demonstration opened with about twenty 
Yami elders dressed in their traditional clothes with bamboo helmet, loincloths and 
bamboo chest armour conducting an aboriginal dance in front of the Legislative Yuan. 
The event attracted much attention and made the whole nation aware of the radioactive 
waste issue on Orchid Island.  
 
In May 1995, there were further protests in both Taipei and Orchid Island (Lan Yu) 
against radioactive waste. The Yami people put rocks into the ocean to try to block the 
harbour, and in Taipei, they asked the government to investigate the legality of 
Taipower’s enlargement plan. In response, at the end of 1995, Taipower suspended the 
enlargement plan and promised to reduce the six new ditches to two ditches, but local 
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opposition remained strong (Kao 2000). During the 10th anniversary of the Chernobyl 
accident on 24 April 1996, Taipower’s freighter containing a shipment of 186 barrels of 
radioactive waste was blocked from entering the harbour of Orchid Island (Lan Yu) by 
Yami aborigines. Strong local opposition made it impossible for Taipower to build any 
more ditches in the repository in Orchid Island (Lan Yu) to host more nuclear waste, so 
the repository had effectively reached its maximum capacity (Kao 2000). Therefore, in 
July 1996, Taipower decided to stop sending any more radioactive waste to Orchid 
Island (Lan Yu). But this did not end the controversy, because the presence of the 
existing stock of radioactive waste in Orchid Island (Lan Yu) continued to cause acute 
controversy.  
 
During the 14 years (1982-1996) that Taipower had sent radioactive waste to Orchid 
Island, there were 338 shipments totalling 97,671 barrels of radioactive waste 
transported from Taiwan to Orchid Island (FCMA 2002: 20). In 1998, AEC estimated 
that there were at least 4,000 barrels of radioactive in Orchid Island (Lan Yu) which 
were rusty and that the number was increasing. . The Director of FCMA said to China 
Times on 7 February 1998 that ‘because the natural environment in Lan Yu (Orchid 
Island) has high temperature, high humidity and salt, the radioactive waste barrels will 
last only ten years but 1982 is more than fifteen years ago. We undoubtedly assume that 
the number of rusty barrels will increase day by day’ (China Times 1998a: 9) . Rusty 
barrels may leak radioactive substances into the surrounding water and air and cause 
illness to people. AEC asked Taipower to re-fill the radioactive waste in new barrels, 
and in June 1998, Taipower launched a six-year plan to complete the refix work by 
re-filling the radioactive waste in new barrels. However, Taipower decided that the best 
way of doing so was to build another new ditch for the new re-filling work, but people 
in Orchid Island (Lan Yu) were strongly against building another ditch, and their 
opposition meant that no new ditch was built. On 17 November 2000, a Taipower ship 
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with several barrels arrived in Orchid Island (Lan Yu), and the Orchid Island people 
assumed there was radioactive waste on the ship and prepared for protest (China Times 
2000b: 8), until a Taipower official explained that the barrels on the ship were empty 
barrels brought to replace the rusty barrels (China Evening Times 2000c: 5). The Yami 
people were not satisfied with the length of time taken to complete the refix work: by 
November 2002, 77% of the rusty barrels had been replaced (FCMA 2002: 22), and at 
the time of writing (August 2012), the refix work is still under way, despite the fact that  
Taipower scheduled to finish all the fixing work by October 2011 (Lu 2006, and Chen 
2011: 6). People in Orchid Island (Lan Yu) claimed that Taipower deliberately delayed 
the fixing work, and they suspected that Taipower’s shipments of empty barrels actually 
contained radioactive waste, so they often continued to blockade Taipower’s ships.  
 
At a visit to Orchid Island during his (successful) 1999 Presidential election campaign, 
Mr. Chen Shui-Bian (陳水扁) signed a ‘New Partnership Relationship’ with the people 
in Orchid Island (Lan Yu) committing the government to removing the radioactive 
waste from Orchid Island (Lan Yu) by 2002 (Chen 2002: 5). It was the first time that a 
high profile politician had signed a written agreement with aboriginal people in Taiwan. 
However, the radioactive waste issue was too complicated for the material to be 
removed easily – for one thing, Taipower had not found any other place in Taiwan or in 
other countries, which could host the radioactive waste immediately. 
 
On 15 February 2001, Vice President Miss Lu (呂秀蓮) offered her apology for siting  
the radioactive waste during a visit to Orchid Island. She told the Yami people that 
Taipower had reported they had signed agreements with other countries to deal with the 
radioactive waste by 2002, and she stated that ‘though I cannot say which countries are 
going to receive the waste, the government never forgets the demands of people in Lan 
Yu (Orchid Island)’ (Shin 2001: 8). But ironically, on the following day, Taipower’s 
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general manager reported to the Vice President that is was nearly impossible to remove 
all radioactive wastes from Orchid Island by 2002 (Shin 2001: 8).  
 
On 2 May 2002, the largest protest in Orchid Island was launched, and nearly 2,000 
residents joined the protest. Yami children, women, and elders together with Yami 
youths in their traditional dress marched around the island to express their anger, calling 
on the government to keep their promise to remove the radioactive waste from Orchid 
Island (Lan Yu). The Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. Lin Yi-Fu (林義夫), replied to 
the Yami people by fax confirming that the government’s policy was to gradually stop 
the use of nuclear energy and to achieve a nuclear-free homeland in Taiwan, and that 
Wuciou (烏坵鄉) had been designated as the final disposal site and work had already 
started on its environmental impact assessment (Chen 2002: 5). But the Yami people 
were not satisfied with the reply faxed by the Minister of Economic Affairs, and they 
threatened that if the government could not give them a more concrete reply, they would 
burn the repository. The Minister of Economic Affairs and the Chairman of Taipower 
went to Orchid Island on 4 May 2002 and the former apologised for failure to remove 
radioactive waste from Orchid Island by 2002 (BBC NEWS 2002), and signed an 
agreement with the people in Orchid Island which stated that: 
   1. The Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. Lin Yi-Fu, as a representative of the 
government sent his apology for years of failure to remove radioactive waste 
stored in Lan Yu (Orchid Island). The Minister of Economic Affairs also sent his 
apology for disrespect for the human rights and environmental rights of all people 
in Lan Yu (Orchid Island); 
    2. The government would legislate to protect Yami people’s rights in Lan Yu 
(Orchid Island); 
3. The government would set up a committee to oversee the removal of radioactive 
waste stored in Lan Yu (Orchid Island). The Committee members would include 
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anti-nuclear waste leaders from Lan Yu (Orchid Island), members of 
environmental groups, experts, representatives from the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, representatives from the AEC, representatives from Taipower, Yami 
representatives from the Council for Indigenous People, and aboriginals MPs. 
This Committee would set a timetable to remove radioactive waste as soon as 
possible. 
4. The government would set up a committee within a month to improve the health 
care, living conditions, and education in Lan Yu (Orchid Island), and after removal 
of the waste, to clean up all the radioactive materials and restore the natural 
landscape of the site. 
5. If the government does not comply with this agreement, the government will have 
to face further demonstrations held by the Yami people. 
6. This agreement will be recorded in the Legislative Yuan (Shin 2002: 8). 
 
The Yami signed this agreement with the Minister of Economic Affairs, though 
Taipower stated that the Yami people would have to wait at least seven years for 
removal of all of the radioactive waste from Orchid Island. In November 2002, the 
Committee for the Lan Yu (Orchid Island) Repository Removal (CLYRR) was 
established by Executive Yuan to promote the removal of radioactive waste from Orchid 
Island. But because Taipower had not found a new disposal site, this committee did not 
set out a timetable for Taipower – a failure criticised by Mr. Sharman, a Yami artist: ‘We 
believe the government sincerely wants to remove the radioactive waste from Orchid 
Island. But the committee is useless. It has no timetable. If the government does not 
start to remove the rubbish I am afraid some of the young generation will use very 
radical ways to protest’24. The latest recorded meeting of the CLYRR was held on 14 
August 2007, but with no site named to host radioactive waste, the discussion focused 
                                                 
24
 Interview with Mr. Sharman on 23 December 2003.  
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on the hypothetical procedure of siting the new repository, whereas committee members 
who represented people of Orchid Island were more concerned about compensation for, 
and employment of, local people. Since 2007, the committee has not functioned at all, 
and the website site of CLYRR has not been updated.   
 
After 2002, Taipower changed its strategy towards people in Orchid Island. Before then, 
there were no employees from Orchid Island in the repository, but since 2002, Taipower 
hired more local people, and since 2006 there have been 22 local people out of the 37 
employees who work at the repository (United Daily 2006). Moreover, whereas before 
2002, Taipower employees at the repository who were from Taiwan Main Island 
conducted negotiations between Taipower and people in Orchid Island, since 2002, six 
of the 22 local people employed by Taipower communicate and negotiate with the local 
community (United Daily 2006). Their responsibilities include liaising with local elders 
and distributing compensation to people in Orchid Island who need help. These 
negotiators have a difficult job because, on the one hand, they have to face criticism 
from their own tribe about their attitude to radioactive waste, but on the other hand, they 
have to work for Taipower in helping the locals.  The level of financial compensation 
keeps increasing: according to United Daily Newspaper, from 1982 to 2006, there was a 
total of about NTD 760 million (approximately £13.2 million) (United Daily 2006), and 
since 2002, Orchid Island has accepted about NTD$ 200 millions each year which has 
been spent on medical and educational services, public infrastructure, community 
development, emergency aid, and electricity bills (Taiwan Indigenous TV Station News 
2011).  
 
Taipower’s strategy has defused the anti-radioactive waste movement in Orchid Island, 
and more local people are returning to the island from Taiwan as workers to fix the rusty 
radioactive waste barrels in the repository. But progress on siting a new repository for 
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radioactive waste is very slow. The government was supposed to announce the new site 
for a radioactive waste repository by June 2005, but due to the enacting of the Law on 
Site Selection of Low Level Waste Final Disposal in 2006, the siting process had to start 
again. As of August 2011, none of the radioactive waste has been removed from Orchid 
Island. 
 
5.4 Siting for a final repository for nuclear waste  
 
Although Taipower has reduced opposition in Orchid Island by hiring local people to 
communicate with other locals and by increasing the amount of financial compensation 
paid out to the community, the demand for removal of radioactive waste from Orchid 
Island has never disappeared. Yet since there are six reactors with three nuclear power 
plants in Taiwan, the volume of radioactive waste is increasing day by day. This new 
radioactive waste is being stored at the nuclear power plants but the space in these   
plant areas is limited, and each nuclear power station will very soon reach its capacity 
for storing its radioactive waste. So since the opposition to expanding the Lan Yu 
(Orchid Island) repository is still strong, the siting of a new repository for radioactive 
waste is becoming more and more urgent. 
 
In 1993, Taipower began to look for another site to replace the Orchid Island site for its 
new nuclear waste, but it encountered so much local opposition that in 1997 it 
considered transporting radioactive waste to other countries. This section will first trace 
the steps that Taipower took to find another site within Taiwan, and then examine its 
attempt to find another country willing to receive its radioactive waste. Both strategies 
aroused considerable opposition, and both failed. 
 
5.4.1 Financial support – a nuclear backend fund 
 157 
Siting a permanent repository for radioactive waste is very costly. A lot of financial 
support is needed to conduct research, negotiate with local people, and compensate host 
communities. In 1986, in order to ensure that the financial burden would not be imposed 
on future generations who would not benefit from today’s nuclear power generation 
(Oon 2001: 5), the Taiwan government asked Taipower to establish a nuclear backend 
fund to cover the cost not only of managing radioactive waste, but also of 
decommissioning nuclear power plants (Shieh 1996), and since 1986, Taipower has 
contributed NTD$ 0.17 (£0.34 pence) per unit of electricity produced by nuclear power 
plants to such a fund. By 2008, the total amount of money in the fund had reached 
NTD$9.97 billion (approximately £199.4 million) (Taipower 2009). According to 
Taipower, the fund would be used for the following purposes: 
1. Final disposal of nuclear waste; 
2. Packaging, transport, interim storage and final disposal of spent fuel;  
3. Decommissioning of Taipower’s nuclear facilities and disposal of decommissioned 
wastes. 
 
The fund would also cover the cost of compensation for local communities hosting the 
radioactive waste, as well as expenditure incurred in exporting radioactive waste to 
other countries. The establishment of the nuclear backend fund ensured that the cost of 
siting a new repository would not come from governmental departments or from future 
generations of Taiwanese people. Another advantage was that because the amount of 
money in the fund was huge, although this would encourage local communities to ask 
for more compensation, it would attract many local councillors to serve as Taipower’s 
agents to persuade local people and local government to agree to host radioactive waste. 
Also internationally, this huge amount of money would be very attractive to those 
countries which were willing to host radioactive waste from Taiwan.  
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5.4.2 Siting a permanent LLW repository in Taiwan 
 
In February 1993, Taipower formed a ‘Siting Committee’ comprising 15 professors and 
scholars from local universities and research institutes. The main task of this committee 
was to conduct investigations and surveys for selecting a suitable site for new nuclear 
waste around Taiwan, and Taipower hoped to recommend three candidate sites to AEC 
by February 1998. Taipower’s programme for LLW disposal was planned to be carried 
out in the following six phases: 
1. Selection of disposal site and method of disposal  
2. Environmental survey and assessment 
3. Site characterisation, engineering design and licensing 
4. Site construction 
5. Operation 
6. Post-operation monitoring (Cheng and Wu 2003) 
 
At the end of 1995, Taipower had identified thirty potential sites with a total land size of 
1,500 square kilometres (Shieh 1996). But after several years of anti-nuclear protest in 
Taiwan, Taiwanese people were more aware of the safety issues of nuclear waste, and 
the surveys and investigations of several sites were facing a lot of local opposition. 
Taipower acknowledged that the Taiwanese people did not welcome its surveys, and in 
1997, Taipower decided to change its strategy again to adopt a voluntary scheme (Li 
1998: 8). This voluntary scheme was designed to encourage local counties to allow 
Taipower to conduct investigations and evaluations in their areas for the final disposal 
site of LLW. The local county would be given NTD$1 million (approximately £20,000) 
if they signed a letter of consent to provide land to Taipower for the final disposal site of 
LLW (Li 1998: 8), and Taipower would evaluate the suitability of the proposed final 
disposal site of LLW in the towns that had signed the letter of consent. If the site were 
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chosen for the final disposal site and construction started, Taipower would provide 
compensation of NTD$3.2 billion (approximately £64 million) to the local 
communities.      
 
Under this scheme, several towns signed letters of consent with Taipower to allow 
Taipower to conduct the suitability survey for the final disposal site, including Ju-kuwn 
(莒光) in Matzu (馬祖), Mu-Dan(牡丹) in Pingtung County (屏東縣), Fu-Li (富里) in 
Hualien County (花蓮縣), and Da-Ren (達仁) and Jing-Fong (金峰)in Taitung County. 
Because local opposition was still quite strong, Taipower also considered some small 
islands previously used for military purposes. In February 1998, Taipower chose six 
towns to propose to AEC as the potential sites for LLW final disposal: Little Ciou Yu 
(小丘嶼) in Wuciou Township, Peng Chia Yu (彭佳嶼)in Keelung City (基隆市), Little 
Lan Yu (小蘭嶼) in Orchid Island (Lan Yu), Da-Ren in Taitung County, Dung-Ji Yu (東
吉嶼)in Wang-An in Penghu, and Mu-Dan in Pingtung. In 2003, the government added 
Da-Wu in Taitung County as another potential site (China Times 2003a: 8). From these 
sites, Taipower identified Little Ciou Yu in Wuciou as its most favoured or priority site, 
while Da-Wu was designated the next most favoured site, despite the fact that some of 
the strongest opposition to repositories was found in these two areas. We discuss the 
cases of Wuciou and Da-Wu in more detail below. 
 
5.4.2.1 Wuciou   
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Table 5.3 Location of Taiwan and Wuciou 
 
Sources: Wikipedia  
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/11/Kinmen,Matsu,Wuciou.png) 
 
Wuciou is the smallest township in Taiwan with only 2.6 square kilometres and a 
population of 366 people (Kinmen County Government). It is situated in the Taiwan 
Strait, 80 nautical miles from Taiwan’s west coast (See Table 5.3) and only 9 nautical 
miles from the territory of Mainland China. Local resistance in Wuciou was the 
strongest among the original six sites, but Wuciou Township signed a letter of consent 
with Taipower in November 1996 to provide a 0.4 square km area within Little Ciou Yu 
village as a final disposal site (China Times 1998e: 8). Wuciou Township thought it was 
impossible for Taipower to choose Little Ciou Yu in Wuciou as the final disposal site 
because Taipower’s siting criteria (then) allowed surveys only in places more than 1 
square kilometre (China Times 1998f: 8). So why did Wuciou sign the agreement to 
allow Taipower to start a survey? The answer is that in accordance with the voluntary 
scheme, any county that allowed Taipower to conduct a survey would get NTD$1 
million (approximately £20, 000). Wuciou Township thought, therefore, that they could 
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get the NTD$ 1 million but that no final disposal site would be located in Wuciou. 
Wuciou Township duly obtained its NTD$ 1 million from Taipower in September 1997 
(China Times 1998e: 8), but the situation had changed because Taipower now allowed 
investigations of any area more than 0.2 square kilometres (China Times 1998h: 8), and 
this meant that Little Ciou Yu in Wuciou had become a real option. 
 
Taipower chose Wuciou as its priority site for the following seven reasons: 
 
1. Less population: there are only 69 people in Little Ciou Yu. Even within 2 kilometres, 
there are only 123 people; 
2. There are water tank and military facilities already there, so it would be easy to 
convert these facilities for Taipower’s employee who would be in charge of the site; 
3. The rock is suitable to store radioactive waste; 
4. There are no obvious geological difficulties; 
5. There is a small harbour to make shipment easy; 
6. No road needs to be built on this islet; and  
7. There are no obvious obstacles for construction (China Times 1998c: 8). 
 
Another advantage of using the Little Ciou Yu site was that the land in Wuciou has 
never belonged to local people - it has always belonged to the national government as a 
frontier line because it is very close to Mainland China (China Times 1998h: 8) - so the 
government could use the land in Wuciou for any purpose it chose. Taipower planned to 
store 20,000 barrels of radioactive waste in Little Ciou Yu but there was still a long way 
to go before the construction of the final disposal site could begin. First, Taipower had 
to get the approval document from Wuciou Township before June 1998. Second, 
Taipower had to submit an Environmental Impact Statement Report and a Safety 
Analysis Report to AEC and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and to submit 
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an Investment Feasibility Study Report to the Ministry of Economic Affairs (China 
Times 1998b: 8), and Little Ciou Yu could only be named as a final site after receiving 
approval from these three governmental organisations (Cheng and Wu 2003).  
 
By the time Wuciou was chosen by Taipower as a priority site to host radioactive waste, 
the Wuciou people felt that they had been treated unfairly by the national government 
by asking them to accept radioactive waste, and they called on the government to 
respect their human rights. The leader of Wuciou Forum, Mr. Kao Wu-Ciou, said that 
‘Taipower and the government forced opposed Wuciou residents to accept nuclear 
waste’ (China Times 1998h: 8). To express their opposition to nuclear waste, residents 
of Wuciou held a protest on 6 March 1998 (China Times 1998g: 8), and more than 100 
Wuciou residents, including many who were living in Taiwan Main Island, gathered 
angrily in front of Taipower’s headquarters. They raised the changing  of Taipower’s 
siting criterion for allowing surveys from an area of more than 1 square kilometre to 0.2 
square kilometre (China Times 1998g: 8). ‘If they could allow 0.2 square kilometre, 
why did they set the 1 square kilometre criterion in the first place?’25 asked the leader 
of the protest, Mr. Lin (China Times 1998g: 8). 
 
In answer to the charge that Taipower had changed its siting criteria simply in order to 
made it suitable for Wuciou, the head of Taipower’s Nuclear Backend Management 
Department explained to the Wuciou people that experts and scholars from the siting 
committee had suggested that Taipower loosen its criterion on the area of the final 
disposal site, and Taipower’s decision to change the criterion from 1 square kilometre to 
0.2 square kilometres had been approved by the AEC (China Times 1998g: 8). The 
change was not, therefore, especially designed for Wuciou. Moreover, Taipower 
                                                 
25 Quote from China Times (1998g) “Anti Nuclear Waste-Wuciou People Shouted: Protest until We Die” 
6 March, 8. (in Mandarin) 
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emphasised that the final disposal site of radioactive waste had not yet been decided. 
Taipower still needed to submit many geological investigations and environmental 
impact assessments to AEC, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), and 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and there were still other potential sites 
needing investigation, so the final site would not necessarily be Wuciou (China Times 
1998h: 8).  
 
On the issue of compensation, the head of Taipower’s Nuclear Backend Management 
Department said that ‘Taipower would try our best to negotiate with Wuciou people in 
many ways such as telephone interviews or visits in person. People who Taipower 
would negotiate with included 600 Wuciou people who lived in Taiwan Main Island and 
people resident in Wuciou. After Taipower gets the approval letter from Wuciou 
Township to allow Taipower to start conducting its investigation, Taipower would pay 
NTD$ 50 million (approximately £1 million). Secondly, before Taipower actually began 
their investigation, Taipower would pay another NTD$ 50 million. Finally, after 
Taipower finished the investigation, Taipower would pay another NTD$ 50 million. The 
total compensation was NTD $150 million (approximately £3 million)’ (China Times 
1998g: 8). Moreover, in addition to the NTD $150 million compensation payable if 
Wuciou were named as the final site for radioactive waste, the amount would increase to 
NTD$ 3 billion (approximately £60 million) if the repository were built there. Wuciou 
Township leader Mr. Li said ‘thirty per cent of the compensation fee would go to 
Kinmen County Government (China Times 1998d: 8)26’ which has Wuciou under its 
jurisdiction. NTD$ 1 billion (approximately £20 million) would be used to buy the land 
(though since the government owned the land, this would mean the national government 
handing the money from their left hand to their right hand (China Times 1998d: 8)27. 
                                                 
26
 Quote from China Times (1998d) “Wuciou People Roar to Reject Nuclear Wastes” 28 February, 8. (in 
Mandarin) 
27
 Quote from China Times (1998d) “Wuciou People Roar to Reject Nuclear Wastes”, 28 February, 8. (in 
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The other NTD$ 1.1 billion (approximately £22 million) would be managed by 
Taipower and Wuciou Township for the development of Little Ciou Yu – though since 
half of Little Ciou Yu would be covered by radioactive waste (China Times 1998d: 8), 
and its residents would all be living  on top of the radioactive waste, any development 
would be too dangerous. . Mr. Li asked the national government to stop considering 
Wuciou as a disposal site for radioactive waste and accused Taipower of playing a 
compensation numbers game to misguide and lure the Wuciou people into accepting 
serious health risks (China Times 1998d: 8).  
 
An official of AEC told China Times on 7 March that whether or not Wuciou town 
signed the letter of approval to allow Taipower to start the investigation, Taipower 
would carry out the geological investigation and environmental impact assessment 
(China Times 1998i: 8). The official meant that if people in Wuciou would not agree to 
Taipower starting the geological investigation and environmental impact assessment, the 
government would compulsorily require the Wuciou people to allow the investigation to 
go ahead, since Taipower would apply to the Executive Yuan for a permit for a 
Significant Public Project (China Times 1998i: 8). However, in order to defuse the 
opposition, AEC would ask Taipower to negotiate with the Wuciou community and try 
to get approval from local people. 
 
In June 1998, Taiwan did begin its investigation and environmental impact assessment 
(China Times 1998j: 8), but because of strong local opposition, Taipower did not pay the 
compensation fee of about NTD$150 million until October 1998 (China Times 1998k: 
8), though both Taipower and AEC claimed that they never stopped negotiating with 
people in Wuciou (China Times 1998k: 8). Taipower promised to employ local people 
before outsiders, and also to help improve the local water quality and electricity supply 
                                                                                                                                               
Mandarin) 
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(China Times 1999: 8). In June 1999, Taipower claimed that the opposition in Wuciou 
had been placated and that it was confident that it would finish the investigation and the 
environmental impact assessment and begin to operate the site by 2002 (China Times 
1999: 8). 
 
After two and half years of investigation, in November 2002, Taipower submitted the 
Environmental Impact Statement Report and the Safety Analysis Report to AEC, the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). But 
there were still many issues to be settled. First, the Chinese Ministry of Defence 
claimed that constructing a harbour to allow a 10-ton ship to land at Wuciou was a 
provocative action. The Mainland Affairs Council in the Taiwan cabinet, which was  in 
charge of  Mainland China affairs, was very concerned about this response from the 
Chinese government (China Evening Times 2001b: 5). Second, China raised questions 
about the loss of fisheries, and risk of radioactive contamination to marine life generally. 
Taipower claimed that the impact would be very small unless Chinese fishing vessels 
interfered with the construction work in Wuciou, or blocked the waterway when the site 
began operation (China Evening Times 2001b: 5). Third, the anti-nuclear DPP 
government came into power in Taiwan in 2000. Fourth, the Chairman of EPA, Dr. Lin 
Jun-Yi, was a former leader of the Asia Antinuke Forum (China Times 2000: 8), and 
experts from the EPA were not happy with Taipower’s report (China Evening Times 
2001a: 5), asking it to supply a more comprehensive concrete report on the management 
of the site, the emergency measures, environmental safety precautions, and the impact 
on land and ocean ecosystems (China Evening Times 2001b: 5). In order to deal with 
these issues, EPA asked Taipower to conduct a further Environmental Impact 
Assessment, and revise and resubmit the three reports by May 2001.  
In August 2002, at the same time that Taipower resubmitted the Environmental Impact 
Statement Report, the Safety Analysis Report, and the Investment Feasibility Study 
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Report on Wuciou for approval by the AEC, the EPA and the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Affairs asked Taipower to examine the feasibility of 
other alternative sites. In November 2002, Taipower named four alternative sites – 
Da-Ren and Da-Wu in Taitung County, Wang-An in Penghu islands and Mu-Dan in 
Pingtung (China Times 2005: 8) and undertook to name a favoured site for a radioactive 
waste repository in June 2005. But because of the enacting of the ‘Act on Site for 
Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Facility’ and ‘Law on 
Site Selection of Low Level Waste Disposal’ in 2006, the entire selection process had to 
start again from the beginning.  
 
5.4.2.2 Da-Wu  
 
Of the four alternative sites to that of Wuciou, Da-Wu was evidently the most favoured. 
While Taipower’s project in Wuciou was still awaiting approval by the AEC, the EPA 
and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, President Chen Shui-Bian visited Taitung County 
on 9 April 2003 and declared a government promise to clear the radioactive wastes in 
Orchid Island (Lan Yu) by the end of 2003. After his visit, China Times reported that 
Da-Wu in Taitung County would be the final disposal site of LLW (China Times 2003a: 
8). The report revealed that Taitung County Mayor Mr. Hsu Ching-Yuan together with 
Da-Wu Township Chief, Mr. Wang Fu-Yuan, several representatives of the Da-Wu 
people including village leaders from Da-Wu, together with two Taipower officials, 
went on a trip organised by Taipower to Japan to visit a nuclear waste site and nuclear 
facilities (China Times 2003a: 8). The Taitung County Mayor acknowledged that 
Taipower was organising another trip for Taitung County Councillors to Europe to visit 
the newest technology of radioactive waste management (China Times 2003a: 8). 
According to this report, people in Da-Wu did not refuse to host radioactive waste, 
though a Taipower official said there was not yet any agreement with any township 
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about the final disposal site of nuclear waste; that the whole process would need more 
than ten years to begin operation; and that it was too early to say where the final 
disposal site would be (China Times 2003a: 8).    
 
After the news about the choice of the Da-Wu site was revealed, many people in the 
village were very angry that the government promised to remove radioactive waste from 
Orchid Island only to shift it to Da-Wu which would host the new repository (China 
Times 2003b: 8), so the radioactive waste would never leave Taitung. Responding to this 
public anger, several members of Taitung County Council issued the following 
statement on 18 April 2003: ‘Although we joined the trip organised by Taipower it did 
not mean that we would agree to Taipower establishing a final disposal site for nuclear 
waste in Taitung’ (China Times 2003c: 8) . Some councillors indicated that they joined 
the trip to Europe because people in Orchid Island (Lan Yu) still kept questioning the 
safety of the radioactive repository, and it was necessary therefore for them (the Taitung 
County Councillors) to inspect the latest technology in order to oversee Taipower’s 
safety measures (China Times 2003c: 8). 
 
The Da-Wu Anti-Nuclear Waste Group was established on 23 April 2003 and went to 
Da-Wu Township to express their opposition to the repository plans (China Times 2003d: 
8). Da-Wu Township leader Mr. Wang had just come back from the trip to Japan and 
told the Da-Wu Anti Nuclear Waste Group that his concern was not only about hosting 
nuclear wastes but also about the future prosperity of Da-Wu (China Times 2003d: 8). 
Whether Da-Wu was a suitable site for final disposal of radioactive wastes would be 
determined by experts, but the final decision must be made by local people (China 
Times 2003d: 8). Spokesman of the Da-Wu Anti Nuclear Waste Group said ‘but Lan Yu 
[Orchid Island] has not become more prosperous since the repository began operation. 
In order to save the last beautiful area in Taiwan, we are strongly against Da-Wu or any 
 168 
other place in Taitung hosting radioactive wastes’28.     
 
For its part, Taitung County Government issued the following statement on 23 April 
2003 (China Times 2003d):1. Taitung County Government would ask the national 
government to consider other counties as the final disposal site of nuclear waste. If no 
other county were willing to host radioactive wastes, Taitung County Government 
would not escape from the responsibility; 
2. Taitung County Government would help Lan Yu (Orchid Island) to remove the low 
level radioactive wastes stored there for more than twenty years; 
3. In order to achieve the nuclear-free homeland policy and deal with the wastes from 
decommissioning of nuclear power generation, Taiwan needs a safe and permanent low 
level radioactive waste repository; 
4. The Taitung County Government does not intend to let Taipower choose the final 
disposal site for radioactive wastes in Taitung. But if there are no other counties 
willing to accept, Taitung would support the policy of the national government; and  
5. If the national government decided to build a final disposal site for radioactive wastes 
in Taitung, it must follow the following three conditions: 
a. to treat radioactive waste by using the newest technology;  
b. to negotiate with local communities and local people, respecting their opinions; 
and  
c. to help  local communities with development and compensation.   
 
On 30 April, nearly 300 Da-Wu residents protested outside Taitung County Council; the 
leader of Taitung County Council, Mr. Wu Jun-li, cancelled the trip to Japan arranged by 
Taipower in May; and Taipower officials went to Taitung County Council for briefing 
                                                 
28
 Quote from Interview with spokesman from Da-Wu Anti Nuclear Waste on 23 December 2003. (in 
Mandarin)   
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(Central News Agency 2003a). On 24 June 2003, Taitung County Council passed a 
resolution opposing the establishment of any nuclear waste dump in Taitung County, 
and Taitung County Mayor, Mr. Hsu, declared that he would stand firm with the 
county’s resolution (Central News Agency 2003b). On 3 July 2003, members of the 
Da-Wu Anti-Nuclear Waste Groups and the Taitung Anti-Nuclear Coalition held a press 
conference in Legislative Yuan (Cyberbees News 2003), and declared that: 
 
1. It needs a referendum by local people or 2/3 of the members of the County Council to 
agree to the disposal site for radioactive wastes. Taitung County Government could 
not decide to host the radioactive waste on its own. 
2. Geological investigations and environmental impact assessments should be 
conducted before the final decision is made. 
3. Exporting radioactive waste should be the first priority 
4. Industries that produce nuclear waste should be responsible for disposing of it 
(Cyberbees News 2003). 
 
After 2003, the opposition in Da-Wu asked for help at the national level, and became 
involved in many hearings on AEC’s draft ‘Law on Site Selection for Low Level Waste 
Final Disposal’. In September 2003, the AEC promulgated and implemented the 
‘Regulations on Final Disposal of Low Level Waste and Safety Management of the 
Facilities’, authorised by the Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste Management Act 
in 2002 (AEC 2006a). Amended in 2005, the regulations established the safety 
requirements for the sites for final disposal facilities, making the policy on radioactive 
waste in Taiwan more thorough. 
 
In December 2002, the AEC drafted the ‘Act on Sites for Establishment of Low Level 
Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Facility’ (AEC 2006a), though because of opposition, 
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this draft was not enacted until April 2006 (Central News Agency 2006). The Act is the 
most important single document in the management of nuclear waste in Taiwan, because 
it provided guidance not only for siting a new repository for radioactive waste in Taiwan, 
but also for public participation in the siting process. On the siting criteria it laid down 
for the first time that the disposal facilities must avoid the following areas: 
 
1. Areas where active faulting or geological conditions could endanger the safety of 
disposal facility. 
2. Areas where the geo-chemical conditions are unfavourable for preventing the 
diffusion of radioactive nuclides. 
3. Areas where the hydrological conditions of surface water or groundwater are likely to 
endanger the disposal facilities. 
4. Areas of high population density. 
5. Areas that cannot be developed according to the law (Taiwan. Act on Sites for 
Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Facility 2006). 
 
The Act also stated that a ‘site selection group’ should be established by the 
implementing authority (in this case the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA)) 
consisting of 17-21 representatives of relevant government agencies, experts, and 
scholars (the experts and scholars must be no less than 3/5 of the total members) 
(Taiwan. Act on Sites for Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal 
Facility 2006) . Taipower as a radioactive waste producer should carry out the works 
necessary for site survey, safety analysis, public communication, and land acquisition, 
and to provide the site selection group with this data, and the group would draft a 
disposal facility site selection plan for the MOEA. With regard to public participation, 
the ‘Act on Sites for Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal 
Facility’ stated that a local referendum would be held at the county level in which the 
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site is located, and with the consent of the public through the referendum, the site may 
be listed as a candidate site. The Act also decided the amount of compensation 
(‘feedback subsidies’ as stated in the Act) must be no more than NTD $5 billion 
(approximately £100 millions). The local township which hosts the radioactive waste 
should be awarded not less than 40%; the townships nearby not less than 30%; and the 
county not less than 20% (Act on Sites for Establishment of Low Level Radioactive 
Waste Final Disposal Facility 2006). This compensation package looked very attractive 
to some of the townships located in very poor areas of Taiwan. 
 
Taipower submitted its ‘Final Disposal Plan for Low Level Waste’ on 25 December 
2003, and AEC approved it in January 2004 (AEC 2006a). According to the plan, 
Taipower would submit its most favoured site to the AEC and Executive Yuan in 2008 
and start to operate the new repository in 2013 (AEC 2006a), though according to the 
‘Law on Site Selection of Low Level waste Final Disposal’, it takes five years to site a 
new repository and the construction of the new site would need another five years 
(United Daily 2006). 
 
However, after the enactment of the ‘Act on Sites for Establishment of Low Level 
Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Facility’ in 2006, the site at Da-Wu was abandoned 
because of strong local opposition.  The site at Wuciou was also abandoned because 
the Executive Yuan claimed that it was too close to China and would be seen by China 
as a provocative action endangering its national security. On 17 March 2009, Taipower 
announced that two other potential sites had been identified for the final disposal of 
radioactive waste: Da-Ren in Taitung County and Wang-An in Penghu County29. 
Da-Ren in Taitung County is located on the south east coast of Taiwan Main Island and 
                                                 
29
 Penghu islands are an archipelago off the western coast of Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait consisting of 90 
small islands and islets covering an area of 141 square km. The whole archipelago forms Penghu County. 
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is occupied by the aboriginal Paiwan tribe, while Wang-An in Penghu is one of the 
small islands forming the Penghu islands, which is a very popular tourist destination. 
According to the ‘Act on Sites for Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final 
Disposal Facility’, there would have to be a local referendum in the respective counties 
(Penghu County and Taitung County) in two months time but if there were any 
disagreement on the matter, the referendum could be postponed. At the time of writing, 
no referendum has been scheduled.  
 
The two local communities’ responses to the government announcement were different. 
In Da-Ren, a newspaper report claimed that 60% of the population was willing to host 
radioactive waste because the amount of compensation would improve their economic 
situation (Chen 2009). But in Wang-An, the local people strongly opposed the decision 
to host radioactive waste.  
 
5.4.2.3 Da-Ren  
 
Table 5.4.  Maps of Taitung County 
Location of Taitung County 
 
 
Townships in Taitung County 
 
Sources: Wekimedia. File:Taiwan ROC Political Division Map Taitung County. 
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and http://www.taiwan.com.au/Envtra/Geography/Maps/Taitung02.html 
 
Da-Ren, situated on the southeast comer of Taiwan Main Island (See Table 5.4), is 
occupied by the aboriginal Paiwan people, who, after the announcement of Da-Ren as 
the potential site for hosting radioactive waste, accused the government of violating 
‘The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law’ because Article 34 of the law states that ‘The 
government may not store toxic materials in indigenous peoples’ regions contrary to the 
will of indigenous peoples’ (Taiwan. The Indigenous People Basic Law 2005). Also 
some small anti-nuclear waste campaigns took place in other parts of Taitung and in 
Taipei. On the other hand, after Taipower pointed out that compensation would benefit 
the local people and increase their employment, according to the village leader in 
Da-Ren, 60 percent of the local people agreed to host the radioactive waste (Chen 2009). 
Given the controversy, Taitung County Council withdrew the draft law to set up a 
referendum committee on radioactive waste. At the time of writing, the referendum has 
not yet been held.  
 
5.4.2.4 Wang -An  
Table 5.5.  Maps of Penghu and Wang-An 
Location of Penghu County 
 
 
 Penghu and Wang- An 
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Sources: Wimaxian,  
 (http://www.wimaxian.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/taiwan_map.jpg), and  
Travelpod.  
 (http://www.travelpod.com/cache/city_maps/penghu-taiwan.gif) 
 
Since 2002, there has been speculation that Wang-An (See Table 5.5) would be the final 
disposal site for radioactive waste, but the people in Wang-An were very strongly 
opposed to such a proposal. Penghu County Mayor, Mr. Wang Chien Fa (王乾發), told 
the Central News Agency that Penghu is rich for its natural resources and that in 2005 
the government had promised the Penghu people that radioactive waste would never be 
dumped in Penghu (Kao 2009b: 5). Wang hoped the government would keep its promise, 
and he affirmed that people in Penghu would protect their lives and national resources. 
He accused Taipower of misleading people in Penghu by stating in a booklet which it 
distributed to every household in the community that the repository would host LLW, 
whereas in fact, the plan was to host HLW. Taipower’s representative in Penghu 
admitted that the specification for the repository was up to the standard which could 
host HLW, but this did not necessarily mean that the repository would host HLW (Kao 
2009b: 8). 
 
Penghu County sought to block the plan of hosting radioactive waste by designating the 
area in Wang-An as a natural conservation area which meant that, according to the law, 
any development in the natural conservation area would not be allowed. In June 2009, 
after the Prime Minister visited Penghu County, a Taipower representative in Penghu 
admitted that its attempt to persuade local people to agree to host radioactive waste had 
ended because the MOEA recognised that since the area was now a natural conservation 
area, the issue had become legally complicated. Therefore, Taipower’s negotiators with 
local people had returned to their headquarters in Taipei, though a MOEA official 
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denied the claim that the referendum would not take place (Liu, Tzeng, and Huang 2009: 
9). 
 
5.4.3 HLW and spent fuel management  
 
Turning now to the more difficult issue of HLW and spent fuel disposal, AEC was very 
concerned about the treatment of HLW and spent fuel. Since its nuclear power plants 
began operation, Taiwan’s nuclear raw materials came from the USA, and the US 
government required Taiwan to ask its permission before any HLW nuclear materials 
could be transferred by Taiwan to other countries (though the U.S did not restrict 
Taiwan’s freedom in dealing with spent fuel) (Oon 2001: 155). In 1972, after the Taiwan 
government decided to build the first nuclear power plant in Taiwan, AEC invited 
international bids for reprocessing its spent fuel, and British National Fuel Co Ltd 
(BNFL) won the contract (Oon 2001: 251). However, three years later, BNFL 
announced that it had insufficient capacity to reprocess spent fuels from Taiwan, and the 
negotiations came to a halt in August 1975 (Oon 2001: 252). 
 
As a result, the spent fuel has been temporarily stored in the pools of each nuclear 
power plant in Taiwan since the first nuclear power plant began operation in November 
1978 (Shieh 1996). In 1987, Taipower conducted projects in each of the nuclear power 
plant to re-rack the storage system in order to increase capacity for housing the spent 
fuel. These projects were completed in 1999 for nuclear power plant I; 1992 for nuclear 
power plant II; and 1995 for nuclear power plant III (Cheng and Wu 2003). But it 
reported that the capacity would be full in 2008 for nuclear power plant I; in 2009 for 
nuclear power plant II; and in 2016 for nuclear power plant III (Shieh 1996). In the 
meantime, Taipower would adopt a strategy of storage of spent fuel in pools for the 
short term, onsite dry storage for the medium term, and final disposal for the long term 
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(AEC 2006b). With regard to onsite dry storage, Taipower submitted a proposal for 
spent fuel dry storage at nuclear power station I (AEC 2006b), and the construction 
began in 2007 and but the process was very slow due to strong local opposition. 
 
With regard to the final disposal of HLW, Taipower launched town study projects in 
May 1986 and November 1988 (Liu and Wu 2001). In June 1991, these two projects 
were completed with a 40-year technology development plan based on two 
considerations: (1) a long-term investigation is required to select a suitable site for 
developing a geological repository and to gain sufficient information for safety 
assessment; (2) interim storage of spent fuels for 40 years or longer would provide 
enough time for carrying out the final disposal plan which would ensure flexibility for 
adopting other options that are proven to be beneficial and feasible in the future (Liu 
and Wu 2001). Bearing these two considerations in mind, Taipower produced a 
long-term plan with four phases: 
1. 1999-2007 : Potential host rock characterization and evaluation;  
2. 2008-2018: Detailed site investigation and confirmation; 
3. 2019-2023: Facility design and licensing; and  
4. 2024-2031: Facility construction (Taiwan. FCMA 2003: 4). 
Taipower submitted this Spent Nuclear Fuel Final Disposal plan to AEC, the review of 
which was completed in 2007. However, Taipower has not yet submitted its feasibility 
study at the time of writing in August 2011.   
 
5.4.4 Exporting Radioactive Waste from Taiwan  
 
Siting a radioactive waste repository abroad was always a potential option for Taipower 
and AEC. Four countries were considered – China, North Korea, the Marshall Islands, 
and Russia.  
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5.4.4.1 China  
 
The siting committee, which was formed in 1993, considered exporting radioactive 
waste to China (World Tibet Network 1993). But since 1949 there were political 
tensions between Taipei and Beijing, and the Taiwan government withdrew this idea.  
 
5.4.4.2 North Korea  
 
North Korea was a much more serious option for the export of radioactive waste, and on 
11 January 1997, Taipower signed a USD$300 million commercial contract for 
shipment of 200,000 barrels of radioactive waste to North Korea (WISE News 
Communiqué 1997). Taipower chose North Korea because the economic situation in 
North Korea was very poor, and North Korea needed money desperately to carry out its 
development goals. But when news of the deal was unveiled, it caused considerable 
controversy, both inside and outside Taiwan.  
 
Domestic reaction to the deal was mixed. On the one hand, the Taiwan Environmental 
Protection Union (TEPU), the largest environmental NGO in Taiwan, announced its 
opposition to the exportation of nuclear waste to North Korea, and argued for an end to 
nuclear power in Taiwan. On 29 January 1997, six members of South Korean’s second 
largest environmental groups, Green Korea, went to Taiwan to join the protest held by 
TEPU and Green Party Taiwan. The six members of Green Korea argued that Taiwan's 
exporting radioactive waste was unjust and against human rights. Also, they believed 
that North Korea’s acceptance of the radioactive waste for money in order to improve its 
own economic plight ignored environmental considerations. Members of Green Korea 
asked the South Korea government to stop this deal between Taiwan and North Korea 
by helping North Korea to improve its economic situation (Fu 1997). The six Green 
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Korea members, accompanied by members of TEPU and Green Party Taiwan visited the 
Legislative Yuan, Taipower and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) to express 
their opposition to Taipower’s contract with North Korea. Finally, they conducted a 
peaceful sit-in protest in front of Taipower headquarter in Taipei (Green Party Taiwan 
1997).  
 
However, some pro-nuclear Taipower employees destroyed the banners and handouts of 
the protesters, and on the following day, a member of the New Party (Taiwan’s third 
largest party at that time which is in favour of re-unification with China) and his 
followers physically beat the six members of Green Korea, and  the Taiwan 
government deported them  (Green Party Taiwan 1997).  
 
The Yami people’s reaction was neutral. Their abiding desire was to remove all 
radioactive waste from Orchid Island, not to comment on where it might be moved to: 
‘Our wish is to move all radioactive waste from Lan Yu [Orchid Island]. Taipower put 
their rubbish to our homeland; we have a right to ask Taipower to remove the rubbish. 
But it is not our business where the rubbish moves. We do not and shall not think about 
where to dump nuclear waste for Taipower’30.  
 
As for the political parties, they were also divided. The largest opposition party at that 
time, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is anti-nuclear, supported the 
Yami peoples’ stance and asked the government to stop building any more nuclear 
power plant until the radioactive waste problem was solved. By contrast, the second 
largest opposition party in Taiwan at that time, New Party, which was in favour of 
unification with China, was not particularly interested in this issue, though it did ask the 
government to make sure that North Korea was able to deal with the management of 
                                                 
30
 In the interview with Lan Yu’s Yami artist Mr. Shaman on 23 Dec 2003. 
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radioactive waste. For the government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that the 
agreement between Taipower and North Korea was a reasonable and legal business 
contract, because North Korea had technology to deal with the radioactive waste 
properly and Taiwan is a sovereign country, so the government of South Korea should 
not intervene in this deal between Taiwan and North Korea. The Ministry of Economic 
Affairs added that the final sites for Taiwan’s radioactive waste would not be in a single 
country: the government would seek international cooperation with other countries. 
Similarly, Taipower emphasised that the exportation of radioactive waste to other 
countries is legal; that Taipower would not export nuclear waste to a country which did 
not have the technology to deal with it; that many small-scale nuclear power plants have 
been operating in North Korea for over ten years; and that the country is experienced 
and capable of dealing with radioactive waste. AEC stated that as a regulator it would 
appoint an official to North Korea in three month’s time to conduct an environmental 
impact assessment, which would be the basis for AEC to permit the export of 
Taipower’s radioactive waste. 
 
International reaction to the Taiwan-North Korean deal was also mixed. International 
environmental groups responded negatively to the contract. For example, the Executive 
Director of Greenpeace International jointly with the Executive Director of Greenpeace 
China and Greenpeace Japan made a statement expressing their complete opposition to 
Taiwan shipping and dumping nuclear wastes in North Korea (Greenpeace 1997a). They 
called upon Taipower and North Korea to cancel the contract immediately; they urged 
the Taiwan government to find an interim solution for dealing with nuclear waste; and 
they asked people in the world to write a protesting letter to their nearest Taiwan 
Representative Office. Greenpeace held a protest with Taiwanese and Koreans on 14 
February 1997 in front of Taipei’s Economic and Cultural Representatives Office in 
Washington DC. ‘It is a height of irresponsibility by Taiwan to dump nuclear waste on 
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North Korea. Taiwan must halt its exploitation of the economic and food crisis in North 
Korea and cancel plans to dump nuclear waste in that country’ said Tim Clements, 
spokesperson for the Greenpeace anti-nuclear campaign (Greenpeace 1997b). 
 
However, the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) did not oppose this 
contract, claiming that it was a commercial contract between Taiwan and North Korea; 
that South Korea had not made any objection on this issue to IAEA; that even if they 
did make an objection, IAEA could not step in because Taiwan and North Korea were 
not members of IAEA; and that all IAEA can do is to go to North Korea to clarify 
whether North Korea is capable of dealing with radioactive waste – and even this action 
needs to be approved by the government of North Korea.  
 
Turning to the reactions from the five foreign countries most closely affected by the 
deal, three were hostile (USA, South Korea, and China); one was largely neutral (Japan); 
and one (North Korea) was in favour. The USA was not happy with the deal, because 
the US government wanted to prevent North Korea obtaining any material that could be 
used to develop nuclear weapon. The US government authorised its diplomats in Taiwan 
to ask the country to end its negotiations with North Korea (China Evening Times 
2000a: 5).    
 
Predictably, the most strongly opposed country was South Korea, whose government 
stated they would ask China, Japan, the USA and IAEA to bring pressure to bear on the 
Taiwan government because the exportation of radioactive waste from Taiwan to North 
Korea would affect the ecological environment of northeast Asia. South Korea would 
not, therefore, recognise the deal as purely a commercial contract. In China, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC condemned the deal, claiming that Taiwan was 
one of China’s territories, and that the Taiwan government was simply trying to create 
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two Chinas, or ‘one China, one Taiwan’ in the international community by this proposal. 
As for Japan, although the Prime Minister acknowledged that the deal would adversely 
affect the environment of northeast Asia, the Japanese government stated that since they 
had no official diplomatic relationship with either Taiwan or North Korea, Japan would 
not intervene. 
       
Only North Korea defended the deal as a commercial contract, affirming that the 
country had the technology and ability to deal with radioactive waste, and that this was 
recognised by IAEA. However, at the end of 1997, the contract almost ended because 
Taipower had a disagreement with North Korea (China Times 1997: 8). Although the 
North Korea government had issued an import permit for radioactive waste from 
Taiwan (Taipower 2005), AEC in Taiwan would not allow the exportation of radioactive 
waste, because according to the regulations in Taiwan, AEC could only permit the 
exportation of radioactive waste to North Korea if the facilities there met all the 
requirement set by IAEA. But at that time, North Korea had not yet completed the 
necessary engineering work: according to the contract, the repository was planned to 
finish construction in September 1997 but due to lack of money, North Korea could not 
finish the work on time. North Korea wanted Taipower to pay the money for storing the 
waste first to help them complete the construction work, but Taipower would only pay 
the storage money after the site began operation. The construction work halted in 
December 1997, and Taipower confirmed that the plan had almost come to an end 
(China Times 1997: 8).   
 
However, after the Korea summit in 2000, the tension between South and North Korea 
eased, and Taipower restarted negotiations on the deal with North Korea (United Daily 
2001b: 7). Taipower asked North Korea to extend the contract to 2009, in return for 
which, Taipower would pay USD$8 million to help North Korea to complete  the site 
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(Liberty Times 2001b: 5). North Korea agreed, and re-issued the importation permit. 
However, AEC still refused to issue the export permit because AEC and Taipower 
stipulated that the nuclear waste from Taiwan should be stored in trenches which only 
hosted nuclear waste from Taiwan (Chi 2004). In any case, continued pressure from 
South Korea and the USA meant that the contract could never have been implemented.  
 
5.4.4.3 Marshall Islands  
 
The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) is about midway between Hawaii and 
Australia (see Table 5.6). With a population of approximately 51,000, the country 
consists of 34 islands scattered over 1.3 million square kilometres, with a total land area 
of 181 square kilometres (BBC Country Profile). The Marshall Islands were one of the 
nuclear test sites used by the US between 1946-1958. Taipower started negotiations to 
site a storage repository on the Marshall Islands in 1995, but due to diplomatic pressure 
from China, negotiations halted in the same year. However, in November 1998, 
Taipower restarted negotiating with the Marshall Islands, and in December 1998, 
Taipower confirmed that they had signed an agreement by which the Marshall Islands 
would host radioactive wastes from Taiwan and in return, Taipower would pay USD$1 
billion to the government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands.  
 
If the agreement between Taipower and the Marshall Islands had come into effect, 
Taipower would have exported 10,000 barrels of radioactive waste from Orchid Island 
to the Marshall Islands. However, although, according to the Director of FCMA in 
December 2003, the negotiations between Taipower and Marshall Islands were still 
going on during that time, Taipower has never applied for a permit to export radioactive 
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wastes to any country31. A newspaper report from Taiwan revealed that the plan to 
export nuclear waste from Taiwan was within a project led by the USA, but the plan did 
not work out because the price which the Marshall Islands government asked was too 
high, and the US withdrew from the project (Ou 2003).  
 
Table 5.6. Map of Marshall Islands 
 
Source: World Atlas.com 
(http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/oceania/mh.htm) 
 
5.4.4.4 Russia  
 
Finally, Russia was also one of Taipower’s targets. According to a news release by 
ECODEFENSE, Russia’s largest non-governmental environmental group, Taipower 
signed a memorandum in 1998 with the Kurchatov Institute (KI), Russia’s largest 
nuclear weapons centre, to transport 200,000 barrels of LLW to Russia via Japan within 
10 years (Taipei Times 2000: 5). The memorandum was organised by KI and a 
Taiwanese-Japanese company, Asia Tat Trading Co Ltd (ATT) (ECODEFENCE 2002). 
In the memorandum, Taipower would pay a total of USD$8 billion to dump radioactive 
waste in permanent sites in Siberia or Simushir Island in Sakhalin province in Russia 
(See Table 5.7) (China Evening Times 2000b: 5). The transportation would be carried 
                                                 
31
 Interview with the Director of FCMA on December 30, 2003. 
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out by Russian military aircraft for which Japan and Russia would be responsible: 
Taipower‘s duty was only to ensure that the radioactive waste was safely transported to 
the Russian aircraft within Taiwan (China Evening Times 2000b: 5). The plan would 
create thousands of job opportunities (Taipei Times 2000: 5); Taipower would have kept 
its promise to the Yami people to remove radioactive waste from Orchid Island; the 
search for a dumpsite in Taiwan would have ended; and ATT would get commission by 
acting as an agent.    
 
Table 5.7.  Map of Russia 
 
 Source: Russian National Tourist Office 
 
Although Russian law prohibited any import of radioactive waste, in December 2000, 
the lower house of the Russian Parliament passed an amendment to allow the 
importation of radioactive waste from Germany, South Korea, Japan, Spain, Taiwan and 
Switzerland (United Daily 2000: 5) . However, environmental groups in Russia strongly 
opposed the importation of radioactive waste, and on 19 February 2001, nearly 300 
people from environmental groups and some MPs held a protest in front of the Russian 
Parliament in Moscow (China Times 2001: 4). They were strongly opposed to Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan and other countries dumping nuclear waste in Russia (United 
Daily 2001a), and they asked the Russian President Vladimir Putin to withdraw the 
amendment and demanded that the Prosecutor General investigate and punish any 
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illegal lobbying of the MPs (ECODEFENCE 2002). But other countries voiced no 
objection to the proposed deal between Taiwan and Russia. Relations between the USA 
and Russia were improving, so the USA did not disrupt the plan. The European 
countries were happy because the dumpsite would be in the Far East (China Evening 
Times 2000: 5), while Japan and South Korea had already signed a contract with Russia, 
and the new amendment of Russian law would benefit these two countries.  
 
Nevertheless, the plan was suspended on March 2001. The Minister of Atomic Energy 
in Russia, Evgeny Adamov, was not re-appointed by President Putin in the cabinet 
reshuffle of March 2001. Adamov had been a very controversial figure in the cabinet 
(China Times 2001b: 4), strongly in favour of importing radioactive waste from other 
countries including Taiwan, and the USA was worried about his willingness to sell 
nuclear reactors to other countries such as India and China. It seems that because 
Adamov’s position was constantly at odds with those of the USA and domestic 
environmental groups, President Putin removed him from office (Concerned Citizens 
for Nuclear Safety News 2001). The new Atomic Power Minister said that Russia would 
reconsider the plan to import of radioactive wastes, and denied the government had 
signed a contract with Taipower on 7 June 2001 (Liberty Times 2001a: 4) , claiming that 
Russia had never issued any permit to allow radioactive waste to import into their 
country. Therefore, the plan to host radioactive waste from Germany, South Korea, 
Japan, Spain, Taiwan and Switzerland has never been implemented (Ou 2003).   
 
With the opposition against a new repository in Taiwan still very strong, and the 
government failing to keep its promise to remove radioactive waste from Orchid Island 
by 2002, the plan to export radioactive waste to other countries seemed an ideal solution. 
But as we have seen, siting a radioactive waste outside Taiwan has itself been fraught 
with difficulties which have caused considerable opposition internationally. Three 
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further issues compound these difficulties. First, the transportation of the radioactive 
waste risked damage to countries near to Taiwan and the hosting countries. Second, it 
merely transfers the environmental justice problem of distributing radioactive waste 
inequitably to another country, making local people in that host country suffer the health 
risk which had been removed from local people in Orchid Island. Third, did the local 
people in the hosting countries consent to Taipower dumping radioactive waste in their 
areas? These questions indicate that Taipower and the government cannot credibly claim 
that this was purely a business contract between Taipower and those countries.  
 
Since 2004, Taipower’s siting strategy has been highly ambiguous. At first, it indicated 
that it had ended all negotiations about exporting radioactive waste to other countries 
and was now focused solely on siting a new radioactive waste repository within Taiwan. 
But in August 2008, during the site selection process for a new repository for 
radioactive waste within Taiwan, Taipower announced that the new repository would be 
an interim repository, and that radioactive waste stored in it would be transferred to 
other countries such as the USA or France after 40 years (Kou 2008). Yet in April 2009, 
a spokesman for Taipower told Central News Agency that the priority for radioactive 
waste management was to site a repository in Taiwan rather than export it to other 
countries, because storing radioactive waste in other countries was very difficult in 
terms of management and regulation (Tzeng 2009). 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
In examining the history of nuclear waste in Taiwan, this chapter has shown how 
difficult it has been for the government to find a repository for its LLW, ILW, HLW and 
spent fuel. In addition to the physical and technical problems of finding a safe site, the 
government has faced considerable opposition from both environmental groups and 
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local communities. It managed to overcome these obstacles and find a suitable site at 
Orchid Island (Lan Yu), where it constructed repositories to store 97,671 barrels of LLW 
between 1982 and 1996. However, saturation of the site combined with increasingly 
vociferous protests by the local Yami people and environmental justice groups, meant 
that the government had to seek a more permanent site elsewhere. But this search has 
proved abortive, both at home and abroad, and with the failure to conclude deals with 
China, North Korea, Russia, and the Marshall Islands, Taiwan is today no nearer a 
solution to its LLW storage problem than it was 15 years ago. Moreover, the more 
serious problems of permanently storing ILW, HLW, and spent fuel have not even been 
addressed, and they are currently temporarily stored in pools near the six reactors. The 
issues raised in this chapter will be discussed at greater length in the next two chapters.    
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Chapter 6. Understanding Opposition I: Empirical Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter six and chapter seven focus in more detail on the opposition to nuclear waste 
siting in two areas in Taiwan - Da-Ren in Taitung County and Wang-An in Penghu 
County. I chose these two cases for detailed study because they were the most recent 
potential sites selected by the government, and so they could be studied as on-going 
struggles. Chapter six conducts an empirical analysis of the two cases, while chapter 
seven presents a thematic analysis of them, picking out the most salient issues.  
 
Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) announced on 17 March 2009 that 
Da-Ren in Taitung County and Wang-An in Penghu County were its two favoured 
potential sites for the final disposal repository of radioactive waste. This announcement 
intensified discussion and debate in the local communities in Da-Ren and Wang-An, and 
this provided a good opportunity for me to conduct qualitative research to investigate 
how local opponents to nuclear waste construct their opposition and the experiences 
they encountered in the decision-making process. As explained in chapter one, , I 
carried out interviews between September and October 2009 with people from Taitung 
and Penghu who were active in the movement campaigning against nuclear waste. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to understand the context of the two chosen sites. It begins 
with a discussion of the government’s process of selecting the two potential sites. Then 
it explains the geo-political context of the sites, discussing the geographical and 
demographic features of Da-Ren and Wang-An. Next is an account of their similar 
economic conditions, but different cultural characteristics, followed by a description of 
their political situations.  
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6.2 The selection of Da-Ren and Wang-An 
 
6.2.1 Identification of the potential sites 
 
On 17 March 2009, Taipower and MOEA announced that Da-Ren in Taitung County 
and Wang-An in Penghu County had been identified as potential sites for the final 
disposal of radioactive waste. Da-Ren in Taitung County is located on the south west 
coast of Taiwan Main Island, inhabited by the aboriginal Paiwan tribe. Wang-An in 
Penghu County is a small island located in the Penghu islands, which is a very popular 
tourist destination. The siting announcement was under the aegis of the ‘Act on Sites for 
Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Facility’. The site 
selection group was established in August 2006 and site selection criteria were based on 
Article 4 of the ‘Act on Sites for Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final 
Disposal Facility (Act on Sites for Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final 
Disposal Facility 2006 and AEC 2006a) 32  and other laws which regulate the 
development in certain areas according to their particular geological, hydrological, 
culture, national defence, conservation, and recreational characteristics. The site 
selection group chose 48 sites from 359 townships around Taiwan as possible sites 
based upon the land transportation conditions, sea transportation circumstances, 
environmental acceptability, and land areas. They subsequently narrowed down the 48 
                                                 
32
 Act on Sites for Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Facility 2006: Chen 
Shui Bian. Article 4. Taipei: Executive Yuan Article 4: A site of disposal facility must not be located in 
any of the following areas: 
1. Area where active faulting or geological conditions could endanger the safety of the disposal facility, 
2. Area where the geochemical conditions are unfavourable for effectively suppressing the diffusion of 
radioactive nuclides, and it is likely to endanger the safety of the disposal facility, 
3. Area where the hydrologic conditions of surface water or groundwater are likely to endanger the safety 
of the disposal facility,  
4. Area of high population density, and 
5. Areas that cannot be developed according to the law. 
See also. Atomic Energy Council, AEC (2006a) Radioactive Waste Management in Taiwan: Low Level 
radioactive Waste Final Disposal. AEC website: http://www.aec.gov.tw/english/, 22 January 2007. 
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potential sites to 8 possible sites, which included some that had been considered as 
potential sites before the ‘Act on Sites for Establishment of Low Level Radioactive 
Waste Final Disposal Facility’ was established, such as Da-Wu, Wuciou, and Orchid 
Island (Lan Yu) (MOEA 2009: 1-15 and 1-20). The eight potential sites were further 
assessed according to ethnicity33; demography; and local election turnout rate34 in 2006 
and 2007, and on 29 August 2008, MOEA announced three sites - Mu-Dan in Pintung 
County, Da-Ren in Taitung County, and Wang-An in Penghu County - as potential sites 
for a nuclear waste repository. Before the final announcement of the potential candidate 
sites in March 2009, Mu-Dan in Pintung County was eliminated from the list because its 
geological characteristics would make the engineering cost higher than for the other two 
sites. As a result, Da-Ren in Taitung County and Wang-An in Penghu County were 
identified as potential sites for a nuclear waste repository and both were scheduled for a 
local referendum in 2010. 
 
Following the announcement by Taipower and MOEA, according to the ‘Act on Sites 
for Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Facility’, there was a 
clear commitment by the government to hold the referendums in June 2010. However, 
Penghu County Government made an important decision to designate Wang-An as a 
nature conservation area. Since by law, no development could be allowed in a nature 
conservation area, and because the law required the government to nominate at least two 
sites, this decision meant that Taipower and MOEA had to abandon the two sites and 
restart the siting process all over again. Because of the considerable attention raised by 
both cases, locally and nationally, Da-Ren and Wang-An provided a very good 
opportunity for me to conduct qualitative research into the two areas to understand the 
                                                 
33
 Sites were further assessed according to ethnicity because the government might not like to violate 
Indigenous People Basic Law since radioactive waste has been stored in Lan Yu which more than 90% of 
the population are indigenous people. 
34
 Sites were further assessed according to election turn-out rate to see how local people react to public 
issues. 
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nature of the opposition to nuclear waste storage. 
 
6.2.2 Important opportunity to understand opposition  
 
The government announcement transformed the local opposition to a new stage. Before 
the announcement, local anti-nuclear waste groups had been established in Taitung 
County and Penghu County, but the campaigns were rather small and did not attract a 
lot of attention locally and nationally. The main focus for local anti-nuclear waste 
groups at that time was to send messages to the government and Taipower that local 
people do not want to host nuclear waste. After the announcement there was a clear 
commitment by the government to hold local referendums on hosting nuclear waste at 
county level in Penghu and Taitung, and as a result, the discussion about nuclear waste 
and the campaign against nuclear waste storage became very lively. In Penghu, people 
from Wang-An who lived in Taiwan, held demonstrations in Wang-An and Taiwan Main 
Island, where they expressed their opposition to nuclear waste very strongly. Similarly, 
in Taitung, led by the Taitung Branch of the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union 
and the Paiwan Anti-Nuclear Union, they held demonstrations in local villages in 
Taitung County, distributing leaflets about nuclear waste, and demanding public 
hearings on the issue. These anti-nuclear waste groups in both areas expressed the 
feelings of unfairness which local people experienced during the decision-making 
process. They accused the government and Taipower of exploiting local economic 
disadvantage and disrespecting local indigenous culture. Both campaigns raised 
concerns about health risks of nuclear waste, economic inequality, political inequality, 
and cultural inequality, and asked local people to vote against the proposed siting of 
nuclear waste in the local referendum. 
 
This heightened public engagement with the nuclear waste issue in Taitung and Penghu 
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gave me a unique opportunity to explore how local opponents conceptualised and 
constructed their opposition. 
 
6.2.3 Previous work on the environmental justice of nuclear waste storage in Taiwan 
 
To help understand how local opposition to nuclear waste storage in Taiwan was 
constructed, we can draw upon previous work on the issue. In the past, most research on 
nuclear waste in Taiwan was concerned with the technical aspects of the problem. 
However, more recently, M.F. Fan has studied the environmental justice of the nuclear 
waste storage issue in Orchid Island (Lan Yu) in Taiwan (see previous chapter), which is 
the traditional living area of the indigenous Yami tribe. As we have seen, Orchid Island 
(Lan Yu) is a particularly controversial case, because local people there have claimed 
that the authoritarian government in Taiwan did not have their consent for dumping 
nuclear waste in Orchid Island (Lan Yu) between 1986 and 1996. 
.  
Fan’s studies were based upon data gathered from participant observations, numerous 
informal conversations, and nine focus groups on Orchid Island (Lan Yu) (Fan 2006a, 
2006b, and 2009). In order to represent the local population and to reflect the variety of 
social experiences, the focus groups consisted of two groups of fishermen and 
housewives, two groups of Yami professionals, two groups of Yami teenage students 
from high school, one group of Yami Taipower employees, and two groups of 
Taiwanese professionals who worked in Orchid Island (Lan Yu). Each group was about 
five to nine people (Fan 2006a, 2006b, and 2009). Participants from each group were 
encouraged to express their experiences, views, and feelings, and to interact with one 
another. 
 
The data were analysed by Fan within an environmental justice framework which made 
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use of themes such as the good life, duty, the right to life, utilitarianism, fairness, and 
democratic procedures (Fan 2006a). She discovered that the understandings of 
environmental justice held by Yami and non-Yami participants were very different. 
Yami participants perceived the nuclear waste as the source of evil spirits, and 
considered that their way of life had been destroyed by the risks of nuclear waste, and 
that it was the Yami people’s duty to stop the nuclear waste storage. They perceived 
nuclear waste issues to be connected to their cultural survival, recognition, and 
exclusion from democratic participation. By contrast, Fan discovered non-Yami  
participants downplayed the issue of nuclear waste in Orchid Island, claiming that the 
nuclear waste repository had no significant influence on human health and environment 
(Fan 2009:173). They argued that there were social problems such as binge drinking and 
smoking that could have had a more serious impact on people of Orchid Island. . 
Despite the differences, both Yami and non-Yami participants shared the same goal of 
reducing the amount of nuclear waste, and Fan (2006a) suggested that environmental 
pragmatism could be employed to defuse any tension between groups of different 
ethnicities through dialogue processes, so that the groups could work together to 
establish an alliance aimed at producing a more just nuclear waste management system 
in Taiwan. 
 
Fan’s work focussed solely on a single case – Orchid Island (Lan Yu) – where nuclear 
waste has been stored. My research is different in that it is a comparative analysis of 
two sites selected by the government for nuclear waste storage in neither of which has 
nuclear waste yet been stored; it is a study of events as they unfolded; and its cases are 
more recent – in 2009-2010 – when we would expect the techniques of opposition to 
have become more streetwise, and the debates over environmental justice to have 
become more sophisticated. However, I have benefited from the pioneering work 
carried out by Fan.   
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6.3 The geo-political context of the two cases  
 
In order to understand the local communities in Da-Ren and Wang-An, this section 
discusses the geographical, demographic, cultural, economic, and political 
characteristics of these two areas. 
 
6.3.1 Geography and demography 
 
Da-Ren township in Taitung County is located on the south east of Taiwan Main Island 
(See Table 5.4), surrounded by mountains and facing the sea, with a total land area of 
306 square kilometres (Taiwan. Taitung County Government) of which 90 per cent is 
hills and mountains. Da-Ren is the traditional territory of the aboriginal Paiwan tribe, 
which has lived there by farming and fishing for generations.  
 
Table 6.1 shows the population and population density in Da-Ren in 2009. According to 
the national statistics of population, the population density in Taiwan is 639 people per 
square kilometre. Taitung County is the least populated county in Taiwan with a 
population density of only 66 persons per square kilometre. Da-Ren has a population of 
4,103, with a population density of only 13 persons per square kilometre - the 4th lowest 
population density township of the 16 townships in the County, making it one of the 
least populated areas in Taiwan.  
 
Wang-An township is made up of 18 islands located in the south of Penghu County35 in 
the Taiwan Strait. Among the 18 islands, only six are inhabited –Wang-An Island, 
Jiangjyunao-yu (Jiangjyun Village)(將軍澳嶼, 將軍村), Dungji-yu (Dungji Village) 
                                                 
35
 Peng-Hu is an archipelago off the western coast of Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait consisting of 90 small 
islands and islets covering an area of 141 square kilometres. 
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(東吉嶼, 東吉村), Dongyuping (Dongping Village) (東嶼坪, 東坪村), Siyuping 
(Siping Village) (西嶼坪, 西坪村）and Huayu (Huayu Village) (花嶼, 花嶼村）(Taiwan. 
Wang An Township). The total land area of Wang-An township is approximately 13.8 
square kilometres with a total population of 4,522 people. Unlike Daren, people in 
Wang-An are non-aborigines.  In Wang-An, the islands are generally flat with no high 
mountains or rivers (Taiwan. Wang-An Township), therefore farming is very difficult 
for local people because lack of water resources. The locals sustain their lives in fishing 
and nowadays tourist industry. 
 
The population of Wang-An is about the same as Da-Ren, but its population density is 
much higher, at 329 compared with 13 person per square kilometre (Taiwan. Peng-Hu 
County Government), reflecting the much higher population density in Penghu County 
than in Taitung County (758 versus 66 person per square kilometre).  
 
Table 6.1: Land area, population, and population density in Da-Ren and Wang-An in 
2009 
Locality Land areas (Square 
Kilometre) 
Population Population Density 
(per/ km2) 
Taiwan 36,191.4667 23,119,772 638.82 
Taitung County 3,515.2526 232,497 66.14 
Da-Ren 306.4454 4103 13.39 
Penghu County 126.8641 96,210 758.37 
Wang-An 13.7824 4522 329.11 
Sources:  
Peng-Hu County Government. Statistics Office;   
Taitung County Government. Statistics office; and 
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Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 2010.  
 
Table 6.2 Population by age and gender in Da-Ren and Wang-An in 2008 
Location Population Gender AGE 
  Male % Female % 0-14 
years 
% 15-64 
years 
% 65years 
of age 
and over 
% 
Taiwan  23,037,031 11,626,351 50.47 11,410,68 49.53 3,905,203 16.95 19,729,608 72.62 2,402,220  10.43 
Taitung 231,849   122,041 52.64 109,808 47.36 38,244 16.50 163,617 70.57 29,988 12.93 
Da-Ren 3,722 2,069 55.59 1,653 44.41 552 14.83 2,802 75.28 368 9.89 
Penghu 92,390 47,705 51.63 44,685 48.73 14,472 15.66 64,045 69.32 13,873 15.02 
Wang- 
An 
4426 2369 53.52 2057 47.48 523 11.81 3072 69.40 831 18.77 
Sources: 
Peng-Hu County Government. Statistics Office;   
Taitung County Government. Statistics office; and 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 2010.  
 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show the population by age groups in Da-Ren and Wang-An in 2008, 
indicating that both Taitung and Penghu County have fewer working age people (aged 
15-65) than the national average. In the percentage of working age people in 25 counties 
and cities in Taiwan, Taitung was the 17th and Penghu was the 21st. The lack of working 
age people suggests that local people have moved in search of jobs to other parts of 
Taiwan. This was certainly true in Wang-An, where the percentage of working age 
people was below the national average, and the elderly and child populations together 
were higher than the national average, indicating that many working age people had 
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moved out from Wang-An to seek work elsewhere in Taiwan. However, the population 
structure in Da-Ren was different: the percentage of working age people in Da-Ren was 
higher than the national average, probably because the aboriginal Paiwan people have a 
stronger relationship with their traditional lands and are reluctant to leave them. Hence 
whereas in Da-Ren, the dependency ratio (i.e. the ratio of the elderly and children to the 
working population) was lower than the national average, in Wang-An, the dependency 
ratio was much higher than the national average (See Table 6.5).  
 
Table 6.3: Dependency ratio in Da-Ren and Wang-An in 2008 
Locality Child Dependency 
Ratio 
 Elderly 
Dependency Ratio 
Dependency 
Ratio36 
Taiwan 23.34 14.36 37.70 
Taitung 23.37 18.33 41.70 
Daren 19.70 13.13 32.83 
Penghu 22.60 21.66 44.26 
Wang An 17.02 27.05 44.08 
Sources:   
Peng-Hu County Government. Statistics Office;   
Taitung County Government. Statistics office; and 
 Directorate-General of Budget. Accounting and Statistics 2010.  
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Dependency Ratio  http://www.economicshelp.org/dictionary/d/dependency-ratio.html 
Definition of Dependency Ratio: The dependency ratio measures the % of dependent people (not of 
working age) / number of people of working age (economically active) 
A dependency ratio of 12% means that for every 100 workers there are 12 people not of working age. 
Children Dependency Ratio = (Number of Children (0-14) + Number of elderly people (age > 65 )/ 
(Number of Working age 15-64) * 100% 
Elderly Dependency Ratio: Number of elderly people (age > 65 )/ (Number of Working age 15-64) 
*100% 
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Table 6.4: Educational attainment of populations in Taiwan 2009 
Place Population 
over 15  
Literate Illiterate 
 Total  Literate 
 % 
College and 
above 
High 
Schools 
Junior High 
Schools 
and 
Primary 
Schools 
Self- 
taught 
total % 
Taiwan 19,131,828 97.78 5,889,998 
(35.91%) 
 
6,297,758 
(32.91%) 
 
5,651,893 
(28.56%) 
74538 
(0.39%) 
403516 2.22 
Taitung 193,605 97.61 41,013 
(21.18%) 
 
66,008 
(34.09%) 
 
81,047 
(41.87%) 
914 
(0.47%) 
4623 
 
 
2.39 
Da-Ren 3,170 99.46     396 
 (12.59%)  
936 
( 29.53%) 
1,762 
(56.58%) 
 
1 
(0.32%) 
17 0.53 
Penghu37 77,918 97.95 17,889 
(22.96%) 
23,393 
(30.02%) 
34,625 
(44.44%) 
416 
(0.53%) 
1,595 
 
2.05 
Wang-An 3,903 97.16 493 
(12.63%) 
911 
(23.34%) 
2363 
(60.54%) 
25 
(0.64%) 
111 2.84 
Sources:  
Peng-Hu County Government. Statistics Office;   
Taitung County Government. Statistics office; and 
Directorate-General of Budget. Accounting and Statistics 2010.  
                                                 
37
 The data of Penghu is 2007 
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Table 6.4 shows that the education profiles of the people in Da-Ren and Wang-An, were 
similar, in that both areas had a high rate of education to junior high school level, and a 
low rate of education to college level or above. This indicates that local people in 
Da-Ren and Wang-An can write and read but are not highly educated.  
 
6.3.2 Economics 
 
Table 6.5: Average income in five Townships/Districts in Taiwan in 2008 
Locality Annual Income in 2008 
per person (NT$1000) 
Rank positions among the 
359 Town/district in 
Taiwan 
Da-An District, Taipei 
City 
1,476         1/359 
Wang-An Township, 
Penghu County 
        590       179/359 
Bai-Sha Township, 
Penghu County 
        589 180/359 
Da-Ren Township, 
Taitung County  
        491       341/359 
Lai-Yi Township, 
Pingtung County 
        382       359/359 
Sources: Average income of townships in Taiwan. http://gaan.com/deepdish?p=84198 
(access: 20 May 2010) 
 
Economically, the two townships were not very prosperous. Table 6.7 shows that the 
income earned by people in Wang-An ranked them halfway down the list of 359 
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townships/districts in Taiwan, while the income earned by people in Da-Ren ranked 
them almost at the bottom of that list - people in Da-Ren only received one-third of the 
annual income of the richest township/district in Taiwan.. A similar picture of economic 
disadvantage can be seen at the county level: people in Taitung and Penghu only earned 
60 to 70 percent of the average income of people in the whole of Taiwan.  
 
The economic weakness of the two townships (especially Da-Ren) is also revealed in 
Table 6.8 produced by the Industry, Commerce and Service Census (ICS) in 2006, 
where it was reported that the business sector in Da-Ren contributed only 0.3 per cent of 
the total income of the business sector in Taitung County, while the business sector in 
Wang-An contributed only 0.7 per cent of the total income of the business sector in 
Penghu County (See Table 6.8). These figures show that Da-Ren and Wang-An are not 
important commercial areas: indeed, the level of urbanisation in them is low, and they 
are located in mainly rural areas, which added to their attractiveness to the site selection 
committee in MOEA.  
 
Table 6.6 also shows that people who worked for the business sector in Taiwan as a 
whole earned an average income of $541,155 New Taiwanese Dollars (NTD), but in 
Taitung County and Penghu County, people who worked in the business sector only 
earned NTD$380,304 and NTD$330,720, respectively.  This evidence of economic 
disadvantage in the two areas (especially in Da-Ren) explains why some of their 
residents were particularly vulnerable to offers of compensation for hosting nuclear 
waste.  
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Table 6.6: Revenues and Payroll of Business Sectors in Taiwan 
Locality Number 
of 
enterprise 
units 
Number 
of 
Persons 
engaged 
Annual 
Payroll 
for persons  
engaged 
(NT$1000) 
/per person 
 
Total Revenues 
(NT$1000) 
Total 
Expenditures 
(NT$1000) 
Taiwan 1,105,102 9549912 541.155 45,309,441,725 42,031,416,160 
Taitung 9,418 30,750 380.304 58,187,670 57,543,771 
Daren 56 96 271.281 184,608 17,6178 
Peng-hu 4,388 11,871 330.720 18,579,325 16,410,275 
Wang 
An 
48 127 295.087 121,704 101,754 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 2007. The Industry, 
Commerce and Service Census (ICS) in 2006 
 
6.3.3 Culture 
 
Wang-An in Penghu County is demographically similar to most non-aboriginal 
townships in Taiwan where the majority of residents are Han Chinese descendants, and 
therefore share the same traditions. But in Da-Ren, 90% of the population are members 
of the indigenous Paiwan tribe, and in order to understand this community, we must 
explain the Paiwan culture which is very different from the dominant Han Chinese 
culture in Taiwan. The total population of Paiwan people in Taiwan is around 86,000, 
which makes them the third biggest indigenous tribe in the country (Council for 
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Indigenous people), and they live mainly in the southeast corners of Taiwan Island in 
Taitung County and Pingtung County. Historically, the Paiwan people consider 
themselves to be the descendants of the hundred pacer snake, which often appears on 
their clothing and carvings (Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission) (See Table 6.9). 
 
Table 6.7: Paiwan tribe distribution and Paiwan Clothing 
 
 
Source: Council for Indigenous People.  
 
One of the most distinctive features of Paiwan culture is its hierarchical social structure. 
Paiwan society is divided into four classes: chief, nobility, warrior, and commoner 
(Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission). Tribe members inherit their social classes 
at birth, though Paiwan custom allows marriage between members of different classes, 
whereby an individual’s status can change by union with someone of a different class. 
Generally, the chief is the ruler of the tribe – literally the landlord of the tribe he rules, 
since houses built on the chief’s land are owned by the chief, and people living in the 
house are under the command of the chief. The chief is the ritual leader as well as the 
leader of all affairs regarding the tribe, and the chief’s status is inherited by his eldest 
son. The nobility class are the chief’s brothers, sisters, and cousins: the closer to the 
kingship of the chief, the nobler they are. Only the upper class can wear colourful 
clothes decorated by snake skin and the teeth of animals, and their houses are often 
decorated with carvings. Warriors are those who have special achievements and talents, 
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such as carving teachers and outstanding hunters (Taiwan Indigenous People's Culture 
Park ), and they are highly respected by tribe members. Commoners are those who have 
a very distant or no family tie with the chief, and they are the tenant farmers of the chief 
who rent their lands and houses from the chief.  
 
Formal decision-making power in Paiwan culture lies with the tribe council, the 
members of which are elected by people from different land areas under the different 
chiefs, and its decisions are made through majority voting. Although the tribe councils 
are not recognised by the government, their influence dominates public opinion within 
the Paiwan tribe. Substantial informal influence is also exerted by chiefs, nobility, and 
church leaders on every issue, since these people are the opinion leaders and shapers in 
the local areas. In recent years, especially in Da-Ren, issues of nuclear waste have 
divided the community into pro- and anti-nuclear waste group, and this situation has 
caused conflict not only within the local communities but also among family members. 
Local politicians are drawn mostly from the chief or nobility class, and are seen by the 
government as agents to negotiate with local people. 
 
With regard to religion, Paiwan culture holds that the Gods protect people if they follow 
the rules recognised by society. These rules are called taboos, and violating a taboo is 
punished by disease and injury (Digital Museum of Taiwan Indigenous People ). Paiwan 
rituals embrace every aspect of life: the Paiwan people pray for good weather, good 
harvests, and to thank their ancestors. The chief is the leader of all the ritual ceremonies 
but the rituals are practised by priests. In the festival of harvest, commoners pay their 
tributes to the chief by presenting animals they hunted and crops they grew, and in 
return, the chief offers his people alcohol and cooked food ( Overseas Compatriot 
Affairs Commission). Like other indigenous tribes in Taiwan, the Paiwan were 
introduced to Christianity by missionaries from North America and Europe in the late 
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19th century, and they now practise both Christianity and traditional rituals. The 
Christian church is the religious centre of every village and it has an important influence 
on Paiwan people, playing a powerful role in the campaign against nuclear waste: 
founding pressure groups like the Paiwan Anti-Nuclear Waste Union; educating local 
people about nuclear waste; and organising demonstrations in Paiwan areas. 
 
Finally, economically, Paiwan people sustain their living by hunting and fishing. For 
Paiwan men, hunting is their first job and fishing the second (Digital Museum of 
Taiwan Indigenous People ), because despite the influence of modern lifestyles, hunting 
is still seen as an important skill for Paiwan males. Living in mountain areas, slash and 
burn agriculture is also conducted by Paiwan tribes.  
 
6.3.4 Local politics 
 
Local politics is also important in understanding the local communities. In this section, I 
will start by discussing local political arrangements in Taiwan generally and then I will 
discuss local politics at county and township level in Da-Ren, Taitung County, and 
Wang-An, Penghu County.  
 
6.3.4.1 Local politics in Taiwan  
 
Local government in Taiwan is divided into three levels: (1) special municipalities; (2) 
counties and cities; and (3) townships and county-administered cities ( Government 
Information Office. 2010). According to the Local Government Act, an area with a 
population of over 1.25 million would be granted special municipalities status; an area 
with a population of over 500,000 would be given the status of county or city; and an 
area with a population of over 150,000 would be granted township status in rural areas 
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or county-administered city status in urban, industrial areas (Government Information 
Office. 2010). Counties such as Taitung County and Penghu County are headed by 
county mayors, and townships/ county-administered cities are headed by township/city 
mayors, all of whom are popularly elected for a term of four years and may be elected to 
a second term. In order to protect the interests of indigenous people, mayors of 
indigenous townships must themselves be indigenous people (Local Government Act 
2010: Article 57). Below the level of township there is the village, which has a village 
leader, who, under the supervision of the mayor of township/city, or chief administrator, 
handles village affairs and carries out commissioned tasks. The village leader is 
popularly elected for a term of four years and may only run for election for two terms. 
 
County/city governments are responsible for organisation and administration; finances 
(including taxes and levies); social services; education, culture and sport; labour 
administration; urban planning and construction; economic services (including 
agriculture, forestry, fishery, livestock industries); nature conservation; water resources; 
health and environmental protection; transportation and tourism; public safety 
(including policing and fire services); and management of businesses within the county 
( Local Government Act 2010: Article 18). Townships/county-administered cities have 
similar responsibilities, apart from water resources, labour administration, and 
economic services (Local Government Act 2010: Article 19). However, central 
government still controls the resources allocation, funding allocation, economic affairs, 
and policing and fiscal management personnel, and in the case of a dispute between 
central government and county/city government, the dispute shall be resolved by the 
Legislative Yuan (Parliament) ( Local Government Act 2010: Article 77).  
 
In addition to the above executive bodies, there are legislative bodies or Councils in 
Taiwan’s local government system. Councillors of a special municipality, county/city 
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councillors, and township/city representatives are elected by the residents of their 
respective areas for a four-year term and may be re-elected to a second term ( Local 
Government Act 2010: Article 33). The responsibilities of such councils are to pass 
resolutions on the regulations enforced by the governing the authority; approve budgets, 
taxes, and the disposal of properties; review auditors’ reports on the final accounts; 
approve proposals made by the township/city representatives; and listen to petitions 
from citizens (Local Government Act 2010: Article 36).  
 
6.3.4.2 Local politics in Taitung County  
 
Turning to local politics in Taitung County, the first point to note is that after the 
Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, 
KMT allied itself with local elites in order to dominate local elections and thereby 
legitimise its governing base (Wu 2003). In return, the KMT government granted local 
elites a monopoly of economic privilege (Wu 2003). Taitung County is one of the areas 
where KMT has been dominant since 1949: despite the first regime change in the 
presidency in 2000, the victorious DPP regime (2002-2008) still failed to establish 
strong support in Taitung County.  
 
Over the last decade,  politics in Taitung County at county level has been monopolised 
by four families - Wu family (吳) , Hsu family(徐), Huang family(黃) and Rao family 
(饒) – all of whom represented KMT in the local elections. Members of the Wu family 
have been involved in the politics of Taitung since the first Taitung County Mayor 
election in July 1961; members of the Hsu family have been county councillors for over 
30 years and have served as county mayors; members of the Rao family have 
represented Taitung in the Legislative Yuan for over fifteen years - one of the members 
of the Rao family is the deputy leader of Taitung County Council; and members of the 
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Huang family have been involved in local politics in Taitung since the 1960s – Justin 
Huang (黃健庭) was a member of the Legislative Yuan for Taitung and is the current 
Taitung County Mayor.  
 
However, local politics in Taitung has been characterised by scandals and murky deals, 
one of which involved Justin Huang. He participated in drafting the ‘Act on Sites for 
Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Facility’, and during the 
election campaign for county mayor in 2009, he refused to sign the petition against 
nuclear waste being stored in Taitung. In 2005, KMT nominated Mr. Chun-li Wu (吳俊
立) (Wu family) to run for Taitung County Mayor. Mr. Chun-li Wu was prosecuted and 
sentenced for corruption before the election but still managed to get elected, but he did 
not serve as a Mayor of Taitung. Instead, the KMT nominated his ex-wife Ms. Li-Chen 
Kuang (鄺麗貞) to run in the by-election and she was elected as Mayor of Taitung from 
2005 to 2009. However, Ms. Kuang was a very controversial figure, and she was 
accused of over-spending government money on travelling while Taitung County is the 
poorest county in Taiwan. In 2009, Ms. Kuang, aware that her negative reputation 
would make her unelectable for a second term, asked KMT to nominated Mr. Justin 
Huang, and in exchange, she would stand for his vacated seat in the Legislative Yuan 
once he was elected as county mayor. Mr. Huang was duly elected but only narrowly, as 
the DPP obtained its highest share of the vote in the history of Taitung County Mayor 
elections: he got 52.59 per cent, and the DPP candidate got 47.41 per cent (Apple Daily 
2009). This result showed that the Taitung people were tired of being dominated by the 
four families close to KMT who failed to deliver economic development in Taitung 
County. With strong support from local people and the sullied reputation of Ms. Kuang, 
the DPP won the subsequent Legislative Yuan election in January 2010, and so for the 
first time, Taitung County is represented in the Legislative Yuan by a DPP legislator.  
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Another sign of change in Taitung local politics took place in the county councillor 
elections of 2009, when among 30 County Councillors, although the KMT gained 22 
seats, the DPP gained 1 seat (seven seats were won by other parties or independents). 
What is significant about this result is not only that it was the first time the DPP has 
won a seat on the Taitung County Council, but that the DPP candidate who won it has 
been an environmental campaigner for many years, and strongly opposed to nuclear 
waste being stored in Da-Ren. This suggests that people in Taitung had become aware 
of the issue of nuclear waste storage, and approved of opposition to it. 
 
At the township level, local politics in Da-Ren has similarly been tarnished by nepotism. 
The township mayor has always come from either the Pao(包) family or the Chang(張) 
family, both of which are in the noble class in Paiwan’s hierarchical social system. 
National political parties have some influence at the township level but it is not as 
strong as it is at the county level, because Da-Ren is an indigenous people’s area, and 
family has a substantial impact on voting behaviour, so local nepotism is very strong. 
Importantly, this nepotism has been mobilised in the last decades over the issue of 
nuclear waste storage, making this the most important issue in local elections. For 
example, in the 2005 mayoral election, the incumbent mayor, Mr. Shih-Ching Pao (包世
晶), was seeking a second term but he was not re-elected because of speculation of 
corruption with Taipower, and instead, his rival Mr. Chin-Sheng Chang (張金生) got 
elected. In the 2009 mayoral election, Mr. Pao and Mr. Chang were again the only two 
candidates, but because Mr. Pao had signed the petition against dumping nuclear waste 
in Taitung while Mr Chang had not, Mr Pao was elected as mayor: local people believed 
that Mr. Chang supported the development of a nuclear waste repository in Da-Ren. 
 
6.3.4.3 Local politics in Penghu County  
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In Penghu County politics, for 50 years the military had a very strong influence because 
the area was seen as a frontier line against China. As a result, candidates for the mayoral 
election would never be elected unless they gained support from the military and the 
KMT. However, this influence was eroded in the late 1990s with the end of martial rule, 
and during the last decade, politics of Penghu at county level has been dominated by 
several individuals. Unlike in Taitung, these individuals do not owe their success to their 
family memberships, but to their networking skills in forging strategic alliances to 
control the politics of Penghu. These individuals currently include the County Mayor 
Mr Chien-Fa Wang(王乾發), the Legislative Yuan member, Mr. Pin-Kuan Lin(林炳坤), 
and a former member of the Legislative Yuan member, Miss Su-Yeh Hsu (許素葉) . 
These three people are close to the KMT, and formed an alliance to support one another 
in local mayor elections, local councillor elections, and general elections. In the county 
mayor election in 2009, Mr. Chien-Fa Wang sought a second term, and faced a very 
strong challenge from DPP candidate Mr. Chien-Hsing Tsai (蔡見興). The main issue in 
the election was a referendum on the development of a casino in Penghu38: the DPP 
candidate, who was strongly opposed to the casino development, obtained 48.07% of 
the vote; but the pro-casino Mayor Chien-Fa Wang obtained 49.37 per cent of the vote 
and was duly elected, no doubt helped by his network of influential individuals.    
 
                                                 
38
 Residents in Penghu country rejected the idea of opening a casino within their county in local 
referendum. The result were as follows:   
Voters: 73,651               Vote cast: 31054          Turn out rate: 42.16 
Valid Vote: 30756 (99.04%)    Invalid vote: 298 (0.96%) 
Support: 13,395  ( 43.56%)    Against:17,359  (56.44%)   
A total of 17,359 votes, 56.44 percent of the total valid ballots, were cast against the proposition, while 
13,395, or 43.56 percent, supported it. (Liberty Times 2009; Central News Agency 2009). 
Before the referendum, the KMT-controlled central government and Penghu County Government 
supported opening a casino within Penghu County. The Penghu referendum result might suggest that the 
central government and local government are not comfortable using referendums. 
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In Wang-An, local politics has always been dominated by two families, the Hsu (許) 
family and the Yeh (葉) family. Members of the Hsu family have long been elected as 
county councillors, and Mr. Lung-Fu Hsu (許龍富), the leader of the Hsu family, was 
elected as Wang-An Township Mayor in 2001 and again in 2009. The leader of the Yeh 
family is Mr. Ming-Sieng Yeh (葉明縣), who was a county councillor for over ten years, 
while his brother was elected as township mayor in 2005. These two families compete 
with each other and have controlled the local politics of Wang-An for the last 10 years. 
But again there are murky elements in the system. For example, Mr. Lung-Fu Hsu was a 
controversial figure who was prosecuted for election bribery after his successful 
campaign in 2009, and his trial is currently in progress. Penghu County Government has 
appointed its own representative as acting township mayor. 
 
6.4.4.4 Local nuclear waste politics 
 
We have already touched on some aspects of local nuclear waste politics, but there is 
much more to discuss. The politics of nuclear waste at county level in Taitung was not 
as lively as at township level in Da-Ren. At county level in Taitung, politicians usually 
responded to the issue by blandly saying ‘we will act in accordance with the laws’. 
Typically, neither the current nor former county mayor signed the petition organised by 
the Taitung Branch of the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union to stop the hosting of 
nuclear waste in Taitung. Moreover, Taitung County Council refused to hold a local 
referendum by not setting up a referendum committee on radioactive waste. However, 
perhaps the politicians were right to be equivocal, since according to newspaper reports,  
60% of local people were happy to host radioactive waste in Da-Ren (Chen 2009). This 
suggested that public opinion on the issue of hosting nuclear waste in Taitung was 
divided. 
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Local politics in Da-Ren is dominated by the issue of nuclear waste. At the local level, 
judging by the electoral experiences of 2005 and 2009, candidates running in the local 
township mayoral election could only be elected by expressing opposition to hosting 
nuclear waste in Da-Ren. In the 2005 local township mayoral election, Mr. Shih-Ching 
Pao was not elected for a second term because people believed that money from 
Taipower had been transferred to his wife’s bank account. Instead, his rival Mr. 
Chin-Sheng Chang was elected as township mayor. But in 2009, Mr. Chin-Sheng Chang 
in turn failed to secure re-election because he was believed by local people to have 
switched his position to support hosting nuclear waste in Daren: he refused to sign the 
petition against hosting nuclear waste and his son was working for Taipower as a 
negotiator in local villages. In fact, in Da-Ren, the issue of hosting a nuclear waste site 
divided the local community into two groups – pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear. People 
who supported hosting a nuclear waste site held the view that the compensation would 
improve the living standards of local people, whereas people who opposed it argued that 
a nuclear waste site would not only cause health risks but would destroy the Paiwan 
tribe and local culture. People in Da-Ren have struggled to balance the values of family, 
health, and culture against higher living standards. 
 
In Penghu, the situation was rather different. All politicians at both county and township 
level were very strongly against hosting nuclear waste. Penghu County Mayor Mr. 
Chien-Fa Wang told the Central News Agency that Penghu is rich in natural resources 
and the government has promised Penghu people in 2005 that radioactive waste would 
never be dumped in Penghu (Kao 2009). He hoped the government would keep its 
promise and people in Penghu would protect their lives and national resources. The 
Mayor also accused Taipower of misleading people in Penghu. He claimed that 
Taipower’s booklet which was distributed to every household stated that the repository 
would host LLW but actually it was designed to host HLW. Taipower’s representative in 
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Penghu admitted that the plan for the repository is to a standard which could host HLW 
but that did not mean that the repository would host HLW (Kao 2008). 
 
The strong opposition to nuclear waste led to Penghu County making the decision to 
designate the whole Wang-An township as a natural conservation area in August 2009. 
This decision was strategic because, according to the laws, no development would be 
allowed in a natural conservation area, so it ruled out the possibility of Wang-An being 
the repository for nuclear waste. This decision also meant that the siting process had to 
start from the beginning again because according to Article 9 of the ‘Act on Sites for 
Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Facility’ 39 , the 
government must nominate at least two sites as candidate sites and then conduct a 
referendum in both counties on the same day. As soon as the Wang-An site became 
impossible, the government could not nominate only Da-Ren as a potential site. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter is the first of two chapters in this thesis to analyse in depth the two 
townships of Da-Ren in Taitung County and Wang-An in Penghu County, which were 
the potential sites selected in 2009 by the Ministry of Economic Affairs for the storage 
of nuclear waste. These two communities provided ideal case studies for my study of 
the opposition to the siting of a permanent nuclear waste repository on the island of 
Taiwan. This chapter has focused on the empirical details of the two cases, preparing the 
ground for chapter seven’s thematic analysis of the issues arising from these details. The 
                                                 
39
 Executive Yuan (2006) Act on Sites for Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal 
Facility 2006: Chen Shui Bian. Article 9. Taipei: Taiwan 
 
Article 9: The site selection group shall, within 6 months after the list of potential sites is publicized, 
submit a report on the selection of recommended candidate sites to the implementing authority and 
recommend at least two recommended candidate sites. 
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chapter has encompassed the geography, demography, economics, culture and politics 
of the communities, creating snapshots of their many-sided identities. The two cases 
shared many similar features – e.g. both were relatively poor rural areas with 
comparatively sparse populations – but they also differed in significant respects – e.g. 
Da-Ren was a community made up almost exclusively of an indigenous tribe (the 
Paiwan) whereas Wang-An was made up mostly of people of Chinese Han origin. In the 
next chapter we shall see how these similarities and differences play out in the thematic 
analysis of the issues raised by the controversy over nuclear waste siting in the two 
areas.     
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Chapter 7. Understanding Opposition II: Thematic Analysis 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter follows on from chapter six, complementing its empirical analysis of the 
opposition to nuclear waste storage in the Da-Ren and Wang-An areas by a thematic 
analysis of the main issues raised in that chapter. As we shall see, this thematic analysis 
is centred on the notion of environmental injustice. But before beginning that analysis, it 
is worth reflecting on the intensity of feeling generated in the Lan Yu case against four 
of the most reviled sources of environmental injustice committed by the government 
and Taipower – secrecy; bribery; duplicity; and inequality. First, the government and 
Taipower saw the issue of nuclear waste disposal siting virtually as a state secret, and 
systematically failed to inform Lan Yu residents about plans to dump nuclear waste in 
their community even after those plans had been implemented. Second, the government 
and Taipower blatantly bribed local people with trips and public benefits in exchange 
for their acceptance of nuclear waste. Third, the government and Taipower duplicitly 
assured Lan Yu residents that Taipower’s nuclear waste repository had stopped 
expanding at the same time as giving Taipower permission to continue expanding. 
Fourth, inequality of power between the government and Taipower on the one hand, and 
local government and communities on the other hand, was exploited and exacerbated by 
the government’s deliberate policy of marginalising participative processes in Lan Yu. 
As we shall see, public resentment at this unjust treatment fuelled popular protests 
which honed conceptions of procedural environmental injustice by aggrieved groups. 
But the actions of the government and Taipower also generated conceptions of 
distributive environmental injustice, as communities felt disadvantaged compared with 
other communities by decisions over the siting of nuclear waste disposal facilities.          
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These themes are among those analysed in this chapter within the framework of 
justice/injustice, divided into five sections: (1) distributive environmental injustice; (2) 
procedural environmental injustice: (3) economic injustice: (4) political injustice; and (5) 
cultural injustice. As we shall see, the issues that are discussed under the headings of 
distributive and procedural environmental injustice are seen to be symptoms and 
reflections of the broader forms of economic, political and cultural injustice.  
 
7.2 Distributive environmental injustice 
 
Four themes of distributive environmental injustice emerged from the interviews: unfair 
distribution of benefits and burdens; seriousness of health problems; safety risks of 
nuclear waste management; and intergenerational injustice considerations. The 
unfairness of the distribution of the benefits and burdens of nuclear energy and nuclear 
waste was identified by many of the opponents of a nuclear waste repository in Penghu 
and Taitung. For example, the interviewee D21said: 
 
Taitung is less populated compared to other counties in Taiwan and we use less 
electricity. It’s not fair to ask us to host nuclear waste. Why should we bear this 
burden for the whole Taiwanese society? (Interviewee D21– interviewed on 2 
October 2009.) 
 
Similarly, interviewee W 1 said: 
 
We Dungji40 use so little electricity, there are only about 10 residents in this island, 
and totally about 30 people live on this island including policemen and civil 
servants. It’s not fair to put nuclear waste on our island. Why not just put the waste 
                                                 
40
 Dungji 東吉村 is the village where the nominated nuclear waste repository would be located. 
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in the capital or the industrial areas where those big companies use a lot more 
electricity than us! (Interviewee W1 - interviewed on 10 September 2009). 
 
The same message came from Interviewee W4 :  
 
Now there are only about 30 people live and work in Dunji village. How much 
electricity can they use? They consume a very small portion of the electricity but 
they have to host the rubbish from producing electricity. It is not fair at all. Why 
Tungji? Why we are so unlucky? (Interviewee W4- interviewed on 1 October 2009.) 
 
Likewise, Interviewee D7 said:  
 
Taitung is the place we use the least electricity in the whole country, but why we 
have to bear the result of dumping nuclear waste to our place? Those computer 
technology companies near Taipei, they use far more electricity than us. Why 
shouldn’t they share most of this nuclear waste? (Interviewee D7 - interviewed on 
18 September 2009.) 
 
For these people, storing nuclear waste at Penghu and Taitung is ‘not fair’ because their 
communities receive only a very small share of the benefits of nuclear energy but a 
nuclear waste repository in their communities would mean that they would suffer all of 
the burdens of nuclear energy. They do not see how this can be a fair allocation of the 
benefits and burdens associated with the nuclear industry. These interviewees were 
arguing for a principle of distributive justice - that those who benefit from nuclear 
energy should also bear the burden. In their view, nuclear waste should be stored in 
industrial areas and economically advanced areas because those who benefit the most 
from nuclear energy are those who actually cause the problem.  
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This unfairness is particularly acute in the case of Taitung County, because it has been 
the repository for nuclear waste for nearly 30 years: Lan Yu (Orchid Island) which is an 
island within Taitung County has stored nuclear waste since 1982. Although in 1996 
Taipower stopped adding to the stock of nuclear waste in Lan Yu (Orchid Island) the 
waste has not been removed, so the Taitung area is still bearing the risks of nuclear 
waste storage. Understandably, therefore, some interviewees in another part of Taitung 
County, Da-Ren, feel upset about being nominated by the government as a potential site 
for a permanent nuclear waste repository. For example interview D5 said: 
 
Since Lan Yu [Orchid Island], Taitung has accepted nuclear waste for more than 20 
years. Why we have to accept those rubbish which people do not want? We Taitung 
have suffered the burden of nuclear waste for more than 20 years. Why should we 
have to bear this anymore? (Interviewee D5- intererviewed on 16 September 2009.) 
 
Similarly, interviewee D21 said: 
 
Why we should bear this burden for the whole Taiwanese society? And why it is in 
our aboriginal areas again? Lan Yu [Orchid Island] is enough. We don’t want 
nuclear waste in Taitung anymore (Interviewee D21- interviewed on 2 October 
2009) 
 
Likewise, Interviewee D6 member of the Taitung Branch of Taiwan Environmental 
Protection Union said: 
 
Why Taitung again? Why we have to host nuclear waste when no one wants it! Why 
people in Taitung have to suffer from the risk of nuclear waste? It’s not fair at all. 
Other parts of Taiwan use more electricity than us. They should host nuclear waste, 
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not us! (Interviewee D6 - interviewed 17 September 2009). 
 
One interviewee from Dungji pointed out that Taiwan also hosted three nuclear power 
plants, so the county was in danger of being inundated by nuclear waste:    
 
They should never put nuclear waste in Dungji,….We have already had two nuclear 
power stations in northern Taiwan and one in the southern Taiwan and they all store 
nuclear waste. We also got Lan-Yu [Orchid Island] on the west…..If they put the 
nuclear waste in Dungji, the whole Taiwan would be surrounded by nuclear 
waste……Nuclear waste would become the biggest threat to Taiwan…( Interviewee 
W2- interviewed on 15 September 2009.) 
 
Some opponents put forward the more radical argument that the burdens of nuclear 
waste should not be borne by anyone. They argued for an end to nuclear energy in 
Taiwan. These interviewees argued that nuclear energy should not be used until we have 
solved the problem of nuclear waste. For example, Interviewee D1 said:  
 
Nuclear waste is poisonous rubbish. We should stop producing it because we have 
failed to find a solution for it….. I think we should stop building the fourth nuclear 
power station ….. Also, we should start to decommission nuclear power stations 
which are in operation now. (Interviewee D1 - interviewed on 11 September 2009) 
 
Also, Interview D25 argued: 
 
It is the rubbish of civilisation. If we cannot deal with it properly then why should 
we use it? We should build a nuclear free Taiwan and use more renewable energy. 
(Interviewee D25 - interviewed on 7 October 2009) 
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Some interviewees questioned whether people needed such a lot of electricity in 
Taiwan:  
 
The new government would like to build more nuclear reactors in Taiwan. ….It is a 
very difficult issue. Do we really need such great amount of electricity? 
(Interviewee D2 -interviewed on 15 September 2009) 
 
These opponents of nuclear waste held that nuclear power should come to an end in 
Taiwan, claiming that Taiwan did not need a great amount of electricity, and so should 
not build new reactors and should decommission the existing nuclear power plants. And 
they wanted the existing nuclear waste stored within nuclear facilities such as nuclear 
power stations. For example Interviewee D25 said:  
 
Storing radioactive waste in the nuclear waste plants can save the transportation cost. 
When the nuclear power plants are decommissioned, then the sites can be use as 
repositories. (Interviewee D25 - interviewed on 7 October 2009). 
 
Similarly, Interviewee D3 held that  
 
All the nuclear waste should stay in the nuclear power stations until the nuclear 
power stations are decommissioned then turn them into repositories. (Interviewee 
D3 - interviewed on 15 September 2009). 
 
The same message was conveyed by Interviewee D1:  
 
I think we should stop building the fourth Nuclear Power Station and to use the site 
as a repository for nuclear waste. Also, we should start to decommission the existing 
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nuclear power station, and leave all the nuclear waste on sites since those locations 
have already been contaminated…( Interviewee D1 - interviewed on 11 September 
2009.) 
 
The second theme of distributive environmental justice in the interviews was the nature 
of the effects of nuclear waste on human health. The opponents of nuclear waste 
explained the burdens associated with nuclear waste, claiming that nuclear waste would 
affect their ways of living by contaminating their crops and fisheries, and causing 
long-term health problems. For example, Interviewee D20:  
 
How safe can this nuclear waste be? …..If it discharges to the sea or into the soil, 
our crops, our fishing, and our lives will be endangered… (Interviewee D20 - 
interviewed on 1 October 2009.) 
 
Also, Interviewee D1 argued that :  
 
Nuclear waste has a very long term effect to human health. It can cause genetic 
problems... (Interviewee D1 -interviewed on 11 September 2009) 
 
Similarly, Interviewee D18 said that  
 
Once if it (nuclear waste) discharges into the sea or the air, the damage to our health 
is not only many years but hundreds or thousands of years. If the nuclear substance 
discharged into the sea, the radioactivity would affect all Taiwan…. (Interviewee 
D18 -interviewed on 1 October 2009.) 
 
The third theme of distributive environmental justice in the interviews was the adequacy 
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of safety procedures to prevent leakage of nuclear waste. Despite the fact that the 
government and Taipower often reassured them by claiming that nuclear waste would 
be safely packed, stored, and monitored, local people doubted Taipower’s capacity for 
safeguarding the nuclear materials. Lack of trust between local people and Taipower has 
always existed. For example, Interviewee D19 said:  
 
The nuclear waste in Lan Yu [Orchid Island] already had a leaking problem. I don’t 
believe Taipower can safely manage the nuclear waste. (Interviewee D19- 
interviewed on 1 October 2009.) 
 
Likewise, Interviewee 24 said: 
 
I am not very confident of Taipower’s technology credibility…Do not forget that in 
Lan Yu [Orchid Island] there are thousands of barrels of nuclear waste rusty and 
leaking too. I doubt about how they can manage nuclear waste better this time. 
(Interviewee D24 - interviewed on 6 October 2009.) 
 
Interviewee D1 was also critical of Taipower’s safety record:  
 
Taipower always claimed it (nuclear waste) is very safe since we have had nuclear 
power plants in Taiwan. But Taipower’s safety record is really poor. Each year, some 
accidents happened causing radiation exposure and discharging to outside of nuclear 
power plants. Also, the barrels of nuclear waste in Lan Yu [Orchid Island] are rusty 
and leaking. How can Taipower manage nuclear waste safely? I’m doubtful. 
(Interviewee D1 - interviewed on 11 September 2009.) 
 
The fourth theme of distributive environmental justice in the interviews is about 
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intergenerational justice. Opponents of nuclear waste storage emphasised the unfair 
burdens that would be placed on future generations. In particular, they focused on the 
future generations of their community who are their own descendants.  
 
Once we accept nuclear waste, the danger would last for hundreds or thousands of 
years. Not only would the present generation suffer but the future generations and 
generations after that. I cannot agree to host nuclear waste on behalf of our future 
generations. (Interviewee D19 -interviewed on 1 October 2009.) 
 
Similarly, Interviewee D20 argued: 
 
The present generation which makes the decision to accept nuclear waste will all 
pass away one day but it is our future generations who would be suffering the health 
risk (from nuclear waste). Radioactivity could last for hundreds or even thousands 
of years, we would suffer generations after generations and never recover again. 
(Interviewee D20 - interviewed on 1 October 2009) 
 
Opponents from the aboriginal tribe in Da-Ren identified a range of damaging future 
effects on land and traditions of their community, and argued that the tribe would be 
‘ruined’ by accepting nuclear waste. For instance, Interviewee D12 said:  
 
We have to protect our land for us and for future generations. It is the land our 
people have been living in, farming, and fishing for generations. It is our 
responsibilities to keep our traditions and keep our land for future generations. 
Nuclear waste would ruin our land and ruin our traditions. Refusing to accept 
nuclear waste coming to Da-Ren is not only for us but also for our future 
generations. (Interviewee D12- interviewed on 24 September 2009.) 
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Similarly, Interviewee D17 argued: 
 
We cannot allow nuclear waste dumping in our land. It is our native land; our family 
has been living here for generations. If we decided to host nuclear waste, not only us 
but also our future generations would suffer. The government would tell our 
descendants that it was your ancestors who decided to host nuclear waste in here. 
Our descendants in future generations would hate us because our decision today 
ruins their home. We cannot decide for our future generations. We have to protect 
our native land for our future generations. (Interviewee D17- interviewed on 30 
September 2009.) 
 
One interviewee suggested that agreeing to host nuclear waste would be ‘selling our 
land and our soul’. Future generations of the community would rightly be mocked for 
the actions of their ancestors who sold them out. This emphasises the importance of the 
idea of a transgenerational community for many of the opponents. For example, 
Interviewee D14 argued:  
 
If we accept nuclear waste, it is not only us but also our descendants who will suffer. 
People will laugh at our descendents that it was your ancestors agreed to host the 
nuclear waste. We have to preserve this land for our future generations. Our fight 
against nuclear waste is not only for us but also for our future generation. We can’t 
sell our land and our soul. Nuclear waste will ruin our tribe. (Interviewee D14- 
interviewed on 25 September 2009.) 
 
These interviewees linked the issue of hosting nuclear waste to the survival of local 
tribes, local traditions, and local culture. If nuclear waste was stored in their 
communities, their culture, tradition, and racial identity could all disappear.  
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7.3 Procedural environmental injustice 
 
The opponents of nuclear waste thus emphasised the distributive environmental 
injustice of locating nuclear waste in their community. But they talked more about the 
procedural environmental injustice or unfairness that they saw in decision-making about 
nuclear waste. In this section, there are five themes of procedural environmental justice 
that emerged from the interviews: (1) lack of information from Taipower/government; 
(2) absence of opportunity to discuss issues with Taipower/government; (3) exclusion 
from the decision-making process; (4) asymmetry of power between the people and 
Taipower/government; and (5) corrupt dealings between Taipower and local politicians.  
 
Three of these five themes were touched on by Interviewee D12 : 
 
They [Taipower] never really told us anything about this nuclear waste thing ... They 
never give us opportunity to discuss this issue. Our voice is never been heard. We 
don’t have any power to go against them. (Interviewee D12 – interviewed on 24 
September 2009.) 
 
On the first theme, many interviewees reported that geological investigations began 
before the public were informed, and that they viewed this level of secrecy and lack of 
information and transparency as characteristic behaviour of the government and 
Taipower. Moreover, they felt that these characteristics had persisted ever since the Lan 
Yu (Orchid Island) case over 30 years ago. For instance, Interviewee D19 said:  
 
Taipower or government never told us they are doing some work at our places. We 
discovered this by ourselves. They always do this kind of thing secretly. 
(Interviewee D19 - interviewed on 1 October 2009.) 
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Similarly, Interviewee D1 argued: 
 
Taipower never inform local people that they would conduct any investigations in 
their village. Local people discovered…..that they were the sub-contractor from 
Taipower and doing some work for Taipower to see whether it is suitable for hosting 
nuclear waste. (Interviewee D1 - interviewed on 11 September 2009.) 
 
Opponents of the nuclear waste repository felt that Taipower was untrustworthy, never 
told the truth, and did whatever they wanted: 
 
Taipower never told local people what they are doing. They just asked their 
subcontractor company to do the investigation work. And local people found out by 
asking the workers; those workers told them they were investigating the suitability 
for nuclear waste repository. Taipower just do what they want and never tell local 
people the truth. (Interviewee D6 -interviewed on 17 September.) 
 
The lack of transparency in the initial stages of investigation of the suitability of the 
Da-Ren site had potentially serious consequences, according to a local geologist who 
claimed that the suitability of the site was not investigated properly by Taipower’s 
survey work:   
 
From mine and other scholar’s report, we believe this area is very unstable and has 
lots of earthquakes each year…..this area would never be chosen as a site for a 
nuclear repository because of the earthquakes. Also, the active geological 
movement would cause the leak of nuclear waste into the sea and soil…..I 
suspected that Taipower’s survey had already presumed that Da-Ren is the site 
before they published their report! (Interviewee D11- interviewed on 24 
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September 2009.) 
 
Interviewees held that Taipower’s communications policy was deliberately opaque to 
confuse the public and obfuscate the issue through the use of technical language. For 
example, Interviewee D4 reported that:  
 
Taipower and government never mention the term ‘Nuclear Waste’. Instead, they 
use the term ‘Low Level Radioactive Waste’. They tried to use this very technical 
term to fool people.  I’ve asked them what ‘Low Level Radioactive Waste’ is. They 
said they are some tools, clothes, and gloves which people use in the nuclear power 
stations. (Interviewee D4- interviewed on 16 September 2009.) 
 
Similarly, Interviewee D18 said: 
 
They changed the term ‘nuclear waste’ to ‘Low Level Radioactive Waste’. I asked 
them what LLW is, they told me they are the clothes and gloves from people work in 
the nuclear power plants. But I don’t think it is as simple as that. Even if it is low 
level radioactive waste, the radiation could still exist for hundreds of years causing 
health risks to the human body. LLW is just a misleading term in order to minimise 
people’s worry because it is ‘low’ level. (Interviewee D18- interviewed on 1 
October 2009.) 
 
Interviewees also accused Taipower of misleading the people by producing 
misinformation about tourism. For example, Interviewee D23 said: 
 
Taipower claimed that people would come to visit the nuclear waste repository. 
Some local people do believe Taipower’s argument. But from the experience of Lan 
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Yu [Orchid Island], no one who goes to Lan Yu [Orchid Island] would like to visit 
the nuclear waste site. We want more people to come to visit us and bring the money 
in but once you host nuclear waste who will come to visit this place? It is wrong to 
promote tourism and also accept nuclear waste. (Interviewee D23 - interviewed on 6 
October 2009.) 
 
Similarly, Interviewee D20 argued: 
 
Taipower told our villagers that like in Japan or Korea, the repository would 
generate more tourists to visit our place. But is that true? Would people come to visit 
a nuclear waste repository for fun? I doubt it very much. (Interviewee D20- 
interviewed on 1 October 2009.) 
   
The second theme of procedural environmental injustice – lack of opportunity for the 
people to discuss the issues of nuclear waste storage with Taipower and the government 
- is illustrated by interviewees both in Penghu and Taitung, emphasising inadequate 
consultation in the siting process. For example, Interviewee W1 reported: 
 
I don’t think there is any consultation in the process and they just published their 
decision on their website. They never come to ask us any question. (Interviewee W1 
- interviewed on 10 September 2009.) 
 
Similarly, in Taitung, Interviewee D15 said: 
 
I don’t think there is any consultation. They never asked our opinion. And there’s no 
discussion with Taipower. (Interviewee D15 - interviewed on 29 September 2009.) 
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Opponents of nuclear waste in Taitung and Penghu accused the government of merely 
publicising their decision to nominate two potential sites on their website. They felt that 
their opinions were not heard and there was no discussion with Taipower. Although 
interviewees did report some meetings with Taipower officials, they pointed out that 
they were merely one-sided presentations designed by Taipower to tell people how safe 
nuclear waste was and how a nuclear waste repository would benefit the local 
community. For example, interviewee D22 reported that: 
 
…..the local village leader asked us to get together for a meeting… Taipower’s 
officials were there. They gave a talk about the safety and cleanness of nuclear 
waste. They also advertised the benefits of accepting nuclear waste. (Interviewee 
D22- interviewed on 5 October 2009.) 
 
Another interviewee, D16 said:   
 
Taipower asked village leaders to get us together…  the time we were there, 
Taipower officials started to talk about how clean and safe the nuclear waste is and 
that we will all get free health care, free school fees for kids, free utility bills and all 
the infrastructures in the town will be well-maintained by the government. They also 
showed us a film that a nuclear waste repository in Japan has generated lots of 
tourists to visit local villages and that their most famous agricultural product – 
apples - were not affected by the nuclear waste and are still very popular around the 
world. So Taipower said to us that the nuclear waste would not only benefit local 
people but bring tourism to the communities. (Interviewee D16 -interviewed on 29 
September 2009.) 
 
Interviewee D5 shared his similar experience of local meetings:  
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There were many time that we heard our village leader asking us to attend a village 
meeting. We went there and thought maybe there is something that our villagers 
have to discuss. But when we got there, Taipower’s employees showed us a film 
about the safety and cleanness of nuclear waste in Japan and Korea. After the film, 
they asked us some quiz from the film and nuclear waste, if we answered the quiz 
correctly, we got some prize (such as a pack of rice or some cakes) for it. And after 
the meeting, all of us got a torch as a gift. (Interviewee D5- interviewed on 16 
September 2009.) 
 
So the interviewees saw the consultative exercises conducted by Taipower as strategic, 
manipulative and dishonest. Taipower’s intention was not to provide clear information 
on which local people could make an informed decision, nor to engage in a meaningful 
consultation or dialogue with local people, but to present unconvincing reassurances 
about safety and tourism benefits. For example, Interviewee D15 reported that:  
 
They don’t give us opportunity to discuss this issue with them. Each time they come 
to us is just to say how clean and safe the nuclear waste it is and how it would bring 
benefit and money to local people and communities. (Interviewee D15- interviewed 
on 29 September 2009.) 
 
Similarly, Interviewee D22 reported that: 
 
They didn’t give us opportunity to express our views thoroughly. They only told us 
how safe it is and gave us torches or rice as gifts for attending the 
meeting…..(Interviewee D22-interviewed on 5 October 2009). 
 
According to interviewees, therefore, Taipower’s attitude was only to talk about the 
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benefit of nuclear waste for local communities: they never talked about the dangers of 
nuclear waste. The information provided by Taipower was a one-sided story that 
‘nuclear waste is safe and clean and good for local communities’.   
 
The third theme of procedural environmental injustice – exclusion from the 
decision-making process – has two elements – one exemplified by the proposed 
referendum, and the other exemplified by the public hearing. On the proposed 
referendum, the central issue was who would be included and who excluded from 
taking part in it. Many interviewees raised the issue of scale with regard to the 
boundaries for the proposed referendum. For example, Interviewee D1 said: 
 
It is not fair that the referendum should be held within the [Taitung] County because 
the site in Da-Ren is located on the border between Taitung County and Pingtung 
County. The government should draw up an area which would be potentially 
affected by hosting the nuclear waste. And people in this area could have a 
referendum. (Interviewee D1-interviewed on 11 September 2009.) 
 
Similarly, Interviewee D13 said: 
 
The fact is that Da-Ren is just beside Mu-Dan which is in Pingtung County. It is not 
fair that those who live about 60km from Da-Ren but in Taitung County have the 
right to vote, but people who live in Mu-Dan, a town just nearby have no right to 
vote because Mu-Dan is in a different county. (Interviewee D13 - interviewed on 25 
September 2009.) 
 
Similarly, in Penghu, Interviewee W2 said:  
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Dungji is about 20 nautical miles from Tainan City(台南市) and 26 nautical miles 
from Penghu Main Island. I think the government should draw up an area and 
people in this area would have a referendum on this issue because if Dungji hosts 
nuclear waste, these places would be affected too. (Interviewee W2 - interviewed on 
15 September 2009) 
 
Another issue about the referendum that was raised by interviewees was anxiety that 
Taipower would bribe electors to vote in favour of nuclear waste storage. For example, 
Interviewee D1 said:  
 
In any election in Taiwan, if candidates give people any gift worth more than NTD$ 
30 (approx. £0. 60), this candidate would be charged with bribery. But there is no 
such a law to regulate referendums like this. People told us that Taipower gave local 
people rice and torches in order to ask them to vote for accepting nuclear waste. It is 
bribery. Taipower is playing in this grey area of law and we will try to sue Taipower 
when the referendum is about to take place…..(Interviewee D1 - interviewed on 11 
September 2009) 
 
More general anxieties about lack of fairness in the referendum were expressed by 
Interviewee D22:  
 
Is this referendum fair? Taipower only tell us how good follows from accepting 
nuclear waste and using anything they could to bribe local people. When there is no 
consultation, and people do not have a chance to express their views about this issue, 
is this referendum a fair one? (Interviewee D22 -interviewed 5 October 2009.) 
 
One interviewee raised another issue about the exclusionist nature of the referendum, 
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questioning the idea of majority rule determining the outcome:  
 
In our Paiwan culture, there is no such a thing as majority rule. Every issue related 
to our tribe would only be decided when all members of our tribe are agreed. So if 
Taipower would like us to accept nuclear waste in our land, they would have to have 
the permission from everyone in the whole Daren Town.--- (Interviewee D17 
-interviewed on 30 September) 
 
For the Paiwan tribe, decisions should be consensual not majoritarian – i.e. inclusive of 
everyone, not exclusive to the majority.  
 
With regard to the second element of the third theme of exclusion from 
decision-making – the public hearing – the central issue here was about the 
meaningfulness and fairness of the one public hearing that took place. The public 
hearing was held in Taitung County Council on 17 April 2009, as a result of the demand 
by local people and environmental groups in the protest against nuclear waste repository 
after the government announcement on 17 March 2009. In this protest, local people and 
environmental groups handed a petition to Taitung County Council asking for a public 
hearing on the decision. The leader of Taitung County Council organised the public 
hearing, which Taipower officials, local people, environmental groups, Taitung County 
Councillors and the leader of Taitung County Council attended. However, during the 
public hearing, two members of the Taitung Branch of Taiwan Environmental Protection 
Group were arrested by the police, accused of disturbing the meeting, and taken to a 
remote place to prevent them expressing themselves at the public hearing, releasing 
them two hours later when the meeting had ended. The two people expressed their anger 
at being excluded from the public hearing. Interviewee D24 said   
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I was taken by the police when I was attending the public hearing which is held in 
the Taitung City Council. They (the police) accused me of disturbing the public 
hearing but I had not said a word. I just held up a banner which stated ‘Anti-nuclear 
waste! That is bad for our good health’. The police took me into their car and took 
me to a very remote place then released me. (Interviewee D24-interviewed on 6 
October 2009.) 
 
Interviewee D3 said:  
 
We were taken to by the police from the public hearing. They took us to a very 
remote police station and held us there for about two hours. They intended to not let 
us to speak in the public hearing. (Interviewee D3- interviewed on 15 September 
2009.) 
 
Opponents of nuclear waste thought that the public hearing was potentially a real 
chance to express themselves. But when the two members of the environmental group 
were taken away by the police, it raised questions in the minds of the opponents of 
nuclear waste about the meaningfulness and fairness of the public hearing. They were 
not convinced that Taipower genuinely wanted to communicate with them. Some 
interviewees pointed out that Taipower did not respond to their demands. For example, 
Interviewee D15 said:  
 
the only chance [for discussion] was in April 2009, the public hearing held by 
Taitung County Council. We expressed our views but Taipower just responded by 
saying that they will take these suggestions back and think about it. (Interviewee 
D15 - interviewed on 29 September 2009.) 
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The fourth theme of procedural environmental injustice - asymmetry of power between 
the people and Taipower/government – was illustrated by the referendum; by 
Taipower’s general system of incentivisation (or bribes); and by its hegemonic 
pro-nuclear waste storage discourse. The Executive of Paiwan Anti-Nuclear Waste 
Union claimed that the referendum was unfair because there was not a level playing 
field between the pro- and anti- forces:  
 
It is not a fair competition between government and our anti-nuclear waste group. 
They didn’t inform us in the beginning and there is no consultation. …. All they 
want us to do is to vote yes for the nuclear waste in the referendum. It is not a fair 
competition. (Interviewee D5-interviewed on 16 September 2009.) 
 
Interviewees portrayed the referendum as a ‘David and Goliath’ struggle between two 
sides with very unequal power and resources: Taipower and the state on the one hand, 
versus local people on the other. For example, a minister from Paiwai Presby of the 
Presbyterian Church in Taiwan argued that:  
 
When the government is using all its resources to ask you to accept this, it is really 
difficult to fight against it. We have no money, no resources, and no power. It is so 
difficult to compete with the government and Taipower. They do their best by using 
all their resources to try to persuade people in our communities to accept it but we 
will fight to the end. (Interviewee D21- interviewed on 2 October 2009.) 
 
Similarly, Interviewee D5 said that:  
 
We don’t have power and we don’t have money. It’s so difficult to organise this 
protest. We need money to organise protests - we need money to hire a coach taking 
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us to Taitung city. What we can do is only to visit our people to tell them about the 
danger of nuclear waste and the outcome of accepting nuclear waste. But compared 
to Taipower we have so little resources. (Interviewee D5 - interviewed on 16 
September 2009) 
 
This asymmetry in power between Taipower/government and people on the referendum 
was symptomatic of a more general asymmetry, illustrated by interviewees’ claims that 
Taipower coerced poor people by routinely offering them economic inducements to 
accept nuclear waste in their areas. For example, a member of Taitung Branch of Taiwan 
Environmental Protection Union reported that Taipower offered to sponsor events in 
Taitung County in order to persuade people to support nuclear waste siting: 
 
For any event in Taitung, you can ask for funding from Taipower. They will give 
you NTD$ 20,000 (approx £400) but you have to let them hang the banner of ‘‘LLW 
is Clean and Safe’ and let them take a photo of this banner in this event. 
(Interviewee D8- interviewed on 22 September 2009.) 
 
Interviewees explained that Taipower would pay for the expenses of the harvest 
festival41 for aboriginal tribes in Taitung, For example, Interviewee D17 said: 
 
During the harvest festival season, Taipower representatives approached us to offer 
to pay the expenses. They said they can provide food, drink, and money for the 
event and the only demand from them is to let them hang the banner of ‘LLW is 
Clean and Safe’ and let them take a photo of this banner in this event. (Interviewee 
                                                 
41
 Harvest festival is the most important event for Taiwan’s aboriginal people - their New Year 
celebrations. Each tribe has a different time for their harvest festival according to where they live. The 
celebration includes traditional dance as well as food (mainly pork from whole pigs) and drinks. It can 
last for up to seven days.  
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D17 - interviewed 30 September 2009.) 
 
Interviewees also told of Taipower offering trips to local people in order to make them 
accept nuclear waste. For example Interviewee D23: 
 
Taipower offered local people a trip…. Some people did not know the trip was 
organised by Taipower in the first place. They only realised after they went to visit 
the nuclear power station and Taipower officials explained to them the benefit of 
accepting nuclear waste. On joining the trip, for insurance purposes they would ask 
people to sign their names, addresses, and ID number. Taipower then used these data 
to know where those who were against nuclear waste lived and go to visit them 
regularly. Also, Taipower has taken local township mayors and local representatives 
to Japan and Koran to visit nuclear waste repositories. (Interviewee D23- 
interviewed on 6 October 2009.) 
 
This practice was confirmed by Interviewee D17: 
 
Taipower had offered local people free trips… We did join the tour …before coming 
home; they took us to the No.3 Nuclear Power Plant. At there, Taipower’s 
employees told us how safe the nuclear waste is… briefing us about the benefits we 
would get from accepting nuclear waste. (Interviewee D17 - interviewed on 30 
September 2009.) 
 
The asymmetry of power between Taipower/government and the people was also 
illustrated by the hegemonic dominance of the discourse used by the former. For 
example, interviewees drew attention to the way that Taipower and the government used 
their superior intellectual and scientific resources to overwhelm the people who had less 
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educational advantage.  
 
In the law, it stated ‘Low Level Radioactive Waste’, who knows what this is? The 
government and Taipower just use this term of LLW to mislead people…..because 
they thought ‘Low Level’ would decrease people’s worries. Most of our local people 
are not very well-educated; they don’t really know what LLW is. But they 
understand that nuclear waste is not a good thing from Lan Yu [Orchid Island]’s 
experience. (Interviewee D12 -interviewed on 25 September 2009.)      
 
Some interviewees claimed that this terminology policy was adopted by Taipower and 
the government because they knew that local people had relatively low levels of 
education.  
 
The fifth theme of procedural injustice raised by interviewees was the murky 
relationship between Taipower and local politicians. Indeed, several interviewees 
explicitly linked Taipower with corruption in local politics, suggesting that local 
politicians, representatives, and opinion leaders were bribed by Taipower. For example, 
Interviewee D1 said:  
 
Taipower asked the local politicians to negotiate with local people. The current 
Da-Ren Township Mayor, Mr. Chang was elected because he discovered that some 
money from Taipower was transferred into the hands of the former Township mayor, 
Mr. Pao’s wife, and people believed that Mr. Pao was bribed by Taipower42. Mr. 
Chang was elected in 2004 but now Mr Chang’s son works for Taipower in Da-Ren 
as a negotiator. (Interviewee D1 - interviewed on 11 September 2009.) 
                                                 
42
 Interestingly, Mr. Pao subsequently stood as a Township Mayor candidate in March 2010, attacking Mr. 
Chang’s pro-nuclear waste position, and he was successfully re-elected. 
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Similarly, Interviewee D14 said: 
 
Taipower started to persuade local politicians and local representatives, and opinion 
leaders. … I suspect the local Township mayor has been bribed by Taipower. He 
supports the acceptance of nuclear waste in this township and his son works for 
Taipower in the village to negotiate with people who are against dumping nuclear 
waste in our town. (Interviewee D14 - interviewed on 25 September 2009) 
 
This was recognition that local leaders were important opinion-shapers, making them 
obvious targets for Taipower. Several interviewees reported the changed position 
adopted by the township mayor, and raised questions about his motivations. For 
instance, Interviewee D25 said: 
 
Taipower…knows we would listen to our local representatives, local village leaders, 
or Township mayor. They made these local politicians agree to host nuclear waste 
and asked them to persuade local people. …Da-Ren Township Mayor’s son works 
for Taipower to negotiate with local people. The Township Mayor was elected in 
2004 because of his anti-nuclear waste position, but now he’s on the same side as 
Taipower. (Interviewee D25 - interviewed on 7 October 2009.) 
 
Also, Interviewee D18 claimed that politicians switched their positions on the nuclear 
waste issue after they got elected:  
 
Politicians are only against nuclear waste when there is an election coming. Four 
years ago, the current township mayor signed an agreement with the Taitung Branch 
of Taiwan Environmental Protection Union that when he got elected he would be 
against nuclear waste. He got elected because the former Da-Ren Township Mayor, 
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Mr. Bao, was discovered to have corrupt dealings with Taipower, but since Mr. 
Chang got elected, he’s become pro- nuclear waste and his son works for Taipower. 
(Interviewee D18 -interviewed on 1 October 2009.) 
 
The perception of corrupt local politicians was more pronounced among interviewees 
from Taitung County than from Penghu County. For example, Interviewee D3 argued: 
 
We feel very frustrated because in Penghu from the County mayor, Township mayor, 
and local village leaders all are strongly against dumping nuclear waste in their land, 
but in Taitung our local politicians are not against it but in favour of it. Our voice is 
relatively weak. But if some more high-profile politicians would stand up against 
nuclear waste, we will have a better chance to say no to nuclear waste. (Interviewee 
D3 - interviewed on 15 September 2009.) 
 
We have observed that the local opponents of a nuclear waste repository raised many 
issues of distributive and procedural injustice. We have also discovered that many 
interviewees link these issues of ‘nuclear waste justice’ to broader, more general issues 
of economic, political and cultural injustice, which can be seen as underlying issues in 
Taiwan. In the next three sections, these more fundamental issues of economic, political, 
and cultural injustice touched on by the interviewees are discussed.  
 
7.4. Economic Injustice 
 
In chapter four we saw how Taiwan enjoyed prodigious levels of economic growth until 
2000. However, the gap between richest and poorest 20 percent of the population 
widened to its peak (6.39 times) during 2001(see table 4.12). In 2009, this gap was still 
at its second highest level (6.34 times). This is evidence of economic injustice in Taiwan. 
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From the data in table 6.7, Wang-An was ranked 179 among 359 district/townships in 
Taiwan in terms of income, and Da-Ren ranked even lower, 341 among the, 359 
district/townships in Taiwan, Da-Ren was one of the poorest townships in Taiwan, in 
which local  people only earned one-third of the income of the richest township/district 
in Taiwan. Table 6.8 also shows that people in Taitung and Penghu earned only 60 to 70 
percent of the average income of people in Taiwan. Da-Ren and Wang-An were clearly 
among those communities which are most economically disadvantaged in the country, 
which helps to explain their vulnerability for hosting nuclear waste in order to get 
compensation money. 
  
Several interviewees point to the lack of resources held by the aboriginal community 
and, therefore, the relative weakness of their position. They emphasise the poverty of 
their local communities and the attractiveness of potential ‘compensation’ payments for 
storing nuclear waste. For example, Interviewee D2 said: 
 
Because Taitung is the poorest county in the whole of Taiwan, so the government 
thinks it is easy for them just to use money to exchange Taitung people’s willingness 
for hosting nuclear waste. (Interviewee D2- interviewed on 15 September 2009.) 
 
Similarly, Interviewee D14 said:  
 
They think we are easy to buy out: just give us some money and we would accept 
nuclear waste. Some people are attracted by the money, and I don’t blame them but I 
worry about the situation if more and more people are attracted by those 
compensations. (Interviewee D14 - interviewed on 25 September 2009.) 
 
Some interviewees acknowledged how seductive the promises of compensation were to 
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poor people:  
 
Those free health care, free utility bill, free school fees, and all the compensation are 
really attractive. These do make lots of people in favour of nuclear waste because 
some of our aboriginal people are really poor. (Interviewee D 25 - interviewed on 7 
October 2009)  
 
However, other interviewees were sceptical about how much compensation would 
actually be given. For example, Interviewee D21 stated that: 
 
Taipower told us after we accept the nuclear waste; we will get NT $5 billions. It is 
very attractive. But in fact, do we know how this money will actually be given to us 
or not? It is an impractical dream for our local people. How much can we really get? 
We don’t know. (Interviewee D21 - interviewed on 2 October 2009.) 
 
Interviewee D10 questioned: 
 
How do they distribute the money?43: In the Act it is stated that there are NTD$5 
billion for the compensation but we don’t know how this money will be used? How 
much of it will actually go into people’s pocket? (Interviewee D10 -interviewed on 
                                                 
43
 Act on Sites for Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Facility 2006, Taipei: 
Executive Yuan. Article 4 
Act on Sites for Establishment of Low Level Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Facility: Article 12  
In order to advance the work of selecting the site of disposal facility, the implementing authority may 
allocate outlay from the Nuclear Backend Management Fund as feedback subsidies. 
The total amount of feedback subsidies referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be calculated at the 
present value of the time when the site of disposal facility is approved by the Executive Yuan, and must 
be no more than NT $5 billions. The distribution of the feedback subsidies is as follows: 
1. No less than 40% to the township (city) in which the site of disposal facility is located. 
2. No less than 30% to all the townships (cities) nearby the site of disposal facility; in absence of such 
nearby township (city), 15% more to each of the township (city) and the county (city) in which the 
site of disposal facility is located. 
3. No less than 20% to the county (city) in which the site of disposal facility is located.  
The implementing authority shall lay down other regulations on the use of feedback subsidies. 
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23 September 2009.) 
 
Likewise, Interviewee D5 said:  
 
Taipower told us that when once we accept the nuclear waste, we will get the money, 
free health care, free utility bills and so on and on. It gave local people an 
impractical dream. (Interviewee D5 - interviewed on 16 September 2009.) 
 
Another interviewee (D16) noted that the experience of Lan Yu (Orchid Island) was not 
encouraging:  
 
See Lan Yu [Orchid Island], they have hosted nuclear waste for more than 20 years, 
yet they only got NTD $60,000 (approx £1,200) ever since. (Interviewee D16 - 
interviewed on 29 September 2009.) 
 
In these statements, there was a common feeling that Taipower and the government 
were seeking to exploit economic inequality, and in particular, the poverty of the local 
community. For some, this was a clear case of bribery which was grounded in a lack of 
respect. For example, Interviewee D16 said:  
 
Because our aboriginal people are poor, the quality of living is lower. So they try to 
use money to bribe us to exchange for hosting nuclear waste. I am disgusted by this 
attitude from Taipower. They look down us and think we are easy to bribe. 
(Interviewee D16 - interviewed on 29 September 2009.) 
 
Interviewee D25 warned that residents would be giving away much more than they 
would be compensated for: 
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The NT $5 billions is really attractive. But have people really thought about it? Why 
do they want to give you this money? There’s no free lunch. We exchange our land, 
our environment, and our health and also our future generation’s health for this 
money. (Interviewee D25 - interviewed on 7 October 2009.) 
 
Interviewee D14 expressed disgust at this exploitative strategy:  
 
That compensation did make lots of people in favour of accepting nuclear waste. 
The government and Taipower used this strategy to buy us off. I am disgusted by 
this strategy from Taipower and the government. (Interviewee D14 - interviewed on 
25 September 2009.) 
 
To sum up this section, background economic inequality and poverty provides a context 
in which Taipower’s offer to pay compensation in return for agreeing to host nuclear 
waste is seen as exploitative. It takes advantage of the economic weaknesses of people 
in the local community by offering them a deal that they would not accept if their 
circumstances were better.   
 
7. 5 Political injustice 
 
Political inequality also contributes to the vulnerability to hosting nuclear waste of local 
communities in Da-Ren and Wang-An. The experience of Orchid Island (Lan Yu) was 
clear evidence that the decision making on the issue of nuclear waste excluded the 
members of local communities: there was no genuine public participation at all.  
Taipower provided insufficient information to local people and used very technological 
terms in the hearings or meetings which would mislead local communities. According to 
interviewees, instead of giving local people an opportunity to express their ideas about 
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nuclear waste, Taipower tried to corrupt local politicians in exchange for their 
acceptance of nuclear waste repository.   
 
The interviewees’ concerns about procedural injustice reflected more general concerns 
about political injustice. In other words, the procedural injustice they experienced in the 
nuclear waste dispute was symptomatic of a wider form of political inequality they had 
always suffered in the country. Many interviewees believed that their voice was not 
heard in the politics of Taiwan. For example, Interviewee D15 complained that: 
 
Our aboriginal people….Our voice is relatively weak and has never been really 
heard by the government. .. (Interviewee D15 - interviewed on 25 September) 
 
Similarly, Interviewee D5 remarked that:  
 
This is the sorrow for our aboriginal people. We are always the last to be considered. 
Our voice is always neglected. We voted for our government but they never really 
do anything good for our aboriginal people. (Interviewee D5 - interviewed on 16 
September 2009.) 
 
Some opponents of nuclear waste perceived a lack of freedom of speech and media in 
Taitung, claiming that Taipower exerted undue influence on local TV and radio stations 
through financing programmes in order to promote nuclear waste and to minimise the 
voice of opposition. For example, Interviewee D6 talked about his appearance on a 
radio programme: 
 
I was once invited to a radio programme to talk about nuclear waste. There were 
three people…in the programme, one Taipower official, one medical doctor and me. 
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I was always the last one to talk before the commercial break, and at the end of the 
show the Taipower official even gave us money. This programme that I thought was 
neutral, was actually organised and financed by Taipower. (Interviewee D6 - 
interviewed on 17 September 2009.) 
 
Interviewee D1 spoke of his similar experience on a TV programme: 
 
Once I was interviewed by a local TV station during a protest against nuclear waste. 
But when I watched the news report, I saw that the images and voices of all the 
Taipower officials and government officials were broadcasted, but for my 
part…what I said in the interview was cut off….Iinterviewee D1 Chairman of 
Taitung Branch, Taiwan Environmental Protection Union- interviewed on 11 
September 2009.) 
 
The two protesters who were ejected from the public hearing on 17 April 2009 accused 
the government of violating their basic human rights of freedom of expression and 
speech. The hosting of nuclear waste in Taitung was very much in the hands of 
Taipower and the government, and they had the money and resources to minimise the 
voice of opposition. But when the police also acted to help curb the freedom of speech 
and expression of the opponents of nuclear waste in Taitung, this showed how 
powerless local people were in Taiwan. 
 
Some opponents of nuclear waste storage accused the government of a breach of the 
Indigenous Peoples Basic Law4445 by choosing Da-Ren as a potential site. For example, 
                                                 
44
 The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law 2005, Taipei: Executive Yuan.  
The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law approved by the Legislative Yuan and promulgated in February 2005 
which was influenced by the U.N. declaration. It could be recognised as a landmark document that 
declared that indigenous peoples "have the right to self-determination" and "by virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."  
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Interviewee D16 claimed that:  
 
Building a nuclear waste repository in Da-Ren has broken the ‘Indigenous Peoples 
Basic Law’. They didn’t have the consent from us. The Law is established by the 
government and now the government can do whatever they want. We are very 
disappointed and feel we are being neglected. (Interviewee D16 - interviewed on 29 
September 2009.) 
 
Likewise, Interviewee D20 said that: 
 
The government breaks the law by choosing us as a potential site. We feel we are 
being cheated. The law is what they established so they can’t do whatever they want. 
But we don’t trust the government anymore. (Interviewee D20- interviewed on 1 
October 2009.) 
 
7.6 Cultural injustice 
 
Behind much of the animus felt by indigenous residents against the economic and 
political injustice of siting a nuclear waste repository in their areas was a sense of 
cultural injustice. For example, the reaction of some interviewees to Taipower’s promise 
of compensation was regarded as a cultural slap in the face. As one interviewee argued, 
                                                                                                                                               
http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=1284019&lang=eng_news, 17 June 2010. 
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 The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law 2005, Taipei: Executive Yuan. Available at: 
http://www.apc.gov.tw/main/docDetail/detail_official.jsp?isSearch=&docid=PA000000001795&linkSelf=
231&linkRoot=231&linkParent=231&url=, 17 June 2010. 
 
Article 31  
The government may not store toxic materials in indigenous peoples’ regions  contrary to the will of 
indigenous peoples. 
 
Article 32  
the government may not forcefully evict indigenous persons from their land, except in the case of 
imminent and obvious danger. 
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the idea of an exchange of money for hosting nuclear waste reflected a lack of cultural 
understanding and respect: 
 
A Taipower official once said to me: “why don’t you just sell your land to us? We 
give you a good price then you can move out”. They don’t understand us. They 
don’t understand our aboriginal people always have a very strong connection with 
the land we live. They don’t respect and don’t understand our culture. They look 
down on us. Because we are poorer than other part of the country so they think it is 
easy to use money or compensation to buy us out….After all, we all would like to 
live in or near our native land. (Interviewee D25- interviewed 7 October 2009.) 
 
The Paiwan people in Da-Ren felt that Taipower and the government were ignorant of 
the relationship between their land and their culture. Taipower and government took the 
view that because they could give residents compensation, the residents could move 
away from the nuclear waste if they thought nuclear waste was dangerous. But such a 
view overlooks differences between different cultures: the Paiwan people saw nuclear 
waste as an issue about ethnic survival - about their well-being and the well-being of 
future generations on the land which they have been farming, fishing, and living for 
centuries.   
 
The Paiwan interviewees constantly emphasised the importance of their culture: they 
clearly understood themselves in terms of their tribal identity, i.e., primarily as 
indigenous Paiwan people rather than as Taiwanese. This tribal identity informs their 
values and how they believe that others see them and why others discriminate against 
them. Many of them felt hurt by Taipower’s and the government’s lack of respect for, 
and understanding of, their culture during the siting process. They were particularly 
sensitive to ignorance of their primal relationship with their land, as Interviewee D25 
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noted:  
 
A Taipower official once said to me: “why don’t you just sell your land to us? We 
give you a good price then you can move out”. They don’t understand us. They 
don’t understand that we aboriginal people always have a very strong connection 
with the land where we live. They don’t respect and don’t understand our culture. 
(interviewee D25 - interviewed on 7 October 2009.) 
 
Similarly, Interviewee D15 pointed out that:  
 
When our lands are all contaminated by the nuclear waste, we can only move to 
other places. But we aboriginals have a very strong relationship with our land. Our 
culture, our living is very much related to our land. Taipower don’t understand our 
culture they just want us to accept the nuclear waste……(Interviewee D15- 
interviewed 29 September 2009). 
 
Interviewee D25 explained that: 
 
The site in Da-Ren is actually situated in the middle of an ancient trackway called 
Alanyi. This ancient trackway was the causeway which our ancestors communicate 
with the outside world. It has a very significant cultural, historical, and biological 
value. Once we accept the nuclear waste, the government would build a road on it in 
order to transport the radioactive waste, which will totally destroy our culture and 
history. (Interviewee D25 - interviewed on 7 October 2009.) 
 
Interviewee D13 affirmed that: 
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We Paiwan people have been fishing and farming in this land for generations. This 
is not our land but our ancestors’ land. This is the land that feeds us Paiwan people. 
Nuclear waste is an evil thing as the Lan Yu [Orchid Island] people have described. 
(Interviewee D13 - interviewed on 25 September 2009) 
 
For some interviewees, the very survival of the culture and the people was at stake if 
nuclear waste came to their land. For example, Interviewee D21 said: 
 
If we accept these nuclear waste, all our people would suffer from the health risk of 
radioactivity. Not only that, our farm, our fish would all be contaminated. It is an 
issue of our survival. The government name us as a potential site…  just like to kill 
us and try to demolish the whole race. ( Interviewee D21 - interviewed on 2 October 
2009.) 
 
Similarly, Interviewee D17 argued:  
 
If we accept nuclear waste, our culture will be gone; our tribe will not exist anymore. 
It is damage to our culture. Why they always choose the aboriginal land?  ... They 
don’t respect us, and our culture. (Interviewee D17 - interviewed on 30 September 
2009.) 
 
For one interviewee, agreeing to host nuclear waste would be ‘selling our land and our 
soul’. Future generations of the community would rightly be mocked for the actions of 
their ancestors who sold them out. This claim reflects the importance of the idea in the 
minds of tribal respondents of a transgenerational cultural community.   
 
If we accept nuclear waste, it is not only us but also our descendents who will suffer. 
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People will laugh at our descendents that it was your ancestors who agreed to host 
the nuclear waste. We have to preserve this land for our future generations. We are 
fighting against nuclear waste not only for us but also for our future generations. We 
can’t sell our land and our soul. Nuclear waste will ruin our tribe. (Interviewee D14 
- interviewed on 25 September 2009.) 
 
Many of the interviewees were particularly critical of the government’s failure to take 
seriously the requirements of the ‘Indigenous Peoples Basic Law’ which forbids the 
siting of toxic wastes on tribal land. For example, Interviewee D19 pointed out that: 
 
‘The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law’ said that ‘The government may not store toxic 
materials in indigenous peoples’ regions contrary to the will of indigenous peoples’. 
But now if they dump nuclear waste in our place, it is against our will and violates 
the law. But this is what our government do. They established the law and they can 
break it. They do whatever they want according to their interest and don’t bother 
looking at our interests. We feel betrayed. (Interviewee D19 - interviewed on 1 
October 2009.) 
 
Another interviewee (D22) asserted that the legal status of the Indigenous Peoples Basic 
Law was as inviolate as the constitution itself: 
 
The ‘Indigenous Peoples Basic Law’ should be as superior as the constitution. The 
government asking us to host nuclear waste has already violated the Indigenous 
Peoples Basic Law. They don’t take the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law seriously. 
We are very angry about it. (Interviewee D22 -interviewed on 5 October 2009.) 
 
However, one interviewee – a specialist in Environmental Law – drew attention to 
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weaknesses in the ‘Indigenous Peoples Basic Law’.   
 
Actually this ‘Indigenous Peoples Basic Law’ is an ideal. There are lots of articles in 
it which are like basic principles. But the government have not established any 
regulations or bylaws to implement it. And also it is doubtful whether its legal status 
is superior to other laws such as ‘Act on Sites for Establishment of Low Level 
Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Facility’….. The legal status of this Indigenous 
Peoples Basic Law, in my opinion, is not clear. (Interviewee N2 - interviewed on 22 
September 2009.) 
 
As we saw earlier, one interviewee also raised questions from a cultural standpoint 
about majoritarian decision-making. So, while most interviewees argue that Taipower 
and the government failed to show respect for the indigenous people by not securing 
genuine political equality for them, such as fair political competition, this interviewee 
argued against a majoritarian understanding of political justice and democratic 
decision-making and for a consensus-based or unanimity-based view of 
decision-making. Therefore, using a majoritarian decision-making process to decide the 
result of the proposed referendum was itself seen as a form of cultural injustice.   
 
To sum up this section, much of the animus expressed by interviewees from Da-Ren 
against a nuclear waste storage repository in their community stems from their cultural 
identity as a tribe, giving them a very strong bond with their ancestral lands. The 
situation is, however, different in Wang-An, where the cultural norms are largely similar 
to the majority Chinese Han culture in Taiwan. In principle, this would suggest that 
Taipower and the government would have less difficulty in siting a nuclear waste 
repository in Wang-An than in Da-Ren. But in practice, the reverse was the case, 
because Penghu County designated the whole Wang-An Township a natural 
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conservation area in August 2009, thereby making it illegal for the government to site a 
repository there. Since siting the repository in Da-Ren Township would also be illegal 
(violating the law protecting indigenous communities), the government was forced back 
to the drawing board. This suggests that opposition groups are far from powerless after 
all.    
 
7.7 Internal conflict in local communities 
 
In addition to the wider forms of injustice generated by (and reflected in) the 
distributive and procedural environmental injustices of the government’s nuclear waste 
policy, there was also internal conflict caused within local communities. As Interviewee 
D15 said:  
 
The nuclear waste issue has caused a lot of conflicts within our communities. People 
don’t trust each other and the relation between families is not as good as it used to 
be. Because we are all relatives, for example, I am against nuclear waste but our 
village leader who is my mother’s cousin, he supports hosting nuclear waste. So one 
day last month he came to my house to blame me for not respecting the elderly. It 
made my parents very embarrassed, and I have no idea what I can do. It not only 
happened to me but also to many of my friends who are against nuclear waste in our 
town. (Interviewee D15 - interviewed on 29 September 2009.) 
 
Similarly, Interviewee D22 stated that: 
 
This nuclear waste has divided our community. People don’t trust each other and 
doubt each other’s position because they are in favour of nuclear waste or not. 
People accused others of being bribed by Taipower but on the other side, some 
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others accuse people of being against their chances to have a better life. We were a 
peaceful little village but now are divided by Taipower. (Interviewee D22 
-interviewed on 5 October 2009) 
 
Another interviewee (D20) said:  
 
I am worrying about the situation. Our community has been separated because of 
this nuclear waste issue. God told us to love each other like brothers and sisters, and 
indeed we are brothers and sisters. But because of the different positions in 
accepting nuclear waste or not, people do not trust their families as they used to. We 
are a community in which everyone is more or less related to each other biologically 
or through marriage. I see some parents accusing their sons of not respecting the 
elderly in the family and the sons are struggling. It’s a very, very difficult situation. 
(Interviewee D20 - interviewed on 1 October 2009.) 
 
Interviewee D25 talked about her experience as a teacher of being threatened by parents 
who held a different view from hers on nuclear waste:  
 
When we taught kids in school about nuclear waste, some parents came to see the 
headmaster of the school to ask him to stop teachers teaching this to kids. And 
parents even rang us to ask us not to teach their kids about nuclear waste. They 
asked us to be neutral on this issue and not stop their chance to have more money. 
(Interviewee D25 - interviewed on 7 October 2009) 
 
So the issue about nuclear waste has not only created injustice for local people, but also 
created conflict and distrust within local communities. 
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7.8 Conclusion 
 
The environmental justice framework provides a useful framework for interpreting the 
perspective of opponents to nuclear waste in the case studies. From data gathered from 
interviews, it is clear that opponents of nuclear waste feel unfairly treated in the 
decision-making process. They identified this unfairness in both the inequitable 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of nuclear energy and nuclear waste, and the 
procedural failures of decision-making, including the lack of information and 
consultation. That this sense of distributive and procedural environmental injustice was 
connected to deeper forms of economic, political, and cultural injustices, became 
evident from the interviews. Economic injustice was felt in interviewees’ experience of 
Taipower and the government exploiting the poverty which made local people 
vulnerable to offers of compensation for hosting nuclear waste. Political injustice was 
felt in interviewees’ experiences of exclusion from the nuclear waste decision-making 
process. Cultural injustice was felt in interviewees’ experiences of ethnic discrimination 
against tribal minorities in nuclear waste siting policy. Moreover, these different forms 
of injustice were inter-connected, reinforcing each other, and reflected the way in which 
interviewees felt treated by Taiwan society as a whole. They perceived their position in 
Taiwan in general to be economically marginalised, politically excluded, and culturally 
patronised. So their unjust treatment over the nuclear waste issue was seen by them as 
part of a broader pattern of injustice in the country at large, and would be unlikely to 
end until the government tackled this wider problem. Until and unless this background 
pattern of injustice was dismantled, it would continue to fuel and legitimise the unjust 
treatment of local communities on nuclear waste policy.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In this concluding chapter, there are three sections: (1) summary of the thesis’s findings; 
(2) future research directions; and (3) recommendations for policy makers  
 
8.2 Summary of the thesis’s findings 
 
This thesis is a study of the opposition to nuclear waste storage in several sites in 
Taiwan. Its most important finding is that this opposition is based on principle, not 
nimbyism (‘not in my backyard’ism). Nimbyism is the selfish response of a community 
which demands special treatment for itself that it would deny to other communities. But 
the opposition to nuclear waste storage in the sites studies in Taiwan was not based on 
selfishness: none of the interviewees wanted the waste to be sent anywhere else, but 
ideally stopped from being produced altogether, or failing that, hosted by areas that 
benefitted most from nuclear energy. In other words, the opposition was principled, not 
opportunist. It was based on two principles of environmental justice: distributive 
environmental justice and procedural environmental justice. For example, on the 
principle of distributive environmental justice, opposition to the siting of a nuclear 
waste repository in communities such as Lan Yu (Orchid Island), Wuciou, Da-Wu, 
Da-Ren and Wang-An exposed the unfair treatment meted out to residents by Taipower 
and the Taiwan government in distributing the harm of a repository (e.g. the risk of 
radio-active contamination; the loss of tourist revenue) disproportionately to 
disadvantaged areas, whilst distributing the benefits of nuclear energy (e.g. cheap and 
reliable electricity supply) disproportionately to advantaged areas (who consume more 
power). Similarly, on the principle of procedural justice, opposition to the siting policy 
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exposed the transgressions of Taipower and the government in failing to ensure that 
proper consultation processes were put in place or that stakeholder participation in 
decision-making occurred.  
 
The second most important finding of the thesis is that behind these breaches of the 
principles of distributive and procedural environmental justice over the nuclear waste 
storage siting issue – and what made those breaches possible – lay a systemic structure 
of economic, political, and cultural injustice. This structure is evident in the way that 
disadvantaged groups were denied economic opportunities, excluded from political 
decision-making, and culturally discriminated against. Until an attempt is made by the 
Taiwan government to address these wider injustices, it is unlikely that the 
environmental injustices suffered by the local communities in the nuclear waste issue 
will be removed. Evidence supporting the claim of systemic injustice comes from 
another nuclear environmental issue – the building of nuclear energy power plants.  
 
From discussion, it also provided a picture about how environ meal politics works in 
Taiwan in local and national level.  The documentary Gongliao, ‘How are you?’ (貢寮 
你好嗎) revealed that the same attitudes displayed by Taipower and the government on 
the nuclear waste issue were shown on the issues surrounding the building of the fourth 
nuclear power plant in Gongliao, a small seaside village in New Taipei County. The 
documentary started with the called the "1003 incident which occurred on 3 October 
1991 when members of local communities protested against the AEC outside the site of 
the fourth nuclear power station. Local communities held the protest because the AEC 
passed the environmental impact assessment (EIA) without the consent of local people, 
and because at the final meeting of EIA, those EIA members who opposed the building 
of the nuclear power station at Gongliao were excluded from attendance. In the protest, 
a policeman was killed and Mr.Shun-yuan Lin (林順源), who was 26 and joined the 
 257 
demonstration by chance, was sentenced to life in prison. The documentary shows how 
anti-nuclear activists remembered Lin's suffering and sent their regards to him in jail, 
and interviews of local anti-nuclear activists described the local anti-nuclear campaign 
and local people’s struggle against suppression from the government and betrayal by 
politicians. In 1993, a local referendum showed that 96 per cent of local people opposed 
building a nuclear power plant at Gongliao but the KMT government still decided to go 
ahead. In 1999, the government banned fishing activities at Gongliao, again without the 
consent of local people. The members of local communities asked Taipower to 
investigate the site together, and although Taipower agreed, it failed to provide a map of 
the site and delayed the process. Local people felt that the whole process of fighting 
against the nuclear power plant was a David and Goliath struggle. Evidence from this 
documentary on nuclear power plan siting thus shows that there are many similarities 
with the siting of nuclear waste repositories, in that in both cases, Taipower and 
government see nuclear issues as state secrets; do not provide accurate information to 
local people; duplicitly ignored local people’s opinion; and marginalised the local 
communities.  
 
So injustice seems systemic throughout the nuclear industry in Taiwan. But is it 
systemic in other policy areas? One policy area where it is claimed that public 
participation and consultation works better than in the nuclear industry is health 
insurance, where reforms took place during the 1980s. However, this reform process 
was pretty much a top-down approach, and the little public participation/consultation 
that did occur was probably because health insurance reform was not as controversial as 
nuclear waste and plant siting, since it aimed to redistribute medical resources and to 
make society more equal, whereas nuclear waste and plant siting threatened to create a 
more unequal distribution of risks.  
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The third finding is that there are few signs that the Taiwanese government and 
Taipower have responded to the above demands for environmental justice. It is true that 
national legislation has been passed to provide a legal basis for the siting of nuclear 
waste repositories which includes mandatory referendums on potential site selection, 
and that this should contribute to the democratisation on the policy making in the 
nuclear environmental field in Taiwan. It is also true that the change of ruling parties in 
Taiwan in 2000 and 2008 seemed to promise greater sensitivity to these issues. 
Furthermore, it is true that Taipower has realised that keeping the whole process of 
siting nuclear waste repository secret is impossible because Taiwan has become a more 
democratic and open society. Accordingly, Taipower now hires local people as 
negotiators, which it hopes will facilitate public acceptance of its plans. However, 
Taipower still does not completely share information about nuclear waste with local 
communities and still tries to buy off local communities with support for local events, 
trips, and other material benefits, especially for local opinion leaders, and local people 
claim that this strategy continues to divide the local communities. This suggests that the 
legacy of authoritarian rule in Taiwan is still heavily existent in Taipower‘s company 
culture. Moreover, political corruption is still rife in Taiwan, especially at the local level, 
and this could affect future referendums in local communities on siting plans for nuclear 
waste. This situation is more clearly evident in Da-Ren, where in Paiwan culture chiefs 
are respected by their people, have higher social status, and are very influential in issues 
affecting land use. Generally, people who campaign for township mayoral elections are 
from the chief’s clans, so when the township mayors are corrupted by the government 
or Taipower, they promote acceptance of nuclear waste repositories and strongly 
influence the result of local referendums. 
 
The fourth finding is the crucial role played by environmental non-governmental 
organisations (ENGOs) in this dispute. A distinction must be drawn between 
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Taipei-based ENGOs and local anti-nuclear waste groups. Taipei-based ENGOs have 
generally been established by intellectuals who are concerned about a range of 
environmental issues, including nuclear waste, and they usually have more resources 
which can enable them to conduct surveys and provide education on environmental 
issues for members of the public. By contrast, local anti-nuclear waste groups are 
formed by members of local communities who have personally suffered (or potentially 
would suffer) from the unequal distribution of risk from dumping nuclear waste, and 
they often have very limited resources which makes it very difficult to compete with the 
government and Taipower. The support given by Taipei-based ENGOs to local 
anti-nuclear waste groups was invaluable in educating local communities about nuclear 
waste, providing information to the public, and developing campaign strategies for the 
local groups. For example, it was the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU) 
that first discovered the existence of nuclear waste dumping at Lan Yu, and used this 
finding to educate the Lan Yu people about nuclear waste. 
  
The fifth finding is that Taiwan can learn many lessons from other countries in how to 
deal with its nuclear waste siting problem. In particular, it can learn from Sweden, the 
USA and Canada. From Sweden, Taiwan can learn how to engage the public in siting 
decision-making. Sweden seems to be the country most successful at finding a solution 
for a final storage of nuclear waste, because it focused on social not technical factors. 
Most countries started the siting process by looking for the most suitable area for host 
nuclear waste solely by geological criteria. Instead, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste 
Management Company (SKB) who is responsible for the site selection believes that 
because safety engineer barriers can prevent the leaking of nuclear waste, virtually 
every area in Sweden could host nuclear waste, so the crucial factor is public acceptance. 
Accordingly, SKB sought a voluntary scheme whereby it came face to face with local 
communities in framing the issues relevant to nuclear waste repository by extensive 
 260 
public consultation. SKB holds the position that they are partners with local 
communities, sharing the same common goal. This is lesson that the Taiwan 
government and Taipower must learn - that public acceptance is the key issue of siting 
nuclear waste repository, and that transparency and public consultation are vital factors 
for success. 
 
From the USA and Canada, Taiwan can learn how to avoid cultural injustice – i.e. 
injustice to minority groups. Before the 1980s, in the U.SA. and Canada, many nuclear 
waste dump sited were located in Native lands, but after the 1980s, together with the 
civil right movement, Native Americans started to campaign for moving nuclear waste 
from their lands and claimed for compensation. Although, because nuclear waste is a 
very sensitive issue and finding new repositories is far from easy, much of the nuclear 
waste stayed on native land, since the 1990s, the U.S government and Canadian 
government have been very concerned about the issue of native land, recognising how 
important that land is to native cultures, and they are very careful to consult with local 
communities’ especially local indigenous people. This is a lesson which the Taiwan 
government and Taipower are only slowly beginning to learn.   
 
Each chapter has played a role in contributing to these findings. Chapter One shows 
how controversial the issue of nuclear waste storage siting is, and how other countries 
have struggled to find ways of dealing with it, experiencing varying degrees of success. 
A brief literature review chronicled studies which have investigated opposition 
campaigns against siting decisions, drawing on the theoretical framework of 
environmental justice. Chapter Two explains the technical characteristics of nuclear 
waste disposal, and describes the measures taken by six leading nuclear energy 
countries to manage the risks. Chapter Three presents the theory of environmental 
justice in detail, as the fundamental perspective running through the thesis. The origin 
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and evolution of the concept is explained, and its two main constituent components are 
analysed – distributive and procedural environmental justice – as well as the three 
conceptions of justice that lie behind it – economic, political, and cultural. Chapter Four 
describes the case study of Taiwan in detail, including its geography, demography, 
political history, political economy, foreign policy, and civil society. Chapter Five traces 
at length the history of the problem of nuclear waste disposal in Taiwan, showing the 
regulatory structure established for managing it and the complex (and usually abortive) 
attempts to find a permanent repository site. Most of the focus is on five domestic 
sites – Orchid Island (Lan Yu) (where a temporary site is still in use 29 years after its 
inception), Wuciou, Da-Wu, Da-Ren, and Wang-An – and four foreign locations – 
China, North Korea, Marshall Islands, and Russia. Chapter Six presents a detailed 
analysis of the empirical data from the fieldwork conducted in 2009 on the opposition to 
nuclear waste storage siting in the two most recently proposed areas – Da-Ren and 
Wang-An – comparing the geographical, demographic, economic, cultural, and political 
characteristics of the two communities. Finally, Chapter Seven provides a thematic 
analysis of these data, using the theoretical framework of environmental justice. The 
chapter is divided into five sections – distributive environmental justice; procedural 
environmental justice; and the three deeper forms of justice which lie behind them – 
economic justice; political justice; and cultural justice.    
 
8.3. Future research directions  
 
Three future directions for research in this area suggest themselves. First, an 
investigation could be undertaken into the deeper levels of economic, political, and 
cultural injustice that lie behind the environmental injustices demonstrated here in 
Taiwan’s nuclear waste siting policy. Second, future research could conduct a more 
comprehensive analysis of other countries’ experiences in nuclear waste siting policy in 
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order to produce a checklist of best practice guidelines. Third, to obtain a better balance 
of perspectives, interviews could be carried out with those people who were in favour of 
nuclear waste siting in their areas. 
 
8.4. Recommendations for policymakers 
 
Eight recommendations for policy-makers in Taiwan arise from these findings, the first 
three relating to distributive justice (and economic justice); the next four relating to 
procedural justice (and political justice); and the last relating to cultural justice. First, 
given the extreme difficulty experienced by the Taiwan government (and other 
governments) to find areas where residents are willing to host permanent storage 
facilities for radioactive waste, policy-makers are advised to reconsider the future of 
nuclear energy in Taiwan and seek for other alternatives such as renewable energy. This 
would not only decrease the scale of the problem of nuclear waste (by reducing the 
amount of new nuclear waste), but also defuse the tension between opponents and 
proponents of nuclear energy in Taiwan. In the 2012 presidential election electoral 
debates, the candidate from DPP argued for the end of nuclear energy by 2025 and the 
KMT candidate stated that he would reconsider the use of nuclear energy However, 
since the KMT candidate was re-elected, the issue of nuclear energy seems not an 
immediate priority. Second, policy makers in Taiwan must minimise the unfairness of 
the impact of existing nuclear waste on the host communities. Although it is impossible 
to distribute nuclear waste equally, it is possible to reduce its risk of leakage by 
tightening up safety standards. Also, it is possible to devise a means of compensation 
that is not manipulative or demeaning but meets standard criteria of equity. Third, 
policy makers in Taiwan must deal with the inter-generational implications of the 
nuclear waste storage issue. They must understand that nuclear waste facilities are 
irreversible, and that once the nuclear waste repository begins operation, the risk of 
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impact will last hundreds and thousands of years, affecting not only the present 
generation but countless future generations. This means that policy makers must ensure 
not only that safety standards are robust enough to protect residents for the indefinite 
future, but that compensation should be set aside in a special fund to provide for an 
endless number of future generations.  
 
Fourth, as opponents of nuclear waste claimed that there was no genuine public 
participation in the siting process, policy makers of nuclear waste in Taiwan must 
recognise that public participation is a key element for successfully siting nuclear waste 
facilities. Public participation can be in various forms such as consultation exercises, 
public hearings, and stakeholder meetings. In the siting process, local people from the 
potentially affected areas must be consulted at every stage of the decision-making 
process, and they should have the right to express their feeling towards nuclear waste 
facilities. Moreover, policy makers should not only listen to the voices of local 
communities towards nuclear waste facilities but also take their opinions into 
consideration in the decision-making process. Also, the government should help 
members of local communities to take up the opportunity of participation in the 
decision-making process.  
 
Fifth, the decision makers must provide clear and sufficient information about nuclear 
waste to people who are concerned about nuclear waste, especially people in 
communities hosting nuclear waste or potentially hosting nuclear waste in the future. 
Information provided to people about nuclear waste should not be opaque propaganda 
to promote the hosting of nuclear waste, but accurate, up-to-date, intelligible, 
comprehensive, and freely available factual information on the health risks of nuclear 
waste and other issues concerned with nuclear waste facilities. Sixth, policy makers 
must explain clearly and sincerely to local communities considering hosting nuclear 
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waste precisely how the compensation will be distributed to them, and what other 
benefits they will receive from hosting nuclear waste. This is essential to enable local 
people to make the right decision for themselves. 
 
Seventh, the decision makers in Taiwan must not bribe local opinion leaders to get them 
to persuade other local people to accept nuclear waste. Decision about nuclear waste 
should be transparent and open, and any secrecy or bribing should be made illegal in the 
decision-making process of nuclear waste facilities. Finally, decision makers should be 
aware of the cultural distinctiveness of ethnic minorities, and all decisions regarding 
nuclear waste should respect local cultures. This is especially important in the case of 
siting nuclear waste facilities in the communities of ethnic minorities, because 
opponents of nuclear waste in such communities often linked the issue of accepting 
nuclear waste with the survival of their own culture and ethnic identity.  
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Appendix I. Interviewee Lists  
 
 
A .Interviews List in 2003/2005 
 
Interviewee affiliations Interview 
Date 
Gender Age 
Group 
Ethnicity/ 
other remarks 
Mr. Chi TEPU 17 December 
2003  
Male  55-60  
Mr. Cheng TEPU 17 December 
2003 
Male 55-60  
Mr. Lin TEPU 19 December 
2003 
Male 65-70  
Mr. Yang 
 
Da-Wu 
Anti-Nuclear 
Waste Union 
23 December 
2003 
Male 35-40  
Mr. Sharman 
 
Lan Yu artist  23 December 
2003 
Male 45-50 Aboriginal 
Dr. Yang 
And Dr. Tang 
 
 
Director of 
FCMA; 
Deputy 
Director of 
FCMA 
30 December 
2003 
Male 
Male 
55-60; 
 
55-60 
Aboriginal 
Mr. Huang Lan Yu 
Anti-Nuclear 
Waste 
Campaigner 
3 January 
2004 
Male 
 
 
40-45 Aboriginal 
Mr. Kuo 
 
 
 
Lan Yu 
Anti-Nuclear 
Waste 
Campaigner 
 
3January 
2004 
Male 
 
40-45 Aboriginal 
Mr.Chang 
 
Lan Yu 
Anti-Nuclear 
Waste 
Campaigner 
 
4 January 
2004 
Male 
 
50-55 Aboriginal 
Ms. Lin Lan Yu 4 January  35-40 Aboriginal 
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 Anti-Nuclear 
Waste 
Campaigner 
2004 
L 146 
 
Lan Yu 
Anti-Nuclear 
Waste 
Campaigner 
5 January 
2004 
Male 
 
50-55 Aboriginal 
L2  
 
Lan Yu 
Anti-Nuclear 
Waste 
Campaigner 
5 January 
2004 
Male 
 
30-35 Aboriginal 
 
 
 
B. Interviewee List in 2009 
 
List of interviewees in Da-Ren and Taitung 
Interviewee Interview Date Gender Age 
Group 
Ethnicity/ other remarks 
D1 11 September 2009  Male 40-45  
D2 15 September 2009 Male 60-65  
D3 15 September 2009 Female 40-45  
D4 16 September 2009 Male 30-35  
D5 16 September 2009 Male 55-60 Aboriginal 
D6 17 September 2009 Male 60-65  
D7 18 September 2009 Male 55-60  
D8 22 September 2009 Female 35-40  
D9 22 September 2009 Male 60-65  
D10 23 September 2009  Male 40-45  
D11 24 September 2009 Male 55-60  
                                                 
46
 Interviewee L1 and L1 chose not to reveal their names. 
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D12 24 September 2009 Male 60-65 Aboriginal 
D13 25 September 2009 Female 35-40 Aboriginal 
D14 25 September 2009 Male 60-65 Aboriginal 
D15 29 September 2009 Male 40-45 Aboriginal 
D16 29 September 2009 Male 55-60 Aboriginal 
D17 30 September 2009 Male 30-35 Aboriginal 
D18 
 
1 October 2009  Female 45-50  
D19 
 
1 October 2009 Male 55-60 Aboriginals 
D20 
 
1 October 2009 Female 35-40 Aboriginals 
D21 
 
2 October 2009 Male 60-65 Aboriginals 
D22 
 
5 October 2009 Female 50-55 Aboriginals 
D23 
 
6 October 2009 Female 45-50  
D24 
 
6 October 2009 Male 45-50  
D25 
 
7 October 2009 Female 40-43 Aboriginal 
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List of interviewees in Wang-An, Penghu 
 
 Interview Date  Gender Age 
group 
Ethnicity/ 
other remarks 
W1 10 September 
2009 
Male 60-65  
W2 15 September 
2009 
Male 40-45  
W3 22 September 
2009 
Male 55-60  
W4 
 
1 October 2009 Male 40-45  
W5 8 October 2009 
 
Male 30-35  
 
Other interviewees  
 Date Gender  Age 
group 
Ethnicity/ 
other remarks 
N1 16 September 
2009 
Male 55-60  
N2 22 September 
2009 
Male 40-45  
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